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A bstract
Philosophical analyses of causation take many forms but one major difficulty they 
all aim to address is that of the spatiotemporal continuity between causes and their 
effects. Bertrand Russell in 1913 brought the problem to its most transparent form 
and made it a case against the notion of causation in physics. The issue highlighted 
in Russell’s argument is that of temporal contiguity between cause and effect. This 
tension arises from the imposition of a spectrum of discrete events occupying space­
time points upon a background of spacetime continuum. An immediate and natural 
solution is to superpose instead spatiotemporally continuous entities, or processes, on 
the spacetime continuum. This is indeed the process view of physical causation advo­
cated by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe. This view takes the continuous trajectories 
of physical objects (worldlines) as the causal connection whereby causal influences in 
the form of conserved quantities are transported amongst events. Because of their 
reliance on spatiotemporal continuity, these theories have difficulty when confronted 
with the discontinuous processes in the quantum domain.
This thesis is concerned with process theories. It has two parts. The first part 
introduces and criticizes these theories, which leads to my proposal of the History 
Conserved Quantity Theory with Transmission. The second part considers the exten­
sion of the idea of causal processes to quantum physics. I show how a probability 
distribution generated by the Schrodinger wavefunction can be regarded as a con­
served quantity that makes the spacetime evolution of the wavefunction a quantum 
causal process. However, there are conceptual problems in the interpretation of the 
wavefunction, chiefly to do, as I shall argue, with the difference in the behaviours 
of probabilistic potentials between quantum and classical physics. I propose in the 
final chapter, the Feynman Path Integral formulation of quantum mechanics (with 
the Feynman histories) as an alternative approach to incorporating the probabilistic 
potentials in quantum physics. This account of how to introduce causal processes in 
quantum mechanics fares better, I claim, than the previous one in dealing with the 
situational aspect of quantum phenomena that requires the consideration of events 
at more than one time.
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Chapter 1 
Prelude0
1.1 Introduction
Causation is an active area of philosophical research and it is one notion that is deeply 
entwined with the foundational aspects of both classical and quantum physics.
When asked, “What is Causation? What do we mean when we think that one 
object is the cause of another or one event causes another to happen?”, no doubt 
different connotations would immediately come to mind. And indeed we ought to ask 
“What are the connotations of causation?” These basic connotations, being largely 
empirical in character in the sense that they come from our experience and inter­
actions with the physical world, generally receive different treatments by physicists 
and philosophers. The distinction is a matter of the difference in practice. Physicists 
accept these basic intuitions as facts about causation and physical theories are con­
structed to conform to these “conditions of causality” , which are not to be violated. 
A good example would be that of the “past-future” directed Minkowski light-cone 
structure defined in terms of “cause-effect” relations1. Philosophers, on the other 
hand, approach the subject from a different angle; they conduct conceptual analyses 
of these causal connotations and see whether they do make good logical sense or are 
infected with grave inconsistencies. With the advent of relativity theories, physics 
has added important items to the stock of causal facts. Perhaps the most significant 
one is that special relativity places a limit on the velocity of propagation of causal
°Adopted with modifications and expansion from the paper by C.K.W. Ma (2000) p.631-641.
1See for example, Taylor and Wheeler (1966), p.39.
1
2influences. For the serious philosophical minds, these results cannot afford to go un­
noticed and it would indeed be of considerable interest to investigate the extent of 
the possible interplay between the findings from the respective disciplines.
With this motivation in mind, the plan of this chapter goes as follows. In Section 
1.2, I shall consider a number of basic causal connotations and the various aspects 
that may be deduced from these considerations. We are then in a position that leads 
naturally to the main ideas of David Hume’s theory of causation. Hume’s theory 
is the start of the empiricist philosophical analysis. The Humean account and its 
more modern variants collectively still represent the predominant philosophical view 
on causation among anglophone philosophers. However, in a clever paper in 1913, 
Bertrand Russell was able to show that the Humean view is not free from inconsis­
tencies given an important assumption on the nature of time. Russell’s argument will 
be examined in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 focuses on the issue of causal continuity and 
the recent physicalist approaches to causation that attempt to resolve some of the 
more pressing difficulties associated with this issue.
It is my modest aim to bring into focus, in the following pages, some major 
philosophical worries on the subject of causation, which may be fairly regarded as 
one of the underlying puzzles encountered in the foundations of both classical and 
quantum physics.
1.2 Causal Connotations and David H um e’s The­
ory of Causation
When one event (or something2) is regarded as the cause of another, we have “postu­
lated”3 the existence of a special relation or connection between the two events. How 
special is it? We may want to emphasize the importance of such a connection by the 
expression that the event we have chosen to call the cause and the one that is called
2What kind of entities does the causal relation relate is an important aspect of philosophical 
analyses of causation. Some argue that the “relata” should be events, while others insist that they 
may be facts, processes or states of affairs. However, as both Hume and Russell take events as the 
proper causal relata, we may therefore focus on events in the present work.
3Notice I have deliberately used the word “postulated? because it is only correct to remain philo­
sophically neutral and avoid making undue assumptions from the outset.
3the effect are necessarily connected to each other so that had the cause not happened, 
the effect would not have happened either. Put slightly differently, this counterfactual 
mode of representation of the special connection refers to an element of necessity in 
the sense that given the cause, the effect “must” follow and any other situations just 
simply cannot and would not happen.
How then are we to discover this necessary connection, whatever it may be? One 
useful place to look is to start from our observations of how causes and effects behave 
generally. An obvious observation is that 11 causes precede their effects”; namely, causes 
occur earlier in time than their effects. One realizes of course that not every pair of 
events happening at the same two respective instants of time are to be thought of 
as causes and effects. A concrete everyday example illustrates (Figure 1-1). Suppose 
we have two individuals, Angelo and Bianca, standing side-by-side in a room and 
Angelo, who is nearer to the light switch, turns it on and at the same moment in 
time, Bianca starts to sing. Even though Angelo’s action and Bianca’s singing are 
both events happening prior to the lamp being lit up, we would deem it appropriate to 
attribute the cause of the lamp lighting to the switching action provided by Angelo but 
not to Bianca’s singing. Why? It is in part because a continuous physical connection 
is envisaged between the light switch and the lamp and there is in general no obvious 
and direct correlation between the processes of singing and the lamp lighting.
So temporal succession between two events alone is not a sufficient condition 
for causation. To place the matter in a more scientific perspective, consider the 
Minkowski lightcone in Figure 1-2. Events Ej and Ek4 both lie in the future light- 
cone of the event Ei and hence are causally connectible to Ei since signals sent 
from Ei can reach either Ej or Ek. However, neither Ej nor Ek is necessarily con­
nected to Ei for there need not be an existing connection after all. Whether there 
is in fact an actual connection depends upon the existence of actual physical pro­
cesses linking Ei to Ej and/or Ek. Therefore, tem poral succession and  the
4These are treated as simultaneous events that lie on the same hyperplane, but the argument 
would remain valid even if they do not.
4spatio-tem poral continuity  between the cause and effect provided by phys­
ical processes together seem  necessary o f  causation.
Bianca
A / V
Angelo
Figure 1.1: Figure 1.2:
Granted the physical connection between the light switch and the lamp, is this 
connection really necessary, in the sense that contrary situations are precluded from 
occurring? Unfortunately, the answer is in the negative. Although it takes an awfully 
short time for the electrical signal to travel from the light switch to the lamp, it is, 
however, always conceivable that an accident like a power cut may occur within this 
short time interval, as a result of which the lamp would fail to light up. It is therefore 
not necessarily the case that whenever the switch is turned on, the lamp must light 
up; this is only true if no other factor interferes.
Let us now imagine instead the scenario where Bianca is the only person in the 
room and there is no light switch attached to the wall. We observe that when Bianca 
starts to sing the light comes on a split second later. On one mere instance of this 
observation, it would be reasonable to put it down as a case of sheer coincidence 
because we do not usually conceive of a possible (physical) connection between these 
two events. However, if such an observation is repeated many times and each and 
every time the same sequence obtains so that whenever Bianca starts to sing, the light 
comes on, then we would no doubt conclude that the occurrences of both events in 
close temporal succession are too regular to be discounted as pure chancy coincidences. 
And so from repeated observations of the regular succession of the two events, we find
5it proper and indeed justified to “infer” a special connection (Figure 1-3) between this 
pair of events and set out to search for the “hidden” mechanism that could have been 
responsible for giving rise to such a correlation.
The question remains: is such a connection we have so inferred upon repeated 
observations of regularities a necessary one? Although experience teaches us that fre­
quent correlations are usually prima facie good indicators of causation, it is however 
well-known that correlations do not have to imply causation. Logic does not prohibit 
the apparent correlations we see as arising from pure chance. One may well imagine 
the world to be a chancy enterprise in such a way that “it so happens” that whenever 
E\ occurs, E2 follows later. Still, one may argue that quite unbeknown to us, there 
could exist some kind of a voice-recognition device which provides the physical con­
nection between Bianca’s singing and the lighting up of the lamp. But what gives us 
the impression and prompts us to look for this “unknown device” in the first place? 
Nothing other than the constant conjunction of the two events of the singing and the 
lamp being lit - given the same cause, the same effect follows. Once again, such a 
physical connection is by no means necessary as for instance, a power cut may occur 
and tamper with the normal functioning of the device, thus rendering the succession 
of the two events unattainable.
E i  E2 Ei --------------►-------------- E2
Direct
E l --------------------------------------------E2 El Ei
E i --------------------------------------------E2 V
•  \ .  /
• /
• c*
E l  --------------------------------------------------E2 Indirect
Figure 1.3: Figure 1.4:
Temporal succession of two events is not sufficient for causation. A case of causa­
tion is deemed to obtain when temporal succession is supplemented by the presence 
of a spatially and temporally continuous physical connection which provides the link 
between the two events in question. Similarly, the situation where the same cause
6has found to be followed by the same effect on a great number of occasions also gives 
us the feel of a causal correlation and induces us to look for an underlying connec­
tion. It is in this way that it is often thought that spatio-temporal continuous physical 
processes are essential for making sure that “the same cause is to be followed by the 
same effect”. Unforeseen circumstances may happen during the spatial and temporal 
course of this continuous physical process and frustrate the connection between the 
two events. Due to the absence of necessity, in the sense that unforeseen circum­
stances can always occur, it follows that there can never be any guarantee without 
fail that the same cause is to be followed by the same effect. This clearly indicates an 
incompatibility between these two causal connotations and that in reality, “the same 
cause is always followed by the same effecf is not warranted by “spatio-temporal 
continuity . This is quite contrary to our ordinary way of thinking.
Spatially and temporally continuous physical processes, though they are by no 
means necessary connections, do nevertheless impress upon us the idea of the existence 
of causal relations by way of the physical connections. Such physical connections 
between two events may, however, either be (i) direct or, (ii) indirect. In the latter 
case, we seek a third event C* that existed in the overlap region of the respective 
past lightcones of the two events so that both events are direct consequences of 
C*. In this model, both of the events are effects of the common cause C* (Figure 
1-4). This illustrates nicely the appeal of hidden variable programs in the efforts 
to provide an explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox. Special 
relativity rules out a direct physical connection between the two space-like separated 
measurement events. However, the existence of the remarkable correlations of the 
results of measurements calls urgently for an explanation. It is thus natural to look 
for possible common causes (hidden variables) in the past that could have given rise 
to these correlations. But, while such a procedure may satisfy one’s intellectual urge, 
logic permits a world in which these correlations are all there are; the empire of 
chance rules in such a manner that the correlations always obtain even without any 
underlying spatio-temporal continuous connection, be it direct or indirect. In fact, the
7significant achievement of Bell’s 1964 inequalities5 rests on their success in dispelling 
local hidden variable models in favour of quantum mechanics, as has since then been 
so forcibly confirmed by many sophisticated experiments6.
In relation to the spatio-temporal continuity between causes and effects, another 
common connotation we have for causation is to suppose that a certain cause event 
has occurred but nevertheless the expected effect has somehow failed to materialize. 
The situation is usually explained by the presence of other events that must have 
got in-between them and inhibited the occurrence of the effect. In other words, the 
spatio-temporal continuity between the supposed cause and the supposed effect is 
disturbed. In order to diminish the opportunity for other events to go “in-between” 
and behave mischievously, it is desirable to make both the spatial and temporal inter­
vals between the cause and the effect as short as possible. The shorter these intervals 
are, the smaller the probability generally for other factors to interfere. Causes and 
effects are expected to be spatially and temporally close to each other, so that they 
should exhibit a degree of spatio-temporal “nearness”. For events happening at vastly 
separated spacetime locations to be causally connected, we look for events to provide 
the intermediate links between these two spacetime locales, and hence, we arrive at 
the idea of a “causal chain” to ensure causal continuity across spacetime regions.
The foregoing discussions now lead appropriately to the introduction of the major 
ideas of David Hume’s theory of causation, which exerted tremendous influence over 
the logical positivists and their contemporaries such as Bertrand Russell.
Hume maintains that there are two basic elements to human understanding that 
form the pillars to his philosophical system: impressions and ideas. Impressions 
correspond to all “lively signals” we receive from the physical world through our 
senses, like perceptions, sensations, feelings etc. Ideas, on the other hand, consist in 
the formation of a conception of the impressions. The general principle he adopts 
for his philosophical analyses is that: uall ideas originate from the association and 
combination of the different impressions”. So any idea we may possess for some entity
5Bell, J.S. (1964).
6See for example, Aspect et al. (1976) and Shih and Alley (1986).
8has to come from our perceptual experience with it through our senses.
Armed with this principle, he then asks, from which impressions do we form 
the idea of cause-and-effect as some sort of a necessary connection1 He is able to 
identify three such impressions from our empirical experience of two events behaving 
like causes and effects. These are: “ p rio rity  in  tim e ” of the cause , “constant 
con junction” between the cause and the effect and “ con tigu ity” in space and time 
between causes and effects. And these should be of some familiarity to the reader 
since they refer to none other than the three causal connotations we have considered 
in the above: “causes precede their effects”, “given the same cause, the same effect 
follows” and “continuity' respectively. But as we have already discussed, from these 
three properties and these three alone, one can never deduce the element of necessity. 
Hume argues that even though there may actually exist connections in the world 
which are necessary in the above sense, beyond this, the only real idea we can have 
of this connection is of the three properties above. Since these properties are not 
sufficient to entail necessity, philosophical prudence must now compel us to take a 
skeptical view of the idea of necessary connection between causes and effects.
Granted that our experience is incapable of furnishing us with the idea of a neces­
sary causal connection, how are we able to associate the three impressions of causes 
and effects to arrive at the idea of a necessary connection between two events? Hume 
answers that after many instances of observing the behaviours of constant conjunc­
tion, priority in time and contiguity in time and space between the two events without 
exception, the mind has in the course grown accustomed to expect that the second 
to follow the first on any new occasion. This feeling of expectation thus leads to 
the impression from which our idea of connection is copied. Therefore, the idea of a 
necessary connection comes not from our experiences of the external world but rather 
orignates from our own response to it. In other words, the causal relation as a nec­
essary connection is an idea “imposed” by the mind upon the unfailing, successive 
observations of these regular behaviours of causes and effects. The three impressions 
of priority in time, constant conjunction and contiguity in time and space can never 
provide us with the idea of a necessary connection.
9It must again be emphasized that it is never Hume’s intention to deny the existence 
of necessary connections in Nature. Rather, the three impressions are all we possess 
by way of a source for the idea of causal necessity. Since this evidence alone is not 
adequate to reveal to us such an element of necessity, it would be more reasonable 
not to impose its existence on Nature, leaving this instead as an open question. And 
Hume concludes7,
A s to what m ay be said , that the operations o f  nature are in­
dependent o f our thought and reasoning, I  allow it; and ac­
cordingly have observed, that objects bear to each other the 
relations o f contiguity and succession; that like objects m ay be 
observed in several instances to have like relations; and that 
all this is independent of, and antecedent to the operations o f  
the understanding. B ut i f  we go any fa rth er, and ascribe a 
pow er or necessary connection to these objects; this is what we 
can never observe in them , but m ust draw the idea from  what 
we feel in ternally  in  contem plating them.
7Hume D. (1888), p. 168-9.
10
1.3 R ussell’s Objection to Hum e’s Temporal Con­
tiguity Thesis
In 1912, Bertrand Russell made his presidential address8 to the Aristotelian Society 
the occasion to cast doubt on the tenability of the Humean account of causation and 
to argue against the notion of cause in physics.
We have already taken pains to stress the inherent incompatibilities among the 
three causal impressions of priority in time, contiguity in space and time and constant 
conjunction. In particular, it has been indicated that in the absence of the ingredient 
of necessity, spatio-temporal continuity is not really capable of ensuring the constant 
conjunction of the causes and effects. The main reason for this is that even if there 
is a continuous spatio-temporal physical process connecting the cause and the effect, 
anything can still happen during the time interval while the causal influence is trans­
mitted down the connection and this results in an uncertainty in the production of the 
effect. The light switch and the lamp in the last section form a good example. This 
is why events which are too removed from each other in both spatial and temporal 
dimensions are not considered as reliable causes and effects.
An immediate solution would be to require that both the spatial and temporal 
distances between the two events be decreased to such an extent for them to stand 
11 adjacent' (or contiguous) to each other, so that other factors cannot impose them­
selves and thwart the occurrence of the effect. But what exactly does one mean by 
two events being “ adjacent' to each other when they are embedded in a background 
of spacetime continuum? The criterion of spatial contiguity between two events is 
easily satisfied and in the limit it is met by the case where two events, happening 
at different times, may indeed occupy the same location in space. The notion of 
temporal contiguity is, however, more problematic since given that two events occur 
at the same spatial location with one after another, how are we to ensure that they 
are temporally contiguous to each other? This problem reduces to one that concerns 
temporal contiguity and this is indeed the important issue addressed by Russell in
8Delivered on 4 November 1912. The ensuing essay was published in the Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 13 (1912-13) and reprinted in Russell, B. (1917), p.180-208.
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his paper.
Russell’s argument begins with a statement of the temporal contiguity thesis 
{TC).  The properties of priority in time and temporal contiguity between cause and 
effect can be summarised as follows:
TC: W henever the firs t event (cause) ceases to ex ist, the 
second comes into existence im m ediately after.
To place T C  in the correct perspective, Russell makes the major assumption that 
time is to be modeled as a mathematical continuum and is therefore considered as 
a dense series. A dense series has the distinctive feature that the notion of a “next 
point” does not make sense because between any two points there always exist others, 
no matter how close these two points are to each other. It is instructive to contrast the 
idea of a dense series such as the real number line with the discrete series of positive 
integers where the notion of consecutive (or “next”) members does take on a well- 
posed meaning. Having specified how the temporal continuum is to be represented, 
we now consider two point events c and e occurring at two respective instants of time 
ti and t2 (ti < £2)* Because time is a dense series, it follows that between any two 
instants (points) of time, there are always other instants (points) no matter how short 
we make the interval t2 ~ t\.  That is, there exists always a temporal gap between c and 
e and so c cannot be regarded as contiguous in time to e. Furthermore, this temporal 
gap provides ample opportunities for other events to creep in between c and e and to 
interfere. Whilst these other factors may not prove harmful to the production of e at 
t2, they may, however, also behave otherwise and hinder the occurrence of e (Figure 
1-5). Under these circumstances, one cannot be certain that the same cause is always 
followed by the same effect since there can always be the chance of e not occurring 
whenever there is to be this temporal gap between the two events.
In order to be rid of unsolicited factors, one must devise a means to ensure that the 
temporal gap is filled. An obvious way to accomplish this is to suppose the cause event 
as having a temporal dimension (Figure 1-6). Russell argued that in this case the
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cause would have to be a static, unchanging event9, occupying the half-open interval 
just previous to the effect. For imagine the cause changed. Then we would need to 
postulate a cause-effect relation between the part of the cause before the change and 
the part after, and we would be no further ahead. Thus the cause must be supposed 
to sit there from time ti to t2, filling the temporal gap and all of a sudden, turns into 
e at t2- However, Russell objects: he argues that it is not at all logical why, being 
unchanging and sitting there complacently, c has to turn into e at t2 but not at any 
other moment, say the earlier to or the later t3?
Figure 1.5: Figure 1.6:
And so static, unchanging events are dismissed outright by Russell as an impos­
sibility. But these static, unchanging events seem to be the only means by which 
the temporal gap can be occupied. Since these are not plausible, one must draw 
the conclusion that there always exists a temporal gap between c and e as a result 
of which c cannot be contiguous to e. Our intuition about the temporal continuity 
of causes and effects comes under threat given the assumption of physical time as 
a mathematical continuum and as a consequence, constant conjunction cannot be 
guaranteed. Russell has succeeded in showing that there exist tremendous tensions 
between our usual connotations of the causal relation.
9For a non-static, changing event such as one composed of a causal chain of discrete events as in 
Figure 1-5, the problem of temporal gaps existing in-between these events within the causal chain 
remains.
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1.4 Causal Continuity and Recent Physicalist Ac­
counts of Causation
Despite the difficulty brought to light by Russell’s critique of the Humean temporal 
contiguity thesis, one is, of course, entitled to argue that the major issue is really 
the feasibility of the definition of events as points occurring at discrete temporal 
instants within the temporal continuum. There is simply no place for the notion of 
discreteness within a temporal continuum. A more congenial approach would then 
be to “superpose” a continuum of events - a continuous rope of events - upon this 
temporal continuum, in the sense that we consider all the events that happen locally 
within this time interval. One finds a convincing example on causal continuity from 
Elizabeth Anscombe10: “Find an object here and ask how it comes to be there?” 
(Figure 1-7),
A B
» ------------------------------------------------------- #
Before After
Figure 1.7:
A causal explanation, says Anscombe, would be “it went along some path from 
A to B ”. The locution “along some path” in fact entails more than the case where 
the object just turns up at location B  after having been at A  previously. It requires 
the object to occupy also all the intermediate positions between A  and B. To satisfy 
constant conjunction, it is sufficient for the object to turn up at location B  after hav­
ing been at A  some moments earlier and without having to assume the intermediate 
positions between the two locations. But this would not be deemed to be an adequate 
causal explanation11. And so to “explain causally” , a path has to be imposed to pro­
vide the connection between the two events of the object being at the two respective
10Anscombe, E (1974), p.150.
11 One reason is that the two locations A and B  may be situated very far apart. Given that reliable 
causes-and-effects are thought to be events that occur locally to each other in space and time, so 
although it may be the case that there is constant conjunction between the two events of the object 
occupying the respective “far-away” locations; they would certainly not be deemed to be genuine 
cause-and-effect in accordance with what is generally perceived as a causal situation.
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spacetime locations. For the purpose of explanation, it is therefore proper to consider 
spatio-temporal continuous connections when thinking about causation.
Consider the simple case of one mass in motion colliding with another that is at 
rest (with both masses being apart initially), and subsequently setting the second 
into motion (Figure 1-8),
this circumstance. One would say that the collision event between the masses M  and 
m  is responsible for bringing about the dynamical changes in both masses. However, 
one may also extrapolate further and assert that it is the motion of M  which causes 
the collision in the first place. It would therefore seem that “the motion of M ” is 
the “cause” of the collision. It is the motion of M  through spacetime that brings its 
closer to and triggers the collision with mass m  that is at rest. It is the motion of 
M  that provides sufficient momentum and energy required for the collision to occur 
(two masses at rest in contact would not give rise to a collision, even though they 
are in close encounter in a localized region of spacetime). But may we speak of the 
motion of M  as an event?
An event is often thought to occupy a localized position in spacetime. That is, 
events are thought of as occurrences at spacetime points. Here, however, the motion 
of M  is an entity that spans both a spatial and a temporal extent, one which is 
composed of all the point-events that correspond to the different positions taken up 
by M  at different times during its motion. Any one point-event on its own is unable to 
achieve the effect - the event of collision. But each and every one of them contributes 
to the production of the effect; each subsequent event brings M  closer to m. It would 
therefore not be sound reasoning to single out any one such point-event, any one
Initially at rest
Figure 1.8:
Taking causes and effects as events, one may speak about two kinds of “events” in
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specific position of M  at a certain instant of time and ask how it might relate to the 
collision.
The point is that each of these point-events derives its significance from the con­
tribution12 it makes to the overall motion of M. Each of these events are prior in 
time to the final event of collision but would only be deemed meaningful as a part of 
the cause (Figure 1-9),
Direction of motion of M
m
(X C ytc)
Figure 1.9:
To emphasize the fact that it is indeed the entire collection of these point-events 
that is to be considered as the cause and that such a cause is an extended entity in 
both the spatial and temporal sense, we introduce the term “process” to signify this 
series of point-events.
Now suppose that an impulse is applied to M  at position xq at time to and set 
it into motion. The motion carries M  through all the intermediate spacetime points 
and arrives at xc at time tc when it collides with m, which is at rest. In the spirit of 
Russell’s temporal gap, one may now ask: given the earlier event Eo that corresponds 
to the application of the impulse at (xo,to), how is this one event to bring about the 
later Ec that corresponds to the collision between the masses M  and m l  Our reply 
would be: the two events of Eo and Ec are connected by the continuous spatiotemporal 
motion of M  - a “continuous rope of point-events” . It is by virtue of this motion that 
energy and momentum supplied by the impulse in the first place get transported from 
the point of application to the location of collision. The motion of M  - the causal
12These may be regarded as equal contributions.
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process - provides the missing link to restore spatiotemporal continuity
In physics, the motion of a system is usually represented either by spatially and 
temporally continuous paths or by trajectories in phase space. These spacetime paths 
and phase space trajectories are the solutions of differential and integral equations 
- the expressions of spatiotemporal continuity. Whilst these differential and integral 
equations guarantee continuity, it is, however, a fact that they lack the crucial causal 
aspect of an explicit temporal order for cause and effect.
Consider once more the example of mass M  colliding with mass m  and setting 
the latter into motion from an initial state of rest. The same state of affairs can be 
described by two different causal stories. In the rest frame of m  the moving mass 
M  travelling with velocity v appears to be the earlier event - the cause which is 
responsible for the change of states of both masses. On the other hand, in the rest 
frame of M, the earlier event of m  moving with velocity -v is now regarded as the 
cause giving rise to the subsequent change of motion of both masses. Hence, we find 
ourselves confronted by two different causal stories with accuracies depending on the 
frame of reference in which the same state of affairs is viewed (Figure 1-10),
The objective matter-of-fact is, however, that for all inertial frames of reference, 
the “collision” between M  and m  produces the subsequent “changes” in the motion 
of each of the masses. The collision does indeed occur in all frames of reference, 
after which is followed by changes in motions of these masses. It is indeed potentially 
with respect to this event that a temporal ordering may be established. Because
Rest fram e 
o f
Initially at rest
Rest f r  
of
Initially at rest
Figure 1.10:
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of this “causal interaction” between the masses M  and ra, their respective energies 
and momenta are modified accordingly. This interaction may be thought of as an 
encounter between the two masses as their respective path crosses. Both masses, 
having interacted, will carry the causally modified dynamical properties via their 
continuous spatio-temporal trajectories and may participate in further interactions.
The idea of a continuous spatiotemporal path hence forms the backbone of the 
physicalist theories of causation. Although there are variations amongst these the­
ories of physical causation that have been put forward, they nevertheless share one 
basic underlying idea: causal continuity is guaranteed by the transmission of causal 
influences (objective physical quantities) along continuous space-time paths governed 
by physical laws. The “objective physical quantities” being transferred refer usually 
to either momentum or energy in the group of approaches subsumed under the title 
of “transference theories of causation”13. A more sophisticated version is the class of 
the so-called “process-theories” of causation as pioneered by Wesley Salmon in the 
early 1980’s, which has subsequently undergone substantial further developments by 
both Salmon himself and Phil Dowe during the 1990’s14.
“ Casual processes” and “causal interactions” thus form two fundamental causal 
notions of process theories. These approaches take processes , entities construed as 
spatio-temporally continuous paths of physical objects, as the basic unit of causal 
analysis. Events - the interactions - are fixed by the crossings of processes on these 
accounts. When two processes meet so that changes are brought to at least one of 
them as a result, then it is said that the processes llin teracf. Interactions are thus 
of prime importance for they are responsible for the production and modifications of 
the participating processes by introducing changes in their dynamical properties and 
structures. The two notions of process and interaction lie at the very heart of process 
theories of causation.
13Dieks, D. (1981), Ehring, D. (1986), Fair, D. (1979).
14The original idea of process causation was advanced by Wesley Salmon in a series of papers 
during the 1970s (see Salmon, W.C. (1977) and (1980a)), which later received a more complete 
and systematic treatment in his book, Salmon, W.C. (1984). More recent modifications and im­
provements of Salmon’s 1984 account are: Dowe, P. (1992a) and (1992b), Salmon, W.C. (1994) and 
(1997).
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Processes are the vehicles by which causal influences, such as physical informa­
tion and signals, are propagated. Any changes in the make-up of a process are due 
to its interactions with other processes. Perhaps the analogy with the special rela- 
tivistic representation of events may be too plain a correspondence to deserve any 
attention. On Minkowski spacetime diagrams, all the encounters experienced by a 
physical object, that is, a history of events which involves the object, are connected 
by a spatio-temporally path, the worldline of the object. When the object interacts 
with another object, the interaction is an event common to the histories of both ob­
jects and is hence represented as the intersection of both worldlines. So if we take 
the analogy at face value, the processes may then be identified with the worldlines 
of objects and the interactions given by the crossings of these worldlines. This is the 
current view held by both Salmon and Dowe.
One of the most significant impacts of the theory of special relativity on our 
worldview of nature is the existence of an upper limit on the velocity of propagation 
of information and signals. This serves as a limit to facilitate the decision as to 
which events can be physically connected and which cannot, on the understanding 
that a light signal may be sent from one event and received by another after a lapse 
of time. However, there are also events which are so vastly separated in space that 
both happen within an extremely short time-interval; too short for a physical signal 
to travel over from one event to the other and to have influenced it. In such cases, 
successful information or signal transfer would require a speed of propagation to 
exceed c, the speed of light, which is blatantly prohibited by special relativity. So if 
in the first instance, to be “physically connected” is a prerequisite condition of being 
“causally connected” for two events, then the process that provides this connection 
have to carry the physical information or signal at a speed less than or equal to c. 
Indeed, this is one important reason why Salmon subdivides the set of processes in 
the world into causal and non-causal ones with respect to the propagation of physical 
influences. This is, however, not all there is to the story, for there exists yet another 
strong reason to segregate the two kinds of processes. This is to do with two events 
being “ causally connected’ and their being “causally connectible”. We refer the reader
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to the discussion in Section 1.2 and Figure 1-2.
To cast the discussion in a more concrete context, imagine the case of a large 
circular building with a spotlight mounted on a rotating platform at its center, which 
Salmon used in first introducing his account of causal processes. Once the spotlight 
is switched on and set into rotation a spot of light will sweep across the wall of 
the building in circular motion. Although the moving spot of light appears to be 
spatio-temporally continuous and travelling at a speed that is below c, it nevertheless 
cannot provide any sort of connection between two events due to its inability to 
transfer information and signals. If the spot of light is intercepted by a red lens at 
one single spot on its path, it would become red at that very point but then such 
a change (the change from being a white light spot to one being red) would not be 
transmitted beyond this point: the information that it has interacted with the red 
lens is not permanently registered. The travelling spot of light “reverts” back to its 
original state of being a white spot once it has moved beyond the lens.
Why is this process not capable of carrying or transmitting this information? Con­
trast this spot of light with the light ray that travels from the spotlight at the center 
and impinges on the wall. The ray of light, being spatially and temporally continuous, 
is also a good paradigm of a process. Suppose a red lens is placed somewhere along 
its path, the light ray will be coloured red at this point and would remain red from 
then on. In this case, the information that it has been intersected and interacted with 
a red lens is registered and propagated down the process itself.
Looking carefully at each of the two situations, one notices that the moving spot 
of light does not have an independent existence of its own; it owes its existence to the 
impingement of the light rays radiating from the center spotlight on the wall. In other 
words, one point within the moving light spot is not the source of the next and hence 
any intervention with this “process” only affects the very point where the intervention 
is introduced but not others. So the basic intuition is that though the moving light 
spot does appear to be a uniformly continuous process in space and time, it is in 
reality constituted of a series of unlinked interactions between the light rays and the 
wall of circular building; this is quite unlike a self-sustaining process such as a light
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ray, with its every stage being physically connected to the previous (and also to the 
next) via the transfer of energy (and hence information) between the various stages 
of the process. It is by virtue of transmission of causal influence that the successive 
stages of a proper causal process are linked. It is thus of paramount importance that 
only processes that are endowed with the ability to transmit the results of changes 
introduced by their interacting with other processes are regarded as causal ones. In 
short, the capability of some processes to transmit causal influences like energy and 
information is the criterion for being causal processes.
Both the theories of Salmon and of Dowe strive to capture how causal influences 
are carried across spacetime regions in genuine causal processes by imposing their 
respective criterion for when a transference has occurred. Dowe maintains that the 
“possession of a conserved quantity by an object along its worldline is a sufficient 
condition to ensure the transference of causal influences. Salmon, however, argues 
that Dowe’s condition of 11 mere possession” does not capture the fact the the pos­
session of a conserved quantity at each of the spacetime points must not arise from 
interactions.
The foregoing serves only as a concise outline of the contents of Chapters 3 to 4 
of this thesis, where we shall follow the development of the process causal theories 
closely. Salmon’s 1984 theory of process causation will be introduced in Chapter 
3 and the key problematic issue of counterfactuals that plagues Salmon’s program 
will be discussed in detail. The subsequent developments form the main subject of 
Chapter 4, which leads to my proposal of the “history vievd' that takes the place of 
the worldline view of process causation in order to pave the way for the consideration 
of discrete processes in the quantum domain.
But first, in Chapter 2, we shall present Russell’s argument against the temporal 
contiguity between cause and effect, to which the process theories have provided a 
solution.
Chapter 2 
Russell on the N otion of Cause
“Then I  must discover the truth about Causality - in 
the paper I  read the other day, I  only showed that all 
current views are wrong, and I  am at a loss as to what 
is right.”
(Bertrand Russell - from a letter to Lady Ottoline 
Morrell, 23 February 1913)
2.1 R ussell’s 1913 Paper
In the essay “On the Notion of Cause”, his presidential address to the Aristotelian 
Society in 19121, Bertrand Russell attempts to show how the philosophical and the 
scientific concepts of causality differ from each other. Today, there are two important 
inter-related reasons for one who desires to investigate the concept of causality in 
physics to begin with Russell’s 1913 paper. First, in this paper Russell masterfully 
cast the Humean viewpoint in a precise form that makes it possible for him to analyse 
more fully, and to subsequently raise the important issue of the temporal contiguity 
between cause and effect with this standard philosophical picture of causation. Second, 
troubled by this worry with the standard picture, Russell provided an argument 
against the notion of cause in physics. He concludes that the strict, certain and 
universal doctrine of causation - the same cause always produces the same effect -
1Delivered on 4 November 1912. The ensuing essay was published in the Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 13 (1912-13) and reprinted in Russell, B. (1917), p .180-208.
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“which philosophers advocate is an ideal, possibly true, but not known to be true in 
virtue of any available evidence. What is actually known , as a matter of empirical 
science, is that certain constant relations are observed to hold between the members 
of a group of events at certain times"2.
The difficulty with the temporal contiguity between cause and effect arises mainly 
because of the fact that events defined in physics are conceived of as occurrences at 
spacetime points - spatial points at specific instants. Two events being temporally 
contiguous means that one event must happen immediately after the other. But since 
instants of time are described by the mathematical continuum in which all the points 
are subjected to a dense ordering; it follows therefore that between any two events 
happened at two respective instants, there always exist other instants in-between, 
which could have accommodated the occurrences of other events. And the existence 
of these other events implies that, after all, the two events in question cannot be 
occurring immediately one after another. The spatiotemporal continuity between 
two events cannot be attained. Here lies Russell’s challenge: given that there is a 
temporal gap between the cause and effect, how are we to fix it?
In fact, we note that there always exists a continuum of these other events in- 
between any two specified events because there is a continuum of instants between 
any two specified instants. Any one of these events can be considered as contributing 
to the production of the effect, and is thus deemed a cause of the effect; although not 
the sole cause. An appropriate view is to take all these “causes” into account and not 
isolating any one of them. This then forms the key to a solution of Russell’s temporal 
gap problem.
We need to take a spatiotemporally continuous sequence of events as the “cause” 
that is to be met immediately by the effect. In physics, these continuous sequences are 
provided by the continuous trajectories of physical objects in spacetime. Indeed, in 
the simple case of two balls colliding, we speak about the motion of one ball bringing it 
close to and eventually into contact with another. These spatiotemporally continuous 
trajectories of physical objects take care of Russell’s temporal gap by encompassing
2 A quote from Russell, B. (1914), and reprinted (1993), p.230.
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a continuous sequence of events and it is the way to causation in physics. Moreover, 
since the “causal connection” between one instance of cause and effect is now given 
by a physical connection linking the two, one finds a meaning for singular causation 
in physics. These continuous trajectories of physical objects form the basic units 
of analysis for the process view of causation advocated by Wesley Salmon and Phil 
Dowe, which are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 that follow. The process view of 
causation therefore provides a solution to the temporal gap problem.
In the present chapter, I first present a study of Russell’s argument against the 
problem of the temporal contiguity between cause and effect (Section 2.2) and then 
show how his analysis poses an seemingly insuperable challenge for the advocates of 
singularist theories of causation (Sections 2.3 and 2.4). I will also indicate the possible 
ways to resolve this difficulty (Sections 2.5-2.6).
2.2 A Definition of Causality
Russell begins his investigation in the 1913 paper by first establishing what was at 
his time of writing the philosophical “received notion” of causality. With this aim in 
mind, he turns to the definition of causality as given in James Baldwin’s 1902 edition 
of the Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology3. There, this definition of causality 
is given as: the necessary connection o f  events in  the tim e  series4. Being 
“necessary” implies that the “connection of events in the time series” must hold under 
all circumstances. First to notice is that the definition reveals no details about the 
nature of the “connection” except that those events which stand in such a connection 
must obey certain temporal relations, simply because events are taken as temporally 
ordered. This is consistent with our usual empirical observation of events that we 
see as causes and effects since they all bear a “before-after” relation to each other. 
That is to say, causes precede their effects5. Any two events standing in a cause-effect
3Baldwin, J.M. (ed.) (1902).
4As an interesting historical note, I should remark that this entry on causation is a contribution 
by G.E. Moore who provides what is essentially a Humean account on causation.
5Of course, the “before-after” relation is not the only temporal relation that can exist between 
two events. There is also the possibility of simultaneity - with two events happening at the same 
time. But as far as our causal intuition permits, an event we call the “cause” is one that happens
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C E
Yesterday  7.00am 10.00am
Today 5.00am 8.00am
Tom orrow  3.00pm 6.00pm
D ay a fte r  Tom orrow  9.00pm 12.00am
Table 2.1:
relation must satisfy this temporal ordering. This is so in both common sense and in 
physics. Put differently, whatever the nature of this “connection” of the events may 
be, the events so connected would have to be found to be organized into a temporal 
schema of “before-after” as an observational consequence.
Now we must probe deeper and ask in what sense is such a connection “necessary”? 
We have already remarked that for something6 to be necessary, it ought to hold under 
all circumstances. To be precise, some feature(s) of it has to hold in all cases. In 
respect to the relation of cause-and-effect, this would mean, at the minimum and 
without assuming any particulars about the nature of the “connection”, that the 
“before-after” temporal ordering between the cause and its effect must hold under 
all circumstances. In the first instance, a specific temporal ordering holds under all 
circumstances if these “circumstances” refer to all times.
A simple example illustrates. Let C and E  be two events that we refer to as the 
cause and effect respectively. On each of the four days in Table 2.1, C occurs earlier 
than E. This “earlier than” ordering is a prerequisite for C  and E  to qualify as cause 
and effect. In addition, the table brings to our attention another important point: not 
only does the temporal-order between C and E  remain invariant through a translation 
in time, so does the temporal-interval between the two; there is a three-hour delay 
of the occurrence of E  in relation to that of C. To help the reader to appreciate the 
point, the scenario depicted in Table 2.1 is compared with that in Table 2.2.
In the scenario given in Table 2.2, although the temporal ordering of “earlier
earlier than the one we call the “effect”.
6Strictly, this “something” ought to be a proposition for only propositions are capable of being 
true or false.
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Ei E2
Yesterday  6.00am 9.00am
Today 3.00pm 4.00pm
Tom orrow  7.00pm 11.00pm
D ay a fte r  Tom orrow  12.10pm 15.45pm
Table 2.2:
than” is also obeyed by the same two events E\ and E^ in each of the four instances, 
one would be reluctant to infer a cause-effect relation between them as the temporal 
intervals between the occurrences of Ei and £ 2  are not constant. Insofar as our causal 
intuition7 is concerned, they fail to become causes and effects.
So for a “connection” between two events to be necessary, two primary conditions 
must be satisfied,
(1) the temporal-ordering remains invariant under a translation in time and,
(2) the interval between the times of occurrences of both events stays constant 
under a temporal translation.
The definition of causality given as an entry in Baldwin’s Dictionary may now be 
stated with more accuracy as Russell suggests8,
G iven any even t e\, there is an event and a tim e-in te rva l t 
such tha t, w henever e\ occurs, e2 fo llow s a fte r  an  in terva l r.
To cast the definition into the vocabulary of cause-and-effect, the principle of 
causality amounts to the statement that given the same cause (ei), there is always 
the same effect (e2) but only after the lapse of an (constant) interval r.
7I should point out that this intuition holds provided all the conditions under which the events 
C  and E  occur remain the same. Take the simple example of an individual urinating after the 
consumption of some liquid. Of course, the time interval between the occurrences of the two events 
varies since in hot weather, perspiration would have helped to lengthen the interval. On the other 
hand, when perspiration is less likely in cold weather, the event of urination would be brought closer 
in time to that of the consumption of the liquid. In both cases, then, the conditions under which 
the events occur differ.
8Russell, B. (1917), p.183.
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So far we have only indicated that the interval r  must be constant and nothing 
has been said about its duration. It is indeed legitimate to inquire about how long or 
short this interval should be. For the longer the interval is, the greater the possibility 
there is for other events to occur within the interval that may frustrate the production 
of the effect. And so ideally, it is desirable to keep this interval as short as possible, 
which in the limit would mean that there is no lag of time between the cause and the 
effect. Hence, according to the Baldwin dictionary’s definition of cause and effect,
Cause and effect are correlative term s denoting any two dis­
tinguishable things, phases, or aspects o f reality, which are so  
related to each other that whenever the firs t ceases to exist the 
second comes in to  existence im m ediately a fter, and whenever 
the second comes in to existence, the f ir s t has ceased to  exist 
im m ediately before.
Thus, the cessation of the cause is to be followed immediately by the corresponding 
creation of the effect. However, it is relatively simple to reject this statement. Take 
for example, one may well attribute the cause of the triggering of the smoke-alarm to 
a fire; but no doubt it most probably would not be the case that once the alarm is set 
off, the fire vanishes accordingly. Everyday life is flooded with numerous examples 
of such kind. This situation, however, does in no way invalidate our definition of the 
cause as an event that happens before the effect. For even though it does not cease 
after the effect comes into existence, the cause has existed before the commencement 
of the effect. Counterexamples are easy to find because events which are regarded 
as cause and effect occupy extended regions of spacetime and may overlap. This 
concerns the issue of temporal contiguity between cause and effect and we shall see 
how Russell acknowledges the related difficulties.
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2.3 The Issue of Temporal Contiguity between Cause- 
and-Effect
The thesis of temporal contiguity between two events can be stated as: w henever 
the  f ir s t  even t ceases to exist the second even t com es in to  existence  
im m edia te ly  a fte r .
Let us first be clear about one thing. In this discussion, the causal relata9 are 
taken to be events. The reason is because these are the entities that stand in causal 
relations to each other in physical formulations. And the focus on events as causal 
relata then allows us to pave the way towards an investigation into causation in 
physics.
Events happen in spacetime and are therefore characterized by their spatial lo­
cations and times of happening. Events in real life have both spatial and temporal 
extent; they occur in a region of space and over a finite interval of time. However, 
unlike real events, events in physics are idealized mathematical points. They are 
supposed to occur at single spacetime points10.
Conceiving physical events as point events occurring at abstract spacetime points 
constitutes indeed the root of the problem of temporal contiguity between cause-and 
effect. We shall now explain why.
There exist essentially four possible kinds of spatial and temporal relation that 
any two events may bear to each other,
(1) Events located at the same spatial location but occur at different times or,
(2) Events located at different spatial locations and happen at different times or,
(3) Events located at different spatial locations and happen at the same time or,
(4) Events located at the same location and happening at the same time.
9Discussions on causation may also center around the possible relata of a causal relation of which 
events are but amongst one of the candidates.
10Here, we refrain from the debate on the reality of spacetime points but treat them merely as a 
mathematical abstraction used in physics.
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These four categories provide the basis for discussing both spatial and temporal 
contiguities. We first show that spatial contiguity11 is less of a problem than temporal 
contiguity and this will help us to appreciate why indeed Russell takes issue with the 
latter and not the former.
Being spatially continuous means that two events must be so closely adjacent to 
each other in space that there is overlap between them to some extent. In the limit, 
this is trivially attained by the two events happening at the same spatial location to 
achieve maximum overlap. Events that occur at the same location may happen at 
different times (as in (1)) or at the same time (as in (4)). It is easy to visualize events 
of the first kind but events happening at the same location at the same time requires 
some clarification.
Suppose a piece of coal, initially kept at room temperature, is to be heated in a 
furnace. We may speak of the following two events as occurring simultaneously at 
the very same location where the piece of coal is situated: the supplying of heat to 
the piece of coal by the fire as the piece of coal becoming red-hot
Two interesting observations arise. First, it is possible for distinct events to oc­
cupy the same spatial location at the same time. The supply of heat by the furnace 
fire and the piece of coal reaching its red-hot temperatures are distinct, though re­
lated events12. Second, both events have temporal extent as implied by the usage of 
words like “supplying” and “becoming”. No doubt the supply of heat to the piece 
of coal by the furnace fire is an event which precedes that of the piece of coal be­
coming red-hot. But these events are not point events in the sense of the supply of 
heat at an instant being followed by the piece of coal becoming red-hot, happening 
also at an instant The supply of heat is a gradual undertaking and the tempera­
ture of the piece of coal is raised from its initial value to that of red-hot through a 
series of intermediate temperatures. It is emphatically not the case that the temper­
ature jumps from one instant at room value to its red-hot value at the next instant.
11 As we shall see later in the chapter, a solution of the temporal contiguity problem in terms of 
spatiotemporally continuous (physical) entities, would also make good causal connections for events 
described in (2) and (3) above (given that events described in (3) are not spacelike separated).
12It is indeed part of the aim of study of causation to elucidate this relation. This stage of the 
discussion, however, addresses only the spatiotemporal relation.
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The underlined phrases reveal a subtle difficulty. The treatment of events as 
point-events is grossly unrealistic for each of the above takes a finite amount of time 
to occur and does not just occur at an instant. This is most easily visualized by the 
following diagram (Figure 2-1),
tl t2
Supply o f heat Piece o f  coal
becomes
red-hot
Figure 2.1: Two point-events occurring at two instants of time.
Such an idealization misses out on what happens in the intermediate times13 t 
between t\ and t<i with t\ < t < A more realistic picture is afforded by the 
consideration of events having temporal extent.
ti t2
Supply of heat begins Piece ofcoal
red-hot
Figure 2.2: Two temporally-extended events overlapping.
Here the “continuous” supply of heat to the piece of coal raises its temperature 
from its room value to that of red-hot in a continuous and gradual manner. The 
physical process that take place in the intermediate times are thus accounted for. In 
this particular example, the two events overlap in the interval ti < t < (Figure 
2-2).
So it would seem that the reply to the question of whether two events are tempo­
rally contiguous to each other is parasitic upon the definition of an event with respect 
to its temporal extent. For, if we bring the times t\ and very close to each other
13Here, of course, time is taken to be endowed with the structure of a mathematical continuum.
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so that in the limit, t\ and t2 are so adjacently close to each other that the temporal 
duration of both events are diminished to such a degree that their endpoints stay 
very close to each other, see Figure 2-3.
ti t2 
—
II
ti t2
Figure 2.3: Temporal Contiguity?
This situation can, in principle, be achieved by the supply of a large quantity of 
heat as a consequence of which the temperature of the piece of coal is raised to its 
red-hot level in the “next instant” so-to-speak. But can t2 be brought so close to t\ 
in order for it to be considered as a next instant? If the answer is yes, then it would 
seem that we may indeed focus on just the two endpoints as two point events and 
ask in what sense are they contiguous to each other.
Russell argues that there cannot be a notion of contiguity between any two events 
occurring at two respective instants. This is his well-known objection against the 
temporal contiguity between events as causes-and-effects. His argument is based on 
the contention that physical time is described by a dense series in a mathematical 
sense; that is, the mathematical continuum.
A mathematical series is regarded as dense when no terms in the series are con­
secutive, but between any two there are always others. When this idea is applied to 
the time-series, it implies that no two consecutive instants of time are contiguous; the 
assertion of a next instant simply does not make sense because in-between any two 
instants, there exists, in a mathematical sense, a continuum of others. Now suppose 
we halve an interval, and then halve the half. We can indeed continue the process for 
as long as we please, and the longer we continue it, the smaller the resulting interval 
becomes. One hopes that such a procedure would eventually bring the two instants so 
close together that any lapse of time between them may be considered as negligible;
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that is, the interval only spans an infinitesimal duration (as in Figure 2-3).
At first sight, the infinite divisibility seems to imply that there are infinitesimal 
intervals, i.e. intervals so small that any finite fraction of, say, a second would be 
greater. This, however, is an error. The continued bisection of the interval, though it 
gives us continually smaller intervals, gives us always finite intervals. If our original 
was a second, we reach successively half a second, a quarter of a second, an eighth, 
a sixteenth, and so on; but every one of this infinite series of diminishing intervals 
is finite14. We then find ourselves justified in treating this series as an arithmetic 
progression the sum of which is finite and this corresponds, of course, to our original 
finite interval between the two instants. In other words, there exists always a finite 
interval between the two respective instants of time15.
Now if the definition for the temporal contiguity between two events - whenever 
the first ceases to exist the second comes into existence immediately after - is, in fact 
correct, and the time series is to be considered as the mathematical continuum, the 
finite interval that exists between the instant of cessation of the first event and the 
instant of commencement of the second must have to be somehow taken into account. 
This can readily achieved by the interval being absorbed into the temporal dimension 
of the events.
And so Russell suggests that the finite interval between the two instants is to be 
accounted for by supposing either the cause or the effect or both to endure for a finite 
time. However, he at once notes that this supposition runs into serious difficulties.
The only options open to us with respect to the temporal dimension of an event 
are that the event,
(1) behaves as a point which is to be understood as occupying a region of infinites­
imal spacetime or,
(2) exists for a finite period of time.
14Any series which exhibits the feature of denseness, there always exists a finite interval between 
any two points of this series.
15Because of this finite interval, temporal contiguity cannot be attained, despite that there is 
spatial contiguity.
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With respect to (2), we may either think of an event as existing for a finite period 
of time during which it changes or during which it remains unchanged (a static event). 
Events that change may then be analyzed further as either a sequence of point events 
or a sequence of events that stay unchanged within their finite temporal durations or 
a sequence of combinations of both.
We now consider each type of events in turn. First, we have the events correspond­
ing to both the cause and the effect as point events. In this scenario, each of the two 
point events is to occupy an instant in the time-series and because of the dense nature 
of the time-series, there exist always a finite, albeit extremely short perhaps, interval 
to separate the two. Hence, the two point events in question cannot be temporally 
contiguous to each other. Second, we have the situation where one or both events 
are considered to occupy a finite duration involving “change within itself’. Imagine 
the cause changed. Then we would need to postulate a cause-effect relation between 
the part of the cause before the change and the part after. Each of these “parts”16 is 
taken to be either as a point or as one with a finite duration and static (in that they 
are not decomposable into further distinct events that are causally related). There 
are four exhaustive possibilities17 (Figure 2-4),
(i) the first is of a finite duration with the second as a point-event or,
(ii) the first as a point-event with the second event having a finite duration or,
(iii) both the first and the second events span finite durations or,
(iv) both the first and the second events span finite durations and they overlap to 
some extent.
Given the situation in (i), argues Russell, it would seem that only the later (point) 
events within the causal process E\ can be relevant to bringing about the effect E 2 
since the earlier ones are not contiguous to the effect and therefore cannot directly 
influence it.
16Following Russell, we may loosely speak of an event with a finite duration as a “process” to 
signify the presence of temporal parts.
17For the case of an event of finite duration the “parts” of which are considered as points.
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(i)
t2
•  Es
(ii) ti t2
E2
Ei •
(Hi) ti t2
Ei CM
LU
This "division "time 
may vary
(iv) ti t2
Figure 2.4: The temporal gap issue between cause and effect.
In order words, all the subsequent point events that occur at all times t such that 
ti < t < are temporally closer to E 2 than the “initial” cause as a “point event” 
commencing at time t\. But how close can these later parts of E\ be to If these 
later parts are themselves treated as points and since E 2 is supposed to occur at a 
point instant, then there always exists a finite interval to separate them and destroys 
temporal contiguity.
Russell also explores the possibility of diminishing the duration of the process 
without limit; in the hope to bringing the beginnings of both E\ and E 2 closer to­
gether. It is, nonetheless, immediate obvious that, even in the limiting case, we shall 
again arrive at the familiar situation of finding always a finite interval between two 
instants, due to, of course, the denseness of the time-series. Hence there will still 
remain earlier events which do not directly influence the effect! The “true cause” 
event (the beginning of Ei),  so to speak, will never have been reached. By symmetry,
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similar arguments can be made against the respective cases of (ii) and (iii)18 above. 
The same argument can again be iterated for the scenario in (iv) where there is an 
overlap of the two events E\ and £ 2 , since we are interested in the commencement 
points of both events and in this case, there is still a finite interval between t\ and ^  
in spite of the overlap after ^
The foregoing arguments all apply to events being decomposable into parts. Now 
what if, the extended event, or process E\, is static and not decomposable into parts 
but rather, it persists through time without change? Under such a circumstance, E\ 
can be considered as “one and the same” cause and we do seem to have a cause (E\) 
being temporally contiguous to the effect (E2 ). Russell, however, strongly protests 
against the existence of such kinds of events19, “...it seems strange - too strange to be 
accepted, in spite of bare logical possibility - that the cause, after existing placidly for 
some time, should suddenly explode into the effect, when it might just as well have 
done so at any earlier time, or have gone on unchanged without producing its effect 
To understand Russell’s objection, take an event that has a finite duration during 
which it does not change (Figure 2-5).
E i
t* t
Figure 2.5: A static event.
Here, the static cause E\ comes into existence at time t\ and remains unchanged 
until time £2- (h ~ h )  denotes the time lapse between the occurrence of E\ and the 
occurrence of the effect E2 . Russell’s point is: isn’t it strange that E\ occurs at t\ 
and sits there unchanged, then all of a sudden, E 2 bursts into existence at £2? Why 
has this suddenly taken place at t2 while logically, it might have done so at t* or some
18As we are interested in the commencements of both the events E \ and E 2 at times t \  and £2 
respectively.
19ibid., p.184.
35
other time t during the interval fa  — t\)?
Static events persisting over an interval without change is thus not acceptable and 
the cause cannot be made contiguous to the effect by the appeal to static events.
In summary, for two events to be temporally contiguous to each other, the finite 
interval between the times of commencement of both events must be accounted for. 
This may be achieved by demanding that one or both of the events to have temporal 
extent and of finite duration, in order for the temporal gap to be filled. Events of 
finite duration can either considered to be capable of changing and decomposable into 
other events or to be non-decomposable and with itself persisting without changing 
into other events. For events that change, the temporal gap remains because the 
“initial” cause cannot be reached. For non-changing events, the hope to close off the 
temporal gap is shattered by the logical unacceptability of such a kind of event. As a 
consequence, temporal contiguity between the cause and effect cannot obtain in both 
cases.
It is useful at this point to sum up this important argument by a schematic 
representation.
Pi P2
Cause and Effect 
must both edure for 
a Finite Time
The Cause existing 
for a finite time 
during which 
it CHANGES
Times Series 
as
Mathematical
Continuum
Temporal 
Contiguity 
between 
Cause and Effect
The Cause existing 
for a finite time 
during which it 
remains STATIC
Ci C2
Figure 2.6: The logical structure of Russell’s argument against the thesis of 
temporal contiguity between causes and effects.
Written in symbolic form, the logical structure of Russell’s argument against the 
temporal contiguity between cause-and-effect goes as follows,
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Pi
Therefore, - 1P2
It is now obvious that the validity of Russell’s argument depends on the truth or 
falsehood of the premise Pi, namely that whether it is in fact correct in representing 
the time-series by the mathematical continuum. This is in its own right a very 
profound philosophical question that deserves a detailed and careful investigation, 
the scope of which is well beyond the present study. Suffice it to say that Russell’s 
argument is valid insofar as the temporal series is represented by the mathematical 
continuum.
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2.4 Is There a Notion of Cause in Physics?
The second part of Russell’s 1913 paper is devoted to an assessment of the applicability 
of the principle of causality in a theoretical science like physics, with specific reference, 
of course, to the temporal gap problem20.
The principle of causality, as has been established in the preceding section, stip­
ulates that the same cause is always followed by the same effect (but only) after a 
finite interval of time. By considering physical time els the mathematical continuum 
makes it impossible to close off the temporal gap between the cause and effect. But 
the temporal gap presents a problem because it enhances the opportunity for other 
events to “creep in” during this interval and frustrate the production of the effect.
In physical situations, “causes” are to be identified with the so-called “initial (or 
antecedent) conditions” that represent occurrences ahead in time of other events. 
Having the same cause always followed by the same effect implies that the causes, the 
initial conditions, are repeatable. Russell maintains that on a practical front, if an 
event is ever to recur, it must not be defined too narrowly and not take into account 
too precise details. Once the initial conditions become too complex, the likelihood of 
recurrence of each of these fine details is greatly diminished. Thus Russell tells us21, 
“An “event”...is a universal defined sufficiently widely to admit of many particular 
occurrences in time being instances of it.”
One obvious way of narrowing the scope of an event is to restrict the temporal 
definition of its duration. In the limit, the event is defined to occur at an instant and 
as we have seen, such point events suffer miserably from the temporal gap problem. 
The presence of the temporal gap provides ample opportunities for other events to 
happen during that interval that may interfere with the occurrence of the effect.
The only reliable means to dispose of the temporal gap is to take into account 
also those events that occur in the gap which would affect the occurrence of the effect 
in some way. So the cause event and all the ensuing events22 happened during the
20It highlights how the temporal gap destroys our much cherished causal intuition of “the same 
cause is always followed by the same effect”.
21ibid., p.187.
22All these, including the cause event, are considered as points.
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times running up to the time of commencement of the effect are considered as one 
initial condition (Figure 2-7).
If we cannot have the same cause, then there is simply no meaning for the expression 
“the same cause is always followed by the same effect.”
One recognizes, of course, that “the same cause is always followed by the same 
effect” is one of the famous doctrines of Humean causation - that of constant con­
junction between two events as cause-and-effect. It is undeniable that the constant 
co-joining and the temporal-ordering between two events together establish for us 
the intuition that the cause is regularly followed by the effect after a definite time 
interval.
Russell has shown that this Humean doctrine is not applicable in physics. First, 
this is because the temporal gap presents the possibility for other events to intervene 
and thus one can no longer be sure of the occurrence of the effect. Second, even if 
the temporal gap is “closed” by encompassing all the intermediate events with the 
original cause, the complicated initial condition thus results is unlikely to find itself 
being repeatable. Either way, the doctrine of “same cause, same effect” is made 
inapplicable in physics. There is therefore no notion of causality in physics in the 
sense of “same cause, same effect”.
Other even ts
r i
Ci
C2
C ause
event
Effect
event
T
Initial conditions
Figure 2.7:
The intricate details of the initial condition renders it highly unlikely, if not im­
possible, to be repeatable and thus making the phrase of the “same cause” vacuous.
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Russell brings compromise to this seemingly pessimistic state of affairs by propos­
ing an operational meaning of causality23, “...any case of sufficiently frequent sequence 
will be causal in our present case.” One should prima facie give up the hope of find­
ing “causal laws” , in the strict sense of “same cause, same effect” in physics. These 
frequent sequences referred to by Russell are often generalized into the so-called laws 
of physics. But how about the “laws” of physics that we have come to be so familiar 
with, like Newton’s force laws or the law of universal gravitation? With these laws, 
Russell argues24, “there is nothing that can be called a cause, and nothing that can 
be called an effect; there is merely a formula. Certain differential equations can be 
found, which hold at every instant for every particle of the system, ...render the con­
figuration at any other earlier or later instant theoretically calculable. That is to say, 
the configuration at any instant is a function of that instant and the configurations 
at two given instants...But there is nothing that could be properly called “cause” and 
nothing that could be called “effect” in such a system.” And again25, “...it is not in 
any sameness of causes and effects that the constancy of scientific laws consists, but 
in the sameness of relations... “sameness of differential equations”...”.
How does this “functional”26 view differ from the philosophical principle of causal­
ity? First, this view of the principle of causality does not have an a priori feature of 
necessity but mere empirical generalizations. Second, the functional view makes no 
difference between the past and the present. Given data from the past, the future 
state of a physical system can be readily computed and vice versa. Third, although 
it makes no demand for an element of necessity, the functional view does, however, 
require some sort of “uniformity of nature”. The uniformity of nature ensures that it 
is a feature of our universe for a law, which has been found to hold throughout the 
observable past, to be expected to hold also in the future.
23ibid., p.193.
24ibid. p. 194.
25ibid., p.195.
26 These functional laws are the equations of motion of physical systems and we shall see in the 
later chapters how causal processes - the trajectories of physical objects in spacetime - of the Salmon 
and Dowe varieties adheres to this view.
41
2.5 Possible Solutions to the Temporal Gap Prob­
lem
In his famous treatise27 on causation, David Hume came to identify three main im­
pressions from which our idea of a necessary (causal) connection between two events 
arise:
(1) the priority in time of the first event
(2) the constant conjunction of both events (same cause, same effect)
(3) the spatiotemporal continuity of the two events
The three impressions are related to each other in the following manner. Our 
intuition tells us that for any pair of events to be deemed the cause-and-effect, one of 
the two events has to commence before the other and that whenever one occurs, so 
does the other. These observations are subsumed under (1) and (2) above. However, 
as it has been illustrated by the scenarios depicted in Tables 1-1 and 1-2, the “regular” 
observation of the cause-and-effect encompasses the fact that there exists a temporal 
order with a more or less constant time interval between them.
In particular, such an interval ought not be too long or else it would provide ample 
opportunities for other factors to act and affect this particular “causal” relation. The 
most effective way to ensure that the first event, and no other, is the one which causes 
the second, is to bring the cause and effect as close as possible both spatially and 
temporally. The cause and effect are deemed to be closest spatiotemporally when 
the first event draws to a close as and when the second begins. This is how (3) that 
concerns spatiotemporal continuity between the cause-and-effect gets connected with 
that of (1) and (2). And it is Hume’s most remarkable achievement to have shown 
that from these three impressions alone, one never gets to discover the element of 
necessity in what is supposed a connection between two events regarded as cause 
and effect. Russell had, of course, written in this Humean spirit and advocated the 
regularity account as he opted for the functional view of causality in physics.
27Hume, D. (1888).
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With reference to this standard, Russell has shown us the incoherence between
(2) and (3) (Section 2.4 above). In order to achieve condition (2), events ought to 
be defined with some restriction on its temporal extent in order to maximize their 
chances of re-occurrence. In the limit, one considers the cause and effect as point- 
events. With two point-events standing at two instants in the temporal continuum, 
there always exists a finite interval - a temporal gap - between the two events. And 
so the “cause” (the event that is prior in time) cannot be temporally contiguous to 
the “effect” (the latter event). In this case, “same cause, same effect” (2) can only 
be attained at the expense of temporal continuity between the two events as in (3).
This temporal gap may be reduced, so that the cause and effect are brought closer 
together in time, if we consider, say, the cause as an extended temporal entity28. A 
cause having temporal parts may consist of a great deal of intricate details, which in 
turn diminishes its chance of being repeatable. Here, temporal continuity between 
the cause and effect may be achieved but only at the expense of “same cause, same 
effect”.
This much being said, the thesis of “same cause, same effect” may, however, be 
abandoned in the consideration of singular causation where the condition of repeata­
bility is relaxed. There are temporal sequences of events which we consider as causal 
but are not repeatable (in principle) by their very nature. An extreme example is the 
evolution of the universe29. We would like to be able to speak about the notion of 
causation in the context of such singular sequences. Generally speaking, in situations 
where there exist spatiotemporally physical connections, we speak of the causes and 
effects as linked by these physical connections in question. After a light switch is 
thrown, the lamp is lit. We say that the lamp being lit is caused by the switch being 
turned on. The switch being turned on is the cause with the lamp being lit as the 
consequent effect This is envisaged to be so because there is a physical connection - 
an electric wire that acts as the medium for a current to travel from one respective 
spacetime locale to another - between the light switch and the lamp.
28The same argument applies if the effect is considered as an extended temporal entity instead.
29Here, we refrain from considering physical models that describe cyclic universes.
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If it is indeed legitimate to think of causation on a singular level, the problem of 
the temporal gap may then be duly overcome by focusing on the issue of temporal 
dimensions of causes and effects as has been indicated earlier in the discussion.
Here, we shall briefly discuss the attempt of the resolution of the temporal gap 
problem by C.J. Ducasse30. His proposal is of particular relevance to our discussion 
as it centers around the temporal dimensions of events.
Ducasse maintains that it is essential to distinguish clearly “a time” as an instant 
represented by a cut in the time series, from “a time segment” that is defined by two 
cuts (or instants). An event31, he argues, cannot be said to occur at a time but only 
during a time segment. So, an event, for Ducasse, is properly described by a section 
(which itself is continuous) of the temporal continuum. Thus viewed, it seems that 
spatiotemporal continuity of the cause and effect may now be achieved: the same cut 
in the time series marks both the end of the cause and the beginning of the effect. 
The cut itself have no spacetime dimension at all. Ducasse thus concludes32,
W ith cause and effect and their spacetim e relation so con­
ceived, there is no possibility  that, as R ussell contended, som e  
other event should creep in between the cause and the effect 
and thwart the production o f the effect.
It is one matter to assert that the same instant - the one cut in the time series - 
should serve as both the cessation point of the cause and the commencement point of 
the effect, but it is quite a different matter to decide where in the temporal continuum 
ought this cut be situated. Ducasse seems to think that this is a pseudo-problem as 
he writes33,
N or are we compelled, as he (R ussell) also contended, to tr im  
down indefinitely the beginning part o f the cause (and, m utatis  
m utandis, the end part o f the effect) on the ground that the
30Ducasse, C.J. (1926). Reprinted in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.) (1993), p.125-136.
31 Here, he means real happenings that take place over finite durations of time.
32ibid., p.129.
33ibid.
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early part o f the cause is no t necessary to the effect so long as 
the end part o f  the cause occurs. For, once m ore, the cause 
m eans som ething which was suffic iently  necessary to the effect. 
Thus the spacetime lim it o f the cause process at the outer end  
is as elastic as we please, and varies w ith the spacetim e scope
o f the particular description o f the cause that we give in  each 
concrete case. A n d  the sam e is true o f the ou ter end o f  the 
effect process.
Fire starts Smoke-alarm triggered
Furnace fire starts Piece of coal becomes
red-hot
Figure 2.8: Where should the temporal cut be situated?
Ducasse’s argument, of course, presupposes that the cause and effect are not 
concurrent so that the cause must cease as soon as the effect begins. The previous 
examples of the fire triggering the smoke-alarm and the furnace heating up a piece 
of coal are both evidence to the contrary. In both of these situations, the cause and 
effect can undoubtedly co-exist in time after the commencement of the effect (Figure 
2-8).
It is therefore not at all a vacuous exercise to dwell on the debate as to at which 
location the cut should be introduced. Some method must be sought to help fixing 
the position of the cut.
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Careful reflection of both examples lends us an important idea. In the first sce­
nario, the fire starts34 at a small region of spacetime and this event subsequently gen­
erates a sufficient amount of smoke which triggers the smoke-alarm when it reaches 
it. The two events - “the starting of the fire” and “the trigger of the smoke-alarm” - 
being relatively localized in their respective regions of occurrences, are physically con­
nected by the smoke that traverses the intermediate region. The “spreading smoke” 
forms the crucial factor to link the two cause and effect events in question, while at 
the same time it serves the vital purposes of closing the temporal gap.
Entities which have relatively large spatiotemporal extent and stable in structure 
(so that the different parts of the entity differ only in their relative positions in 
spacetime and not in any other characteristics) are ones that must be sought after to 
fill the temporal gap.
In the example, at each of the two localized points where the two events are 
supposed to occur, there are at least two entities involved. At the vicinity of the cause, 
there are the fire and the smoke and at that of the effect, there are the smoke and 
the smoke-alarm. In each instance, the two entities concerned somehow “physically 
interact” to result in the cause and the effect respectively. The place where the cut 
that signifies the commencement of the effect (without necessarily the cessation of 
the cause) may now less arbitrarily and more meaningfully defined by reference to 
these physical interactions35.
Similar reasoning applied to the second scenario leads to a similar picture. Here, 
the event that corresponds to the heating of the piece of coal by the furnace fire 
and the subsequent one where the piece of coal becomes red-hot are not separated 
in space but only in time. Furthermore, at the very same location of both events, 
there are the same two entities involved - the furnace fire and the piece of coal Under 
this circumstance, it is the piece of coal itself - its very spatiotemporal continuous 
existence36 - that forms the physical connection between the event of its being heated 
by the furnace fire at room temperature and the event corresponding to it reaching
34 Assuming that it is not an explosion that takes up a relatively substantial chunk of spacetime.
35 See later discussions in Chapter 3.
36Here we make the basic assumption that the piece of coal has an identity over time.
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the red-hot temperature. It is the spatiotemporally continuous existence of the piece 
of coal that functions to close the temporal gap.
It is also noted that despite a continuous string of interactions, in terms of a 
continuous exchange of energy between the fire and the piece of coal, it is still rea­
sonable to pinpoint two specific events and ask about how they are to be connected 
temporally.
The foregoing examples have suggested the consideration of physical entities of 
spatiotemporally continuous extent as a realistic means to resolve the temporal gap 
issue. This also seems to be Russell’s idea when he had the occasion to reflect on the 
notion of causation more than three decades later after the publication of his seminal 
1913 essay.
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2.6 R ussell’s Causal Lines
In the preceding sections of the chapter, we have detailed Russell’s view on causation 
at the turn of the twentieth century. Three and half decades later in 1948, he renewed 
his opinion on the subject in a more optimistic maneuver with the introduction of 
the notion of “causal lines” , which can be seen as the precursor to the more recent 
process theories of causation.
With the good intention of filling the hazardous temporal gap, we have appealed 
to physical entities that span an extended spatiotemporal existence, during which 
they exhibit stability in their physical characteristics and makeup. This is indeed 
what Russell had in mind when he introduced the notion of causal lines37,
The concept o f  m ore or less perm anen t physical objects, in  
its  com m on-sense fo r m , involves Usubstances” and w hen “sub- 
s ta n ce” is rejected we have to fin d  som e o ther w ay o f  defining  
the id en tity  o f  a physical object at d ifferen t tim e s . I  th ink  th is  
m u st be done by m eans o f  the concept “causal lin e ”. I  call 
a series o f  events a i(causal lin e ” i f  g iven som e o f  th em , we 
can in fe r  som eth ing  about the others w ithou t having to know  
anyth ing  about the environm ent... W hen  two even ts belong to  
one causal line , the earlier m ay  be said  to “cause” the latter.
I n  th is way laws o f  the fo r m  “A causes B ” m ay  preserve a 
certain  validity. They are im portan t in  connection  both w ith  
perception and w ith the persistence o f  m a teria l objects.
And again38,
A  “causal lin e ”, as I  w ish to define the term , is a tem poral series  
o f  events so related that, given som e o f  them , som eth ing  can
37Russell, B. (1948), p.333
38ibid., p.477.
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be inferred about the others whatever m ay be happening else­
where. A causal line m ay always be regarded as the persis­
tence o f som ething - a person, a table, a photon, or what 
not. Throughout a given causal line, there m ay be constancy o f  
structure, or gradual change in either, but no t sudden change 
o f any considerable m agnitude.
Russell intends for the concept of causal lines to define the identity of the time 
of physical objects. Stated simply and naively, the identity over time of an entity 
concerns the question of what makes us think the object we perceive now is the 
“same” one as we perceive at some previous time? The demand for this “sameness” 
has to do with what Russell has referred to in the foregoing passage: the persistence 
over time of som ething.
Think of the simple scenario where we have a tennis ball sitting on the table. The 
ball is recorded as one and the same object between a “continuous” time interval, say, 
t\ and tx , provided that at each of the instants within the interval, there is an entity 
having the same physical qualities and characteristics as the one that existed at t\. 
Logically speaking, the entities at each of these instants need not be the same object 
but different objects with identical physical qualities and characteristics will do. One 
can always imagine a universe where objects with identical properties popping-in- 
and-out of existence at each and every instant.
In that world, one would not be able to tell the difference as to whether the tennis 
ball sitting on the table is indeed the one and the same or if it is consisted of a 
sequence of events, with each corresponding to the individual existence of a different 
object.
However, during any point, say, within the interval, if the tennis ball or a 
different one that shares the identical properties with the original fails to exist, then 
this discontinuity in existence would be a sufficiently strong basis for our reasoning 
to reject the hypothesis that the tennis ball in existence at some times after tM is
39At a minimum level, one would argue that persistence over time entails the continual existence 
of the entity in space and time.
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necessarily the same one which existed before.
The concept of causal lines is brought in to provide what one may call an identity 
criterion, which stipulates the conditions for an entity to be considered as one and the 
same that persists over time. The causal line does not make a distinction between the 
cases of having in reality the same object throughout the interval and those having 
different objects that share identical properties existing in turn during the interval. 
In both cases, one considers the object as one and the same object and this is the one 
object that provides the causal connection. The front most part of the smoke cloud 
that reaches and triggers the smoke-alarm is the part that has emerged first from the 
burning fire. Likewise, it is one and the same piece of coal that is subjected to the 
continuous combustion of the furnace fire.
These causal lines, made up of a sequence of events, each corresponding to the 
existence of a physical object at each point in spacetime, allow us to speak of the 
same object persisting in time. Its ability to persist in time sanctions one to speak 
about the object being the link - the causal connection - between the two events at 
different points in time in which it participates.
The major demand for events making up the causal line is that they should display 
a certain degree of constancy and sameness in their physical qualities and attributes. 
In the example of the tennis ball, all the events exhibit constancy and sameness in 
qualities in that each corresponds to the existence of a tennis ball and any one of 
these balls at each time shares identical (or extremely similar) attributes with the 
others.
Any sudden change disrupts the smooth flow of a causal line. Again, this is 
easily illustrated with the example of the tennis ball when its career in spacetime 
is punctuated by the sudden disappearance of the ball at some point in time and 
re-appearing at another point later. Since a causal line does not obtain, hence the 
ball cannot be said to enjoy an identity over time. We are no longer able to speak 
about the ball that has re-appeared as the one that vanishes some time before, as 
further evidence must be gained to support the contrary.
With the introduction of the causal line concept, Russell has made a deciding
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step towards resolving the temporal gap problem. However, in order to develop the 
idea into a proper causal concept, further work needs to be accomplished and this 
is achieved through the work on process causality by Salmon and Dowe (Chapters 3 
and 4).
2.7 Reflections and Afterthoughts
In his 1913 essay, Russell has provided a sophisticated argument, essentially Humean 
in spirit, against the orthodox view that the philosophical (Humean) notion of cau­
sation is the one that is employed as the concept of causality in physics. Based upon 
the two major assumptions: that events are conceived as occurrences at individual 
spacetime points and that time is a dense mathematical continuum, Russell’s analysis 
reveals to us the inevitable existence of a gap between any two point-events situated 
in the temporal continuum. This temporal gap has far-reaching implications, both 
on the levels of the regularity and the singular account of causation.
With respect to the regularity account, the observation of the constant conjunction 
between two events, from which the idea of “necessary connection” arises, cannot be 
maintained in the presence of the temporal gap. The temporal gap makes it possible 
for other events to intrude into the temporal gap and interfere with the production 
of the effect. Such a possibility defeats the notion of a necessary connection for the 
fact that we cannot be sure whether the effect (the latter event) is to follow in the 
next observation.
Since events are indeed treated as point-like entities in physics, it follows that the 
temporal gap renders the idea of causation, as a necessary causation arising from a 
pair of constantly conjoining events, sterile in physics.
The issue of the temporal gap has also an important impact on singular causation. 
Two events, with one preceding the other in time, can bear some sort of relation 
over and above this mere temporal relation that results in this time-ordering. Or, 
the “apparent” time-order of their occurrences has arisen as a sheer accidental fact. 
They may occur in a random manner such that they just happen to be standing in 
this particular temporal order on this particular occasion. What does it take for
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two events, one preceding the other in time, to be regarded as cause and effect? 
The regularist and the singularist have opposite recipes to decide between the two 
possibilities of a mere temporal ordering or a specific relation from which this ordering 
arise as a consequence.
The regularist maintains that it is not sufficient to draw any conclusion on the 
observation of one instance of these happenings and as such, it is thus meaningless 
to speak about causation on a singular level.
Contrary to the regularist, the singular causal theorist takes the view that there 
is a meaning to call this pair of successive events cause and effect, provided one 
can specify a relation in addition to the temporal ordering. The pair of events are 
considered as cause and effect by virtue of this special relation. The regularity we 
see of cause and effect is then supported by the fact that every pair of like events 
possesses this relation.
Because of the temporal gap problem, the singular theorist is confronted with the 
challenge to use their stipulated relation to close up the temporal gap. The issue 
of temporal gap emerges essentially as a problem for two events that stands in a 
temporal relation to each other. And so it is relevant to the consideration of singular 
causation, which focuses on the causal relation as one that exists between an instance 
of the occurrence of two events.
Even if the causal relation is a mere temporal relation between two events, that 
is, if Ei is an earlier event than , then E\ is deemed the cause of E^ (and E<i is 
deemed the effect of E\), the presence of the temporal gap makes it possible for other 
events to occur in the interval and hence there could be events taking place later than 
Ei but earlier than E 2 . And these other events, rather than E 2 , might be deemed 
the effect of Ei. Similarly, the same events might be deemed the proper cause of E 2  
rather than E\. Under such circumstances, the “cause-effect” relation of two events 
as a temporal relation is thereby utterly destroyed.
In order to maintain the “cause-effect” relation, one must devise a means to close 
off the temporal gap. The most natural and obvious way is to include and take into 
account all the intervening events during the interval and consider an “event” as an
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entity having a temporal extent instead of as one that occurs at a single spacetime 
point. Russell has proposed such a structure as a causal line. However, such “ex­
tended” events themselves are in actual fact composed of a continuum of point events. 
To make our distinction explicit, we shall refer to these temporally-extended entities 
as “processes” to signify a continuous series of events in spacetime.
Serving well the function of filling the temporal gap, such a continuous process 
forms also the physical connection between the events E\ and E<i and hence making 
the notion of causality intelligible on a singular level, for now a physical relation is 
specified to be the causal connection.
It is the major task of this thesis to elucidate the nature of these spatiotemporally 
continuous processes, especially in relation to the extent that they may be consid­
ered as causal in both the contexts of classical (Chapters 3-4) and quantum physics 
(Chapters 5-7).
Before we embark on this philosophical project, there is one last point that de­
serves our attention. This has to do with the assumption that physical time forms 
a mathematical continuum. Indeed, physical time being continuous is the deciding 
premise for Russell’s argument on the temporal contiguity between cause and effect 
to remain valid.
The temporal gap arises because of our desire to forge the integration of the 
concepts of the continuous and the discrete, and our wish to “divide” the temporal 
continuum into dimensionless parts - the durationless instants. The notion of the 
continuum, although explained with reference to the concept of divisibility, is itself 
not supposed to be a divisible entity in the ordinary sense of the word. In particular, 
it is conceivable that the continuum is a description of “indivisible parts”.
If this is indeed the case, Kline40 argues, then Russell’s argument cannot be suc­
cessfully held against Hume’s temporal contiguity thesis because in Russell’s exposi­
tion, time is supposed to be continuous and divisible into instants while in Hume’s 
treatment, time comes in “indivisible parts”. At a minimum, Kline maintains, that 
the idea of indivisible parts entails the discreteness of time.
40Kline, A.D. (1985).
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So if time can take on discrete units, with each spanning a finite interval, it would 
then be capable of accommodating the presence of static events whose very existence 
Russell has so strongly condemned. Of course, the possibility of static events raises 
the hope to foreclose the temporal gap, as a consequence of which the temporal 
contiguity thesis would remain intact.
Kline himself has realized the seriousness of this claim and suggests that we 
must ultimately look to the best physics to see what it teaches about the nature 
of time. In both classical and quantum physics, in the theories of Euler-Lagrange and 
Schrodinger, time enters as a continuous parameter. The whole of physics has been 
founded on a smooth manifold of spacetime. In more recent decades, research in the 
field of quantum gravity - the attempt to unify quantum mechanics with Einstein’s 
theory of gravitation - has brought the difficulty of reconciling the continuous with 
the discrete under scrutiny. Several programs41 within the domain of quantum gravity 
research entertain serious proposals of an underlying discrete structure of spacetime. 
Such proposals are pretty much exploratory in nature but represent a positive step 
forward and we await further advances in this direction.
41See Bombelli, L. et al. (1987), Rovelli, C. and Smolin, L. (1995) and Penrose, R. (1971).
Chapter 3 
Process Theories of Causation
“A common, if  loosely worded, statement of an im­
portant consequence of special relativity is: “No sig­
nal can travel faster than light”. The more sweeping 
statement, “Nothing can travel faster than light”, is 
contradicted by the familiar example of the spot of 
light thrown on a sufficiently distant screen by a ro­
tating beacon. The apparent velocity of the spot of 
light can exceed c, but this does not contradict special 
relativity since there is no causal relation between suc­
cessive appearances of the spot. ”
(J.C. Garrison, M.W. Mitchell, R.Y. Chiao & E.L. 
Bolda, 19981)
“A rotating lighthouse beacon impinges on a distant 
wall. The resulting spot is not a violation of relativity; 
one spot is not the source of the next spot. ”
(Rolf Laudauer, 19932)
1Garrison, J.G. et al., (1998).
2Laudauer, R. (1993).
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3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we learnt from Russell’s analysis of the notion of cause the problem 
of the temporal continuity between cause and effect. The problem arises from the 
consideration of events as specified by dimensionless spacetime points situated in the 
temporal continuum. In the continuum, there is no meaning to speak of a next point 
and so events thought of as occurring at temporal points - the instants - cannot be 
“next to” each other. Therefore, the supposed temporal continuity of cause and effect 
(both as point-events) is thwarted as there always exists a temporal gap between any 
two such events. The trouble stems from the misconception that the temporal con­
tinuum is made up of discrete instants. This poses tremendous difficulties in thinking 
about causal chains as sequences of point-events linked together by causal relations. 
In particular, one asks how one would set out to define the various “components” of 
these sequences.
To amend the temporal gap, to ensure temporal continuity between two events, we 
may either think about (i) a continuum of point-events between the two as providing a 
physical connection or, (ii) physical time as coming in discrete quanta so that “static” 
events occurring in discrete and yet finite intervals are made possible to provide a 
connection. Between these two tentative solutions, (ii) seems too controversial a 
conjecture to proceed with at this point in time. Instead, we pursue a solution to the 
temporal gap difficulty in the direction of (i).
In relation to (i), an immediate question comes to mind: are we permitted to 
conceive of a spatiotemporally extended entity as something which is not amenable 
to be reduced to a sequence of dimensionless point-events? It is to this very idea that 
we should address ourselves in this chapter and the next.
As a serious acknowledgment to the well-known problems deeply rooted in analy­
ses of causation based on an event ontology (that is, where the causal relation is taken 
as one that obtains between two events), Wesley Salmon has proposed an alterna­
tive theory of causation which takes spatio-temporal continuous processes as the basic
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unit of analysis. These processes, claims Salmon, are themselves the “causal connec­
tions” that Humeans have given up looking for. Wesley Salmon’s original account, 
expounded in details in his 1984 book “Scientific Explanation and Causal Structure 
of the World' 3 has sowed the seeds of a series of insightful exchanges between himself 
and Phil Dowe in the last decade. Inspired and motivated by Salmon’s seminal work, 
the Conserved Q uantity Theory (CQ) was put forward by Dowe4 in 1992 whose 
main intention was to modify Salmon’s account and to free the process theory from 
the haunting spell of counterfactuals that was seen to be the main drawback of that 
theory. This consequently led Salmon to abandon much of his original formulation 
and to replace the older account by his 1994 Invarian t Q uantity Theory5 (IQ). 
Subsequently, in response chiefly to forceful arguments from Dowe6 and Hitchcock7 
in 1995, Salmon is understood to adopt a version of Conserved Q uantity Theory 
with Transm ission8 (CQT). It should be emphasized that although now there is 
much convergence between their respective views on the subject, Salmon and Dowe 
still have one obstacle to overcome - namely, the place of transmission within the 
causal analysis. Salmon thinks the concept is vital, Dowe says it is not required. 
Since a thorough understanding of Salmon’s original 1984 theory is essential in order 
to appreciate the developments of the subsequent philosophical ideas, we shall begin 
with an exposition of his 1984 account in this chapter and then continue with the 
more up-to-date philosophical scene on the topic in Chapter 4.
3.2 Salmon’s 1984 Process Theory o f Causation
It is undeniable that causality plays a vital role in scientific explanation. However, one 
has to admit that not all scientific laws express causal relations. Take for instance the 
ideal gas law, P V  =  nRT. As it stands, the law provides only the inter-relationships 
amongst three quantities, pressure (P), volume (V) and temperature (T) of a gas.
3Salmon, W.C. (1984).
4Dowe, P. (1992a).
5Salmon, W.C. (1994).
6Dowe, P. (1995).
7Hitchcock, C.R. (1995).
8Salmon, W.C. (1997).
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It reveals to us only the behaviours of the other variables as and when one or more 
is varied. It divulges to us no information as regards the temporal order in which 
each of these variables is to occur. This temporal aspect of causality aside, it still 
seems possible to give a causal explanation by appealing to the actual physical process 
involved. In a situation where a gas is heated, according to the ideal gas law the 
resulting increase in its temperature is to be accompanied by a corresponding increase 
in its volume and at the same time, a decrease in the pressure. In another situation, 
we may find that the temperature of the gas is raised instead by a moving piston as 
a consequence of which would also have a rise in pressure joined by a fall in volume. 
Supplying heat to the gas or compressing it by means of a moving piston represent two 
different physical processes although they lead to the same end results. Although the 
ideal gas law does not express an explicit “temporal” relation9, it is capable of being 
explained casually if supplemented by the information of the underlying physical 
processes. In other words, causal explanations encompass more meaning than the 
mere temporal orderings amongst events. In our example, two causal explanations 
are available by references to the two physical processes above. It was Salmon’s aim to 
furnish an account of causation which places due emphasis on these physical aspects.
In the standard view on causality that we inherit from Hume, considerable contro­
versy has centered round the nature of the causal relation and also the relata that this 
relation is supposed to relate. In this Humean picture, “events” are the relata con­
nected by the cause-effect relations. As for the causal relation, it has been argued to 
be some kind of statistical relations or some rather complicated combinations of suf­
ficient and necessary conditions10. However, we have been duly cautioned by Russell 
on the difficulties inherent in the Humean view when events are defined at spacetime 
points. With a strong appeal to physical processes, Wesley Salmon presents an alter­
native account to rival the standard picture, which downplays the status of events in 
favour of processes that are taken as extended spatio-temporal continuous entities, as 
the basis units of analysis.
9At least it neither reveals nor depicts the time-ordering among the various variables.
10A good general introduction can be found in Sosa, E. and Tooley, M. (eds.) (1993), p.1-32.
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The development of Salmon’s process theory of causation began as early as in the 
1970’s and has been subsequently organized into a systematic form in his 1984 book 
“Scientific Explanation and Causal Structure of the World” . In this “1984 program”, 
the cause-effect relation is analyzed in terms of three components - an event that 
constitutes the cause, another event that constitutes the effect and a causal process 
that connects the two. Within this framework, the basic unit of analysis is a process 
and in this regard two notions have assumed fundamental importance: propagation  
(or tra n sm iss io n ) and the production  of causal influences. Causal processes are 
the vehicles by which causal influences are propagated and the production of these 
influences are brought about by the interactions of two causal processes. The main 
reason for focusing on causal processes is that in many situations where we talk 
about the causal relations between pairs of events separated in spacetime, continuous 
causal processes seem just the right kind of entities to provide the connections to 
ensure spatiotemporal continuity between them. Also, we iterate that it emphasizes 
the physical aspect of causation.
This picture can easily be visualized with the aid of a concrete physical example. 
An electron gun produces an electron that travels towards a fluorescent screen some 
distance away and impinges on it, resulting in the darkening of a patch of the screen. 
There are two events representing two changes at two spacetime regions: the electron 
is brought into being at the source (the electron gun) and the impingement of the 
electron that brings about the darkening of the screen. The electron in flight provides 
the connection between these two events, which enables one to entertain a causal 
story linking the happenings in those two separate spacetime regions. In Salmon’s 
terminology, the causal influence is produced at the electron gun and this influence is 
carried through space and time over to the fluorescent screen by the electron, which is 
the casual process. On its arrival at the screen, the electron produces the darkening 
of the screen by interacting with it. In this example, the electron is the causal 
connection. Consider also the case of an ox pulling a plough as a more congenial 
everyday example. The changes in the motion of the ox is be to followed by the 
changes in the motion of the plough via the connection of a belt in-between. There
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is a causal interaction between the ox and the belt where a force is exerted on the 
latter. This force eventually reaches the plough and pulls it. The belt is the causal 
process making a connection between the two events of the ox exerting a pulling force 
on the belt and the plough being pulled by the belt. Both examples drive home the 
point that a causal explanation is obtained by appealing to the underlying physical 
process in each situation.
Given that causal processes are conceived to be continuous spatio-temporal phys­
ical entities, it is therefore crucial for Salmon to make a distinction between causal 
and non-causal processes in order to rule out instantaneous causation between two 
space-like separated regions as prohibited by the theory of special relativity (SRel). 
This is to be achieved by invoking the criterion of mark transmission, as was previ­
ously suggested by Reichenbach, where a causal process is defined to be one that is 
capable of transmitting a mark whereas a pseudo-process is not. A mark, following 
Reichenbach, is the result of an intervention by means of an irreversible process. One 
may now pause to ask what does a mark have to do with restricting the propagation 
of causal processes to sub-luminal velocities? If the mark itself is thought of as some 
kind of information or signal and since influences in the form of physical information 
or signals are known to propagate at a velocity which is less than that of light, it 
follows that a causal process is restrained to propagate at a velocity less than the 
speed of light in order to be able to carry and transmit a mark.
It is essential to grasp a good understanding of how these causal concepts of 
causal processes, marks, propagation and interaction all tie together. So we shall now 
examine each notion in greater details in the ensuing sections.
3.2.1 Causal processes
Signals in the form of electromagnetic waves are propagated from the transmitter at 
the broadcasting station to the receiver in our television set at home. This is possible 
because casual influence can be propagated through space and time. Causal processes 
are the devices by which these influences are propagated or transmitted. Now let us 
look more closely at the notion of a process in the context of Salmon’s theory. While
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no formal definition is attempted, a process is supposed to be something which has 
much greater temporal duration and probably of greater spatial extent than an event 
which is, in comparison, more localised in space and time. In the Minkowski spacetime 
diagram, events are represented by spacetime points while processes are represented 
by lines. An object at rest and yet persists through time therefore qualifies as a 
process. When seen in this light, familiar examples of processes include any object 
such as a car (whether stationary or moving), a light pulse or even a shadow of an 
aircraft moving across the landscape. Such objects are considered as processes in 
the sense that they are represented by their respective worldlines on the Minkowski 
diagram. A car travelling from town A  to town B  is a process and so is a stationary 
car that stays parked in the garage from Monday to Friday. Activation of a photocell 
is an event but a pulse of light travelling from a distant star and a shadow of an 
aircraft moving over the landscape would both count as processes.
In general, when one speaks of a process, it is intuitively conceived to be con­
stituted out of a sequence of events. However, Salmon contends that this way of 
thinking about a process is not essential. For him, an essential feature of a process 
lies in the degree of constancy of of its own structure11,
A given process, whether causal or pseudo, has a certain  degree 
o f un iform ity  - we m ay say , som ewhat loosely, that it  exhibits 
a certain  degree o f structure.
Without committing to a definition of what is considered to be “a constancy of 
structure”, Salmon regards a process as the persistence in spacetime of an entity, 
which invariably manifests itself in the constancy of quality or structure as similar to 
Russell’s “causal lines” as we have already met in Section 2.6.
Intended for as the foundation of a theory of physical causation, Salmon finds it 
necessary to lend the concept of processes scientific legitimacy. In SRel, an “event” is 
a frame-independent concept. And the spacetime manifold is regarded as a collection 
of events that bear space-time relations to one another. That is, SRel has been built
11Salmon, W.C. (1984), p.144.
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upon an “event ontology”. An alternative approach to SRel, originated by Alfred A. 
Robb12, employs solely the idea of light paths to determine the fundamental relation 
of “before and after” between time instants out of which the geometrical properties 
of space can be constructed. Furthermore, he also shows that it is possible to recover 
Minkowski’s purely analytical treatment by the introduction of coordinates in his 
spacetime system. In particular, the “before” and “after” relation enables him to 
establish the invariance of the interval as in Minkowski geometry. Robb carried the 
deep conviction that a description for spacetime relations by abstract geometry should 
correspond with physical facts and he thought such a correspondence ought to be 
established by the physical properties of light, because the experimental observations 
at that time all led to the conclusion that the speed of light represents an upper limit, 
a physical bound, at which causal influences can travel. The “causal element” enters 
into Robb’s theory via the definition of the primitive “after” relation by reference to 
the ability of producing an effect at one instant by another. Causality is thus reduced 
to a temporal relation between events. Paths of light are the basic entities used in 
his theory and Robb especially calls attention to their continuous character13,
The types o f geom etry with which we are specially concerned 
when we a ttem pt to m ap out tim e and space involve an infi­
n ite  se t o f elem ents form ing what is called a “C ontinuum ”.
The classes o f these elem ents, such as lines, planes, e tc., with  
which we are concerned, are defined by m eans o f certain  rela­
tions among the elem ents involved.
The continuous character of these basic units of analysis seems just what Salmon 
has intended for his processes. Based on Robb’s seminal work, Salmon argues that 
one may equally well adopt a “process ontology” for SRel. SRel places a constraint 
on the upper limit of propagation of signals and information. It is because of this that 
a process, as a carrier of causal influences in the form of signals or information, must 
therefore be restricted to travelling at less than or equal to the speed of light c. In
12Robb, A.A. (1936).
13ibid., p.6.
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the Minkowskian language, this is tantamount to the statement that causal processes 
are coextensive with the lightcone - a conical region of spacetime surrounding an 
event which can be reached by a velocity less than or equal to the light speed. Only 
those processes found lying within or on the lightcone are capable as carriers of 
causal influences. This serves to rule out processes that travel at arbitrarily high 
velocities (those greater than c); that is, those which lie in the spacetime region 
outside the lightcone and hence are deemed incapable of transmitting causal influences 
and regarded as unphysical. Experience shows that damage is brought to a causal 
process like a car when it collides with a lamp post. On the other hand, a process 
like a shadow cannot be causal because processes as such are unable to bring about 
a genuine physical change, like an actual structural damage in the case of the car. 
The shadow of a car may be momentarily distorted as it crosses a lamp post, but it 
“regains” its original shape immediately after the encounter.
To cast these ideas in a better perspective, consider Salmon’s paradigm example 
of the astrodome. We are invited to think of a large circular building with a spotlight 
mounted at its center. Once the spotlight is switched on, a ray of light travels from 
the source to fall on a certain point on the far wall and this ray constitutes a causal 
process. Now suppose the spotlight is mounted on some sort of rotating mechanism 
like a turntable and is set into rotation. Although the spot of light it casts upon the 
wall revolves in a highly regular fashion - thereby possesses the essential feature of 
being a process - Salmon wants to rule out this revolving spot of light as a genuine 
causal process.
To understand how he makes the distinction, it is advisable to first take stock 
of the similarity and difference in the two cases. The ray of light and the spot are 
similar in that both appear to be spatio-temporal continuous processes exhibiting a 
high degree of uniformity. The subtle difference lies in the fact that the ray of light 
is capable to sustain itself without an external aid once it departs from the source. 
On the contrary, the light spot on the wall will not persist without the source, quite 
independent of its prior history. Put another way, the continuous appearance of the 
moving spot of light is constituted out of a series of “unlinked” units of different tiny
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spots of light at each position on the wall each spot occupies. These spots are created 
by the series of positions on which the rotating beam falls. We ought then to devise 
a method, a criterion to distinguish this sort of disconnected regularities from those 
that arise because of a cause-effect relation. The chosen criterion must capture the 
ability of causal processes to produce physical changes and these resulting changes 
are to be “carried along”, or in technical jargon, transmitted by the process itself 
through space and time. In Salmon’s framework, the essential features of a causal 
process are: (i) that it would persist even if it was isolated from external causal 
influences (that is, regardless of whatever happens elsewhere), (ii) it has the capacity 
to produce physical changes (that is, to “mark” or being “marked” when coming into 
contact and interacting with other processes) and (iii) its ability to transmit causal 
influences (that is, transmitting the mark that results from its physical interaction 
with another process). These ideas are summarized in the following quote14,
A causal process is one that is self-determ ined and n ot para­
sitic  upon other causal influences. A causal process is one that 
transm its energy, as well as inform ation  and causal influence.
The fundam ental criterion  fo r  distinguishing self-determ ined  
energy transm itting processes from  pseudo-processes is the ca­
pability o f such processes o f transm itting m arks.
The notion of a causal process is thus intuitively bound up with the idea of the 
transmission of marks, since it is defined in terms of the latter. Because of the central 
role played by the notion of transmission, it deserves a detailed examination in its 
own right. For heuristic reasons it would perhaps seem more appropriate to consider 
first the production of marks (or physical changes) before dealing with the concept of 
transmission. However, as the business of mark transmission is so much intertwined 
with the nature of causal processes, we shall now move on to consider the topic of 
causal transmission in the next section.
14ibid., p. 146.
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3.2.2 Causal Transmission
Causal processes are identified as so by their abilities to participate in interactions 
that produce physical changes and to carry along or propagate these changes across 
spacetime regions. Speaking in the language of marks as physical changes undergone 
by processes, we say that causal processes can be marked and that they have the po­
tential to transmit these marks. On reflection, pseudo-processes may also be marked 
but the crucial difference is that the marks or changes so acquired are not genuinely 
physical in the sense that they cannot be transmitted beyond the point of interaction. 
A shadow may be distorted momentarily when it passes along a rough patch of the 
wall but would “spring back” to its original shape once it moves beyond.
Let us now return to the astrodome and concentrate on the light ray travelling 
from the rotating beacon to the wall. One may “intervene” by placing a red filter 
somewhere in its path. The intervention constitutes the production of a mark and at 
that point, the light ray is marked - it experiences a physical change as it becomes 
red. This mark is a genuine physical change as the light ray stays red all the way until 
it reaches the wall. In a like manner, the moving spot of light may also be marked 
by placing a piece of red glass at a particular point on the wall. The process - the 
light spot - will be modified and becomes red only at that one point but continues 
on beyond that point as if  no interaction had occurred previously. These examples 
serve to illustrate a very important condition for causal transmission, namely that, 
“a single in terven tion  a t one point in the process transform  it  in  a way  
that persists from  that poin t on”15.
In the case of the moving spot of light, one may choose to make the spot red at 
other places by the installation of a red lens in the source. This would, however, not 
constitute a local intervention at an isolated point in the process (here the spot) itself. 
One may also think of putting red glasses at places along the wall but again this fails 
to satisfy the above condition since it involves many interventions rather than just 
a single one. The condition thus, looks as though it is prima facie able to eliminate 
pseudo-processes. However, a clever counterexample exploited by Nancy Cartwright
15ibid., p.142.
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seems to have circumvented the above condition. If a red glass is inserted at the 
source a fraction of a second before the red lens is placed at the position of the wall 
on which the spot of light falls, argues Cartwright, then the light spot becomes red 
the moment it reaches the wall and will stay red (but only because of the red glass at 
the source) from that point on. This would make it appear like a single intervention 
at one point on the wall in the process of the moving spot has transformed it in 
such a way that persists beyond that point. To remedy this shortcoming, Salmon 
was forced to introduce a counterfactual claim into the above condition for causal 
transmission. He has to stipulate in the condition that the moving spot would have 
turned red in any case because of the red lens inserted at the source, even given that 
no marking activity had occurred locally at the wall. We are now in a position to 
state the modified criterion for mark transmission (M T)16,
Let P  be a process that, in the absence o f  in teractions with  
other processes , would rem ain uniform  with respect to  a char­
acteristic  Q, which it  would m anifest consisten tly over an in ­
terval that includes both o f the space-tim e poin ts A and B  (A  
7  ^ B ). Then a m ark (consisting o f a m odification o f Q into  
Q ’) , which has been introduced in to process P  by m eans o f a 
single local in teraction  at point A , is tran sm itted  to poin t B, 
i f  P  m anifests the m odification Q ’ at B  and all stages o f the 
process between A and B without additional in terventions.
Let us apply this criterion to the respective processes of the light ray and the 
spot of light and see if it fulfills its promise to make a distinction between the two. 
The light ray (process P), in the absence of interactions with other processes and 
being left on its own, would remain uniform with respect to the characteristic (Q) 
of being “white”, which it manifests constantly over an interval including the two 
spacetime points from the source (A) to the wall (B ). Then a mark that consists 
of a modification of the characteristic of being white (Q) into one being red (Q’),
16ibid., p.148.
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that has been introduced into the light ray by means of the insertion of a red glass 
at the source (A), is said to be “transmitted” to the wall (B ) if the light ray (P ) 
manifests the modification of being red (Q’) at the wall (B) and at all stages between 
A  and B  without additional interventions. The question of whether process P  is to 
maintain the modification all the way from the source to the wall is to be settled by 
observations and here it seems to be just what is expected.
Next we consider the case of the moving spot of light cast upon the wall. In 
the absence of interactions with other processes, this process (P ) would also remain 
uniform with respect to the characteristic (Q) of being a “white” spot and continue 
to manifest this characteristic uniformly over an interval between any two positions 
(A and B) along the wall. Once again, a mark can be introduced into P  by way of 
a red lens placed at A, which results in the characteristic of being a white spot (Q) 
changed into that of being red (Q;). Here, observations show that this mark (Q') 
would not be transmitted to point B  since once the spot moves beyond A , it reverts 
to being white once more. So, prima facie, M T can indeed be regarded as a sufficient 
criterion to make the distinction between causal and pseudo-processes.
The real test, however, remains with the Cartwright type counterexamples. The 
magic touch comes from the assurance levied upon the counterfactual claim that 
the process P  of the light spot would maintain the characteristic of being white 
in the absence of interactions with other processes. In Cartwright’s argument, even 
though the process itself has not gone into any sort of interaction with other processes 
(in this case, a red lens has not been placed at the point A), observations show 
that the spot would still become red; the spot would still suffer the modification 
Q'. In this instance, the counterfactual claim is proved to be wrong and hence the 
conclusion that P  is not a causal process follows. The falsehood of the counterfactual 
comes about because of the dependence of this particular process on an external 
source and it highlights the inability of the process to transmit the mark within 
itself. The introduction of a counterfactual then seems inevitable for the effective 
formulation of M T. Salmon seems to be much disturbed by this issue and fears that 
counterfactualness would undermine the objectivity of M T, as the determination of
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the truths of counterfactuals is by no means a straightforward philosophical matter. 
Since, as we shall see, that counterfactuals are also required in Salmon’s definition of 
causal interaction, we shall delay our exposition of counterfactuals until Section 3.3, 
which this issue will be examined in some detail.
We now turn to the core of M T - the notion of transmission. M T  stipulates that a 
mark (which has been introduced into the process by means of a single interaction) at 
A , is “transmitted” to point B  provided that the process P  manifests the modification 
11 a f  B  and 11 a f  all stages of P  between A  and B. For this reason, M T  is also widely 
known as the “at-af theory of causal transmission.
The “at-af theory was first proposed by Russell as a solution to the paradox 
of the flying arrow, one of the well-known Zeno paradoxes of motion. Intuitively, 
transmission involves something that moves across space and time and that is precisely 
why it is so closely associated with the notion of motion. In particular, it captures the 
fact that, for an entity to be transmitted from one point to another in the spacetime 
continuum, it must traverse “continuously” all the intermediate points. However, 
since there is no concept of a next point in a continuum, and in-between any two 
points, there always exists a continuum of others, one must therefore not consider 
separately the individual spacetime points within the motion except for the correlation 
of the different places with different times17,
I f  there is to be m otion , we m ust not analyse the relation in to  
occupation o f a place and occupation o f a tim e. For a m oving  
particle occupies m any places, and the essence o f m otion  lies 
in  the fa c t that they are occupied at different tim es.
And again18,
M otion  consists in the fa c t that, by occupation o f a place at 
a tim e , a correlation is established between places and tim es; 
when different tim es, throughout any period how ever short, are
17Russell, B. (1903), p.472.
18ibid., p.473.
68
correlated w ith  d ifferen t places, there is m otion; w hen d iffe ren t 
tim e s , throughout som e period how ever short, are all correlated  
w ith  the sam e place, there is rest.
W e m ay  now  proceed to sta te  our doctrine o f  m o tio n  in  ab­
stract logical term s, rem em bering tha t m a teria l particles are 
replaced by m any-one  relations o f  all tim es to som e places, 
or o f  all term s o f  a continuous one-d im ensiona l series t to  
som e term s o f  a continuous three-d im ensional series s. M o ­
tio n  consists broadly in  the correlation o f  d iffe ren t te rm s o f  t 
w ith d ifferen t te rm s o f  s. A  relation R  which has a single term  
o f  s fo r  its  converse dom ain  corresponds to a m a teria l particle  
which is at rest throughout all t im e ...T h e  m o tio n  is con tinu ­
ous i f  the correlating relation R  defines a con tinuous fu n c tio n .
I t  is to  be taken  as part o f  the defin ition  o f  m o tio n  tha t i t  is 
continuous, and tha t fu r th e r  it has f ir s t  and second d ifferen tia l 
coefficients.
In classical mechanics, such continuous functions are the equations of motion of 
a physical system, which are in essence mappings between the continuous series of 
coordinates and that of time that take the form: x  =  f(t).  Different forms of the 
function /  specify the different trajectories that correspond to the respective positions 
x  of the system at the corresponding times t.
Rather than thinking about how we are to connect the individual spacetime points 
that the particle occupies, one correlates instead a continuous series of places that a 
particle occupies during its motion with a continuous series of corresponding times at 
which the particle is found at those places. In effect, we have turned our attention from 
the individual single stages of the motion, to a multitude of stages, the “connection” 
of which is described by the continuous and differentiable functions.
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The central role of the notion of transmission in Salmon’s theory is thus justified. 
Transmission, as explicated in terms of the “at-af theory, equips one with these con­
tinuous, differentiable functions, which represent the equations of motion of physical 
systems that provide the physical connection of events situated at two locations in 
spacetime to amend the temporal gap. These physical connections are the causal 
connections we seek in Salmon’s theory of physical causation.
Classical laws of motion all subscribe to this “at-af idea, as a consequence of 
which they have become inseparable from the notion of a continuous trajectory in 
spacetime.
There is, apart from the differential representation of a particle’s trajectory, also 
the integral approach that takes into consideration the entire motion. While the two 
approaches stand on a par when one comes to consider causation in classical physics, 
there exist good reasons to believe that the integral approach is the more fundamental 
one whereby Salmon’s idea of a causal process may be extended to take account of 
causation in quantum physics. This task will be taken up in Chapters 5-7.
A related comment on the “at-af theory of causal transmission is to do with the 
status of causal laws. In “An “At-A t” Theory of Causal Influence”, Salmon says the 
following19,
Causal Processes are o f course, governed by natural laws; these  
laws constitu te regularities whose presence can be em pirically  
confirmed. Such regularities, presum ably, represent the kinds 
o f constant conjunctions to which Hume referred. The m ark  
m ethod m ay be said, roughly speaking, to  provide a m ethod fo r  
distinguishing causal regularities from  other types o f  regular­
ity  in  the world, including that which m ay be associated with  
pseudo-processes.
Causal processes are governed by natural laws: a classical object moving under 
a conservative force obeys Newton’s laws of motion for example. It is by virtue of
19Salmon, W.C. (1977), p.223.
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these functional laws that a description of the transmission of marks is possible via 
the 11 a t-a f theory. Such functional laws constitute the kind of constant conjoining 
regularities perceived by the Humeans. With the functional laws, the concept of the 
transmission of marks supplies the Humean regularities. Here, it is useful to follow 
Hempel20 to make a distinction between what he calls laws of coexistence and laws 
of succession. Laws of coexistence expresses merely a mathematical relationship but 
laws of succession are concerned with temporal changes in a system. Those physical 
laws that fall under the heading of the laws of succession are what we regard as causal 
laws and a functional law like Newton’s second law of motion falls neatly into such 
a category. Functional laws are thus elevated to the status of causal laws in this 
sense. It must, however, be borne in mind that these causal laws are established by 
induction from empirical observations and they are susceptible to be proven wrong 
observationally. So to crown them with the grand title of causal laws does not im­
ply that they bear an element of ontological necessity. In fact, Salmon intends his 
causal theory to provide only a sufficient condition for causation to obtain in physical 
situations.
3.2.3 Casual Interactions
Given that marks are essential in deciding whether a process is causal or not and 
the production of marks is to be explicated as the concept of causal interactions 
between processes; this is how the notion of interaction becomes firmly anchored in 
Salmon’s theory of causation. Interactions are important since they are responsible 
for the production of order and structure of causal processes. Experience tells us 
that after a direct physical interaction between two processes (or loosely speaking, 
moving objects), both will be affected in such a way that any changes so suffered in 
each as a result of the encounter would become correlated. Two billiard balls collide 
and their subsequent motion are to be constrained by a correlation governed by the 
law of conservation of linear momentum. In moving from the classical picture to a 
quantum one, the notion of interaction must now be modified to take account of the
20Hempel, C., (1965).
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probabilistic character.
In the Muller scattering of two electrons, e“ e“ —>e- e“ , the rules of quantum me­
chanics provide for us a recipe to obtain the so-called scattering amplitude of the 
interaction. The modulus square of this amplitude gives essentially the probability 
for such an interaction (the scattering) to take place. The calculation involves the 
considerations of both energy and momentum. The probability characterisation of 
interactions arises from the statistical nature of events in the world as revealed by 
quantum theory. However, this suggestion of characterizing interactions by statistical 
correlations does by no means go without reservations, for one immediately comes 
to notice that there are situations where although two processes are statistically cor­
related, the dependency arises not due to any actual physical interaction between 
the two, but rather to some other special background conditions. These background 
conditions are what generally known as common causes. Examples of common-cause 
situations are many and varied and a simple one would be that of poisonous mush­
rooms being sold in a supermarket and have been independently procured by two 
individuals X  and Y  who had fallen ill on account of them. There are two indepen­
dent causal processes linking the consumption of the mushrooms to each individual 
but there is no physical interaction between X  and Y  whatsoever. In fact, X  and Y  
need not be in the slightest acquaintance! The illness of X  has no direct consequence 
upon that of Y. Besides, chance coincidences are, of course, not impossible - X  could 
have fallen ill because of the food intake of another kind instead of the mushrooms. 
These considerations help to illustrate that the existence of common causes cannot 
be inferred with absolute certainty but only with some degree of probability. This 
probability is surely to increase if there are to be repeated occurrences of the coin­
cidence. On this basis, Reichenbach21 characterizes common causes by a species of 
statistical forks - the conjunctive forks - to capture the idea that the common cause 
is the connecting link that transforms an independence into a dependence,
P(A,B)  > P(A)xP(B)  
21 Reichenbach, H. (1956), p.l57ff.
(3.1)
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Formally, a conjunctive fork is best seen as an indicator of the existence of a
common cause provided the following conditions are met,
P(A,B\C) = P(A\C)xP(B\C)  (3.2)
P(A,B\C) = P(A\C)xP(B\C)  (3.3)
P(A\C) > P(A\C) (3.4)
P{B\C) > P(B\C)  (3.5)
The first two conditions describe the fact that the correlation between the events 
A and B  is dependent on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a third event C. 
The last two conditions capture the fact that the occurrences of events A  and B  are 
individually dependent on that of C.
It can be shown that the above four defining conditions for the conjunctive fork 
entails the 11 screening-off1 condition:
P(B\C) = P(B\A, C) (3.6)
To screen-off means to make statistically irrelevant. The condition stipulates that 
the common cause C makes each of the two effects A  and B  statistically irrelevant to 
each other. In other words, A and B  are correlated only because a variation in the 
outcome C induces a correlated variation in the outcomes of A  and B.  In the absence 
of any variation in C, there is no correlation between A  and B: there is no direct 
interaction between A  and B  even though there may be two independent processes 
with one leading from C  to A  and the other from C  to B.  Unfortunately, the analysis 
is not as straightforward as Reichenbach had anticipated. While the principle of
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common cause asserts that an event that qualifies as a common cause must satisfy 
the four defining conditions, the converse does not necessarily hold since any event C 
that fulfills these conditions may not qualify as a bona fide common cause of A  and 
B.  The identification of the legitimate common cause depends upon the successful 
identification of the physical processes leading from the common cause event to each 
of the two correlated subsequent events.
It is indeed Salmon’s important observation that there exists a specific type of 
common cause that violates the conjunctive fork. This happens when two processes 
interact which leads to mutually correlated modifications that remain with them 
beyond the locus of interaction. Under such circumstances, the two processes are 
said to participate in a causal interaction and the conjunctive fork is to be replaced 
by what Salmon calls an interactive fork.
P(A,B\C) > P(A\C)xP(B\C)  (3.7)
Here, the common cause C does not statistically screen-off the two effects A  and B  
from each other. Rather, the relevant fact is that A  and B  are directly correlated due 
to the physical interaction C. The geometrical picture behind an interaction is one 
that involves the intersection (or encounter) of two causal processes at a particular 
region of spacetime.
However, one may at once raise the question if the intersection of two pseudo­
processes in a region of spacetime is to be readily regarded as an interaction. Is 
there a difference between intersections that lead to genuine causal interactions and 
those that do not? The shadows of the paths of two airplanes may cross and coincide 
momentarily but as soon as the shadows have passed the intersection point, both 
move as if nothing had ever occurred. So a crucial ingredient is required to distinguish 
between the mere crossings of processes without any form of interaction and those 
crossings at which real physical interactions take place. It is often observed that if 
there had been an actual physical interaction, each process concerned would have
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suffered an enduring modification as a consequence of their encounter. Modifications 
can already occur whenever at least one of the processes involved is a causal process. 
Placing a red lens on the wall marks the light spot red. Although the spot is a 
pseudo-process, it nevertheless interacts with another causal process - the red lens - 
and is modified to becoming red but only at the point of intersection and not beyond. 
On the other hand, it is entirely possible for two causal processes to intersect without 
neither suffering subsequent modifications. Two light rays can pass through each 
other without leaving any lasting effect upon either. Both rays have the capacity to 
undergo physical interactions but in this instance they do not. One is thus cautioned 
on the fact that the requirement of both the intersecting processes be causal is a 
necessary though not sufficient condition of producing lasting changes in both. But 
of course, what we want to capture in the theory is that whenever there is a genuine 
physical interaction, the processes involved would suffer lasting modifications beyond 
the point of their encounter22. With these observations in mind, Salmon formulates 
the P rincip le o f  Causal In tera c tio n  (C l)23,
Let Pi and P2 be two processes tha t in tersec t w ith  one another  
at the space-tim e po in t 5 , which belongs to the h istories o f  both.
Let Q be a characteristic  tha t process P\ would exhibit through­
out an in terval (which includes subin tervals on both sides o f  
S  in  the h istory  o f  P \) i f  the in tersec tion  w ith  P2 did n o t oc­
cur; let R  be a characteristic  tha t P2 would exhibit throughout 
an in terva l (which includes sub-intervals on both sides o f  S  
in  the h isto ry  o f  P2 )  i f  the in tersec tion  w ith P\ did n o t occur. 
T hen f the in tersec tion  o f  Pi and P2 a t S  constitu tes a causal 
in teraction  if:
(1) Pi exhibits the characteristic Q before S , but i t  exhibits a modified  
characteristic  Q' throughout an in terva l im m edia te ly  fo llow ing  S ;
22This requirement implies that both processes need to be causal.
23Salmon, W.C. (1984), p.171.
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and
(2) P2 exhibits the characteristic R before S, but it exhibits a modified 
characteristic R! throughout an in terval im m ediately  follow ing S.
A few obvious comments on the above definition are in place. First, as acknowl­
edged by Salmon himself, C l is clearly counterfactual24. The introduction of the 
counterfactual responds chiefly to the need to bar cases where the intersection of two 
pseudo-processes appears to satisfy the principle. When a red lens is installed at the 
rotating spotlight, the light spot on the wall would become red (and not maintaining 
its previous whiteness) irrespective of the fact that the spot itself has not undergone 
any intersection with another process. The failure of the counterfactual clause in this 
instance serves to dismiss a possible intersection between the spot and the red filter 
placed at one location of the wall as a genuine causal interaction.
Salmon resorts, as we shall see later in Section 3.3.2, to elaborated controlled 
experiments to assist the establishment of the truth values of these counterfactuals. 
His dissatisfaction with the adoption of a counterfactual condition in the definition 
stems from the same worry he has for M T, namely, that the overall objectivity of 
the theory may be grossly undermined.
Second, C l is formulated explicitly in terms of two and two processes only (the 
“X ”-type interactions) and it requires the continuing existence of these two processes 
even though they are to suffer mutual modifications in an interaction. This is partic­
ularly problematic where there is to be creation or annihilation of processes resulting 
from the interaction. Examples of this kind abound in the world of elementary par­
ticle physics. A radioactive nucleus may undergo spontaneous decay into a number 
of particles. Salmon calls cases like these Y-type interactions. In an annihilation in­
teraction between a positron and an electron, one finds a situation in which the e+e“ 
pair “vanishes” and in their place come two different processes altogether. There are 
also processes such as a snake swallowing an egg, which constitutes a typical A-type
24As one is informed by the phrases: “Let Q (R ) be a characteristic that process P\ (P2) would 
exhibit through an interval if the intersection with P2 (Pi) did not occur.”
76
interaction. He admits that it would be far more desirable for a principle of causal 
interaction to be able to deal with these important physical scenarios as well25,
Since a large number o f fundam ental physical in teractions are 
o f  the Y -type and o f the X-type, there would appear to  be a 
significant advantage in defining in teractive forks in  term s o f  
these configurations, instead o f the x-type. Unfortunately, I  
have not seen how this can be accomplished, fo r  i t  seem s es­
sen tia l to have two processes going in and two processes coming 
out in  order to exploit the idea o f m utual m odification.
There is a deeper dimension to Salmon’s thinking which comes to mind. He has 
explained that the reference to two incoming processes and two outgoing processes is 
required to capture the idea of mutual modification. However, the requirement is ac­
tually more stringent than what it appears to be. Each of the two incoming processes 
must maintain its identity over time; that is, to remain the same process in order to 
provide a basis for the modifications or changes of the respective characteristics or 
properties to occur. Clearly, such a requirement is quite incapable of dealing with 
changes that correspond to entities that pop in and out of existence. This unfortunate 
state of affairs is exemplified by the fundamental physical phenomena of the creation 
and annihilation of subatomic particles. With the very issue of identity over time at 
stake, are we able retain this concept of change? It is without doubt that coming 
into being or ceasing to exist would undeniably count as legitimate changes that may 
happen to an entity. We shall not dwell upon these issues here but this discussion 
will re-emerge again later in the chapter to follow next.
I should, however, indicate a possibly misleading point. This concerns the linguis­
tic usage of the term “interaction”. Interaction is, in its simplest form, a two-place 
relation between two incoming processes. It does seem rather odd and counterintu­
itive to say that a single process “interacts with itself’ and in particular, in Y -type 
interactions where only a single incoming process is involved (for instance, in the case
25ibid., p.181-182.
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of a spontaneous decay). However, a precise treatment according to quantum field 
theory tells us that it is indeed the interaction with the vacuum that induces the 
decay of the atom.
So, although at first sight C l does not seem to be able to cater for the T-type 
“interactions” , it is an adequate condition if these Y -type interactions are analyzed 
in more correct and finer26 details.
Third, notice that neither the interactive nor the conjunctive fork enters into the 
definition of C l, though they have both played a large part in motivating the principle. 
And in fact Salmon thinks that statistical characterization of causal interactions is 
not desirable. He says, and I quote, from a footnote27,
In (Salm on, 1978), I  suggested that in teractive forks could be 
defined sta tistica lly , in  analogy with conjunctive forks, but I  
now think that the sta tistica l characterization is inadvisable.
In this connection, Ben Rogers28 has ably conducted a careful analysis on how the 
statistical forks, both of the conjunctive and interactive varieties, may possibly relate 
to the Cl. To be sure, the conjunctive fork has been defined in terms of events and in 
order to make a comparison with cases of processes, one must set up a correspondence 
between events and processes. This is done as follows. A process is considered to 
be associated with a set of properties that a process of that kind may possess. The 
state of a process at a particular time is taken to be the set of properties it possesses 
at that time. In this framework, we are allowed to think about the probability of 
the process being in any other possible states in another time. A causal interaction 
would then involve a change in the probability distributions over the possible states 
of each process as a result of the interaction. Following Rogers, let A  denotes the 
event where the first process has a particular property at t<i and B  be the event that 
the second process has a property at 12 . Also let C represent the event where the 
two processes have intersected at a previous time t\ fa  > t\) and C represent the
26The atom and vacuum field represent two processes.
27ibid., p.174.
28Rogers, B. (1981).
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event where the two processes have not intersected at time t\. It is obvious that the 
following relations hold:
P(A, B\C) ±  P(A\C)xP(B\C) (3.8)
P(A, B\C) ^  P(A\C)xP(B\C) (3.9)
P(A\C) ^  P(A\C) (3.10)
P(B\C) ^  P(B\C) (3.11)
Comparing the first condition (equation (3.8)) with that which characterizes the 
conjunctive fork in equations (3.2-3.5), one comes to realise that while the definition of 
the conjunctive fork requires a cause to raise the probability of its effect, the definition 
of causal interaction only requires a change in the probability of an event with respect 
to those cases with interactions and those without. Another salient point should by 
now become transparent: the condition in equation (3.8) implied by the thesis of 
causal interaction is different from that respectively implied by both the conjunctive 
and the interactive forks. So Rogers concludes29,
A s fa r  as in teractions are concerned f the im portan t fa c t is 
that a causal in teraction  brings about a change (increase or 
decrease)  in  the distribu tion  o f probabilities am ong the possi­
ble sta te  o f affairs, measured with respect to the distribution  
given by the law o f non-interactive evolution o f  the process in  
question.
and30,
29ibid., p.208. 
30ibid., p.213.
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I  have argued above that the characterization o f causal in ter­
action, (which is required to get clear about any notion  o f  com­
m on cause) should be m ore general than those o f either con­
ju n ctive  fork  or in teractive fork.
A last side-comment on C l concerns the temporal symmetrical character of the 
principle. Normally, when one speaks of two processes being “modified as a result” 
of their interaction, one has already assumed which are the prior states and which 
are the subsequent ones. Salmon considers such introduction of a prior temporal 
asymmetry inadvisable for it would not admit a causal theory of time. In his view, 
it is best to treat both the notions of causal interaction and causal transmission as 
temporally symmetric31,
The principle C l, as form ulated previously, involves tem poral 
com m itm ents o f ju s t this sort. H owever, these can be purged 
easily by saying that Pi and P2 exhibit Q and R, respectively, 
on one side o f  the in tersection  at S. W ith this reform ula­
tion , C l  becomes tem porally sym m etric. W hen one is dealing 
with questions o f tem poral anisotropy or “direction”, this sym ­
m etric  form ulation  should be adopted. Problem s regarding the 
structure o f tim e are not o f prim ary  concern in  this book; nev­
ertheless, I  am  trying to  develop causal concepts that w ill fit  
harm oniously w ith a causal theory o f tim e.
3.3 The Epistem ology of Causation
The problems raised by Hume’s famous empiricist critique of causation pose a major 
challenge for later generations of scholars on the subject. Just how one comes to jus­
tify that there indeed exist causal connections in nature that are quite independent 
of the human intellect and at the same time conform faithfully to the Humean em­
pirical strictures? Salmon stands up to this challenge with his 1984 theory of process
31Salmon, W.C. (1984), p.176, footnote.
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causation.
One often infer causal claims from premises that record one’s observations and 
causal judgements are verified by observing that certain conditions obtain. In or­
der to adhere to empirical doctrines, such conditions are to be formulated in such a 
way that they deploy only concepts whose satisfaction is observationally accessible. 
It is vital that one does not introduce conditions that makes one unable to explain 
how one can know whether or not they obtain. Indeed, if causal knowledge is in­
ferential knowledge from observations, it is all the more wanting to have an account 
of observational conditions on which causal judgements are based. This is precisely 
what Salmon sets out to achieve by trying to reduce the causal concepts of processes, 
marks, transmission and interactions to empirical observations. Salmon’s 1984 the­
ory is an explicit account of knowledge linking the causal relation to its conditions of 
observability. Disciplined by empirical observability, Salmon’s theory is a promising 
candidate to initiate the contact between causation and a science which is founded 
on empirical observations like physics.
As we have already expounded in some details in the previous sections, the picture 
that Salmon 1984 presents to us is one such that the causal structure of the world can 
be seen as an attempt to specify the relation that obtains between two events (at two 
spacetime points) just in case the earlier is a causal factor in the occurrence of the 
latter. Here a continuous path (of some physical entity) in spacetime (a causal process 
in Salmon’s terminology) that terminates in the two events (the causal interactions) 
at both ends, is a prerequisite for the two events to be connected. This mode of 
connection in turn warrants that the events are causally related. In essence, the 
causal relation is one of the connectibility between two events. This leaves us with 
the question of how the central notions of process and interaction may be defined in 
such a way to satisfy the empiricist requirement that conditions from which we are 
incapable of telling how we can know whether they obtain or not are excluded.
In relation to the epistemology of causal processes, we consider the following. 
For any two distinct points in the continuous spacetime manifold, there exists an 
infinity of paths connecting them. How is it possible for us to delineate those which
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are considered as causal? In the first instance, Salmon appeals to the theory of 
special relativity and relies on the possibility of physical transmission of information 
at velocities less than the speed of light to make the distinction between causal paths 
and non-causal ones. This, however, calls for an immediate refinement, for it does not 
take one long to realise that non-causal or pseudo-processes may travel at sub-luminal 
velocities, although in that case it remains incapable of transmitting information 
or signals. This prompts Salmon to adopt the concept of transmission of (causal) 
information as a criterion to decide causal processes against pseudo ones. Causal 
processes are distinguished by virtue of their ability to transmit or propagate causal 
information, it is to be insisted that there is no transmission of causal information 
even for v <C c, as far as pseudo-processes are concerned. This, as we have discussed, 
is the rationale behind M T, which stipulates that a process, P , linking two spacetime 
points, c and e, is causal iff upon a single local interaction within P, P  suffers a lasting 
modification in one of its characteristics, which would have maintained its original 
form had the interaction not occurred. Moreover, a “lasting” modification or change 
in the characteristic means that the modification is to be found at all spacetime 
points from c to e in the absence of further interactions. The concept of transmission, 
argues Salmon, has now been fully explicated in terms of the empirically observational 
statement: “the modification in the characteristic of P is to be found at all spacetime 
points from c to e ” - the celebrated “at-af theory of causal transmission. The “at- 
a f  theory, as we have already explained, forms the basis of the continuous functional 
laws of physics. Physical entities with equations of motion given by these laws are 
thus regarded as causal processes. The question of which particular subset of the 
spacetime manifold a causal process is comprised may now be answered by reference 
to the physical law that governs the particular process.
In other words, a process that qualifies as causal must be able to undergo a a single 
local interaction and an at-at transmission of its causally modified characteristics. To 
complete the task, it remains for Salmon to reduce the causal notion of interaction 
to observational conditions. His Principle of Causal Interaction (Cl) which attempts 
to explicate interaction in terms of the geometrical intersection in spacetime of two
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processes which can be observed. However, this is complicated by the need to specify 
which intersections are to be considered as proper interactions. C l stipulates that 
only those intersections, as a result of which both processes suffer mutual changes 
in some of their own characteristics, would count as legitimate interactions. The 
interrelations between these concepts are depicted in the chart given in Figure 3-1 
below.
Interaction
Two processes 
intersect
Causal
processes
At-At
transmission
Both processes 
suffer mutual 
changes in 
characteristics
| | - EMPIRICALLY OBSERVATIONAL STATEMENTS
Figure 3.1: Interrelations of Causal Concepts in Salmon 1984.
At first sight, it seems that Salmon has managed to reduce the causal notions of 
processes and interactions to empirically verifiable observational statements, or has 
he not? As for causal interaction, the answer rests with whether all “changes in the 
characteristics ” resulting from the interactions of processes are observable in principle 
or not. Cases of collision between moving billiard balls that lead to observable changes 
in the motions of both surely fit very neatly into the category. However, it is not hard 
to think of examples where there are interactions that do not lead to any observable 
change in the motions of the interacting objects. One can find many situations of 
this kind when a system of forces act in a state of equilibrium. Take for example 
two weights that are attached, each at one end, to a lever that keeps the latter in
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equilibrium (Figure 3-2). In equilibrium, forces act in such a way that the resultant of 
the observable individual effects of each weight32 acting alone is zero and one therefore 
observes no movement of the lever33.
Figure 3.2: Two weights attached to a lever to maintain its equilibrium
There are several interesting aspects to this scenario. First, there is obviously 
an intersection of two processes at each point of contact of between a weight and 
the lever. However, if Salmon’s C l is to be construed as an intersection at a “single 
spacetime point”34, then for this particular system, there appears to be continuous 
intersections at both points of contact, at least in a temporal sense. The continuous 
interactions of each mass with the lever cancel the effects that correspond to each 
being allowed to act alone. As a result, the lever remains leveled as if  it is free 
from all interactions. So it seems not always the case that interactions are to be 
accompanied by observable changes35 in an entity’s characteristic (the motion of the 
lever in this instance).
Sober 36 voices his objection to C l by considering a similar scenario,
Suppose a billiard ball in  un iform  m otion  were bombarded by a 
m ultip licity  o f influences that cancelled out each other. M any  
com ponent causes impinged, but the ne t force was zero. The
32If only one weight is attached, say, at the end A, the lever would have been tilted in an anti­
clockwise direction because of the torque.
33Strains and stresses are regarded as immaterial.
34Construed as a particular spatial point at a specific time.
35This is reminiscent of the argument leading to the formulation of the Principle of Virtual Work 
in classical mechanics. Indeed, the great founder of analytical mechanics, Jean-Louis Lagrange 
(Lagrange, J-L. (1997)) opened his timeless masterpiece ilMecanique Analytique” by asserting that 
the effect of forces are only empirically known through the changes in motion: the work done they 
produce. So as the argument proceeds, the principle of virtual work states that the total work 
done by applied forces in keeping a system in equilibrium must be zero since the system exhibits no 
observable changes in motion.
36Sober, E. (1987), p.255.
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ball persisted  with the velocity it  had before. B u t this sub­
sequent sta te  was not w ithout its  causes. A fte r  all, forces 
impinged, and what are component forces i f  not component 
causes?
In most circumstances, the billiard ball would have had its motion altered by 
the impingement of one force and the alteration in its motion is an observable fact. 
Upon the bombardment by a multiplicity of forces, the individual effects due to the 
component forces cancel each other, leaving the ball in a state that is observationally 
equivalent to where no interaction has taken place. Once again, we conclude that there 
are instances where genuine interactions can occur without leading to any observable 
changes in characteristics of an object that participates in these interactions.
But before we may decide whether there is in fact an observable change in a 
characteristic, we ought to be sure about which characteristics we are making reference 
to. This turns out to be an issue beset by ambiguities. Indeed, Kitcher37 shows in 
a most strikingly extreme example that the unrestricted choice of the characteristics 
of intersecting processes can render C l empty. In his example, the characteristic 
that changes upon an intersection is taken to be the condition that for any pair of 
points on a continuous spacetime path, one belongs to the future lightcone of the 
other. So, if the respective characteristic is chosen to be “not having intersected 
the other process (another continuous spacetime path)’\  then after their intersection, 
these would have adopted the modified characteristic of “having intersected the other 
process (another continuous spacetime path)”. As there has been a change in this 
particular characteristic and since it looks as if all the conditions of C l are satisfied, 
Kitcher concludes that this intersection is a bona fide causal interaction.
Take a more concrete example. In his vagueness charge against Salmon’s use of 
certain terms such as “characteristic” and “structure” in the definitions of causal 
notions, Dowe provides the following38 scenario. In the morning, the shadow of the 
Sydney Opera House has the characteristic of being closer to the Harbor Bridge than
37Kitcher, P. (1989), p.466.
38Dowe, P. (1992a), p.201.
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the Opera House itself. Relatively speaking, the Opera House would have the char­
acteristic of being further away from the Harbor Bridge than its own shadow. As the 
day progresses, the Opera House and its shadow “coincide” at noon and from that 
point on, the respective characteristics of the Opera House and its shadow change and 
reverse to those of being closer to the Harbor Bridge than its own shadow and being 
further away from the Harbor Bridge than the Opera House itself So, the intersection 
of the Opera House and its shadow at noon constitutes a causal interaction according 
to Cl.
The real trouble with this class of examples is that “relational” properties have 
been selected as the relevant characteristics in which changes are to take place. Ar­
guably, such relational properties do not constitute the type of characteristics one 
should be interested in as far as the subject of causal interactions is concerned. But 
might there ever be a universal standard to rule out all those characteristics which 
are not desired39?
In particular, does one need to be in possession of the knowledge of a process being 
causal or not prior to deciding which characteristics do qualify as “appropriate” ? This 
could be a legitimate problem for Salmon’s 1984 program because causal processes are 
defined by their capabilities to propagate modifications of some of their characteristics 
introduced by single local interactions. The changes in the characteristics of the 
participating processes in a causal interaction are the means by which we are to pick 
out the causal processes and if these can only be identified from the knowledge that 
the processes which sustain such changes must themselves be causal, then the account
39An obvious way to do so in physics is to stipulate that only dynamical properties such as 
momentum and energy are to be regarded as genuine characteristics that undergo changes in a 
causal interaction because after all, there are exchanges of these objective quantities when physical 
interactions take place. Moreover, the adoption of such quantities as the relevant characteristics 
has the added virtue of ensuring that the changes in the processes are correlative since they obey 
conservation laws. In the collision of two billiard balls, the loss in momentum or energy in one 
ball is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the numerical value of the same quantity in the 
other; with the sole demand that the overall value of that particular quantity of the whole system 
remains constant. Thus, a reasonable choice for a characteristic that undergoes modifications in a 
physically causal interaction would seem to be a conserved quantity possessed by both intersecting 
processes. This is indeed the choice endorsed by Dowe in his 1992 formulation of the Conserved 
Quantity Theory of Causation.
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would be blatantly circular. Both Kitcher40 and Dowe41 have expressed such a worry 
with Salmon’s theory. The heart of the matter is really that since causal interaction 
(where there are changes in certain characteristics of the participating processes) 
figures prominently in the description of causal processes, must only causal processes, 
and not pseudo ones, undergo changes in some characteristics in a bona fide causal 
interaction?
3.3.1 The Circularity Charge
Let us put all these speculations into a more concrete form and consider Kitcher’s 
examples of pseudo- and derivative marks. Suppose a car grazes a stone wall and 
gets scratched. Two processes are found to be at work - the car and the stone wall. 
The car acquires a scratch that represents a change in a characteristic as a result of 
intersecting the stone wall. This intersection thus qualifies as a causal interaction in 
virtue of Cl. In addition, the mark - the scratch - is transmitted beyond the point of 
intersection by the moving car, the process itself. Hence, the car is a causal process 
in accordance with M T. At the same time when the car grazes the stone wall, its 
shadow changes its characteristics of being the shadow of a car to that of being the 
shadow of a scratched car. Now if one looks more carefully, also at this very moment, 
the shadow is intersecting with another process, namely, the patch of ground upon 
which it is cast. It appears that as a consequence of the intersection of the shadow 
and the ground, the shadow takes on a new characteristic of being the shadow of a 
scratched car while the patch of ground becomes darkened. There are modifications 
of characteristics of both of these processes - the shadow of the scratched car and the 
patch of ground. Besides, the “modified” characteristics of the shadow is transmitted 
beyond the locus of intersection. And thus, the shadow also qualifies as a causal 
process by virtue of M T.
At this juncture, a natural defence for Salmon is that the intersection should be 
“local” and “single” (i.e. without further intersections); he wants to say that the
40Kitcher (1989), p.463.
41op. cit., p.200.
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genuine marking interaction is the one between the car and the stone wall and not 
that between the shadow of the car and the patch of ground. But this is exactly where 
the difficulty arises! Whereas the interaction between the car and the stone wall is a 
single intersection local to the process of the car, the single intersection between the 
shadow and the patch of ground is, likewise, local to the process of the shadow.
So the defence is, prima facie, of no avail here. Still, there bound to exist a subtle 
difference between the two respective intersections so that we are justified in claiming 
that one is causal while the other is not.
The interaction, the mark, in the case of the car and the stone wall is of a legitimate 
causal nature but the one between its shadow and the ground can only assume its 
status as a pseudomark. The process that carries a pseudomark owes its very existence 
to another process and any modification of the characteristics of the former is parasitic 
upon the kind of interaction that happens to the latter. Just as in the case when a 
red lens is placed at one location on the wall of the astrodome, the moving spot is 
marked red at that point but not beyond. As the spot moves ahead it “reverts” to 
a state of being white again. However, had the red lens be placed at the source, the 
light ray would have been marked red, as would the spot.
So a counterfactual introduced to the effect that the spot would have not have 
turned red given no interaction occurs locally within itself is false; since the spot 
would have turned red anyway due to the red lens installed at the source. In other 
words, the counterfactual serves to filter out the spot as a pseudo-process as it would 
have changed from a state of being white to one being red even if  it has not intersected 
another process.
The change from the characteristic of being a white spot to that of a red one 
in this instance is dependent upon what has happened outside the process: namely, 
what has happened at the source. Hence, counterfactuals serve to eliminate processes 
that are dependent on an “outside source” for its survival and as so, they function as 
effective selectors of the sort of characteristic changes that are of relevance when it 
comes to the determination of a “causal” intersection of processes.
Similarly, in the case of the car and its shadow, one should expect a counterfactual
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statement to play also the essential role of barring a case like the shadow of a scratched 
car from being qualified as a genuine causal process.
Such a counterfactual would read: the shadow would not have turned into a shadow 
of a scratched car given that no interaction occurs locally within the shadow itself. 
However, in this instance, there is a local interaction - the intersection between the 
shadow and the patch of ground on which it falls - within the process of the shadow 
itself. Granted that an interaction and a change (into a shadow of a scratched car) 
have occurred, the counterfactual fails to tell that the change in characteristic has, in 
fact, not arisen from this particular interaction between the shadow and the ground. 
And the appeal to counterfactuals for identifying the relevant changes in characteristic 
in a genuine interaction breaks down.
This brings us back to address the circularity charge that Salmon’s theory has 
been accused of. The issue of the matter is such that, in the case of the shadow, be 
it one of the previously un-scratched or now scratched car, it owes its very existence 
to the interactions between the light rays, the car and the ground; that is, to the 
intersections between causal processes. It thus seems obvious that a causal process is 
indeed needed in order to pick out those changes in the relevant characteristics arising 
from intersections that are deemed to be genuine causal interactions. On the other 
hand, in order to decide which processes are causal, a causal interaction, a change 
in the relevant characteristic, for distinguishing them from non-causal processes is 
required. Since both notions - causal interactions and causal processes - are defined 
in terms of each other, the account is circular. The circularity charge is shown in the 
diagram in Figure 3-3 below.
There are two equivalent avenues one may explore in terms of disentangling the 
circularity. First, instead of asserting that the only relevant changes in characteristics 
involved in an intersection are those sustained by causal processes, we may state in an 
explicit manner just what these characteristics consist in. Only when the ambiguities 
are removed and a clear definition of just what are the relevant sort of characteristics 
obtains, then the restriction of the requirement of just causal processes to intersect
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Figure 3.3: The circularity charge against Salmon 1984.
can be duly relaxed. Under such circumstances, specifications of the relevant charac­
teristics dictate what count as genuine causal interactions. Together with the criterion 
of “at-a f transmission, they decide when a process is causal. Alternatively, one may 
find oneself to be more at ease with a definition of causal processes that is indepen­
dent of the notion of interaction and define interaction as the intersection of causal 
processes. Both approaches of rescuing Salmon’s theory from the charge of circularity 
are laid out in Figure 3-4.
One immediately comes to notice that the two schemes differ in the vital aspect of 
causal transmission. In fact, these represent the two approaches adopted by Salmon 
and Dowe in the most up-to-date versions of their respective conserved theories of 
causation. We shall discuss these accounts in details in Chapter 4.
In the second scheme, we see that the definition of causal processes ought to be 
wide enough to capture the changes of characteristics that are deemed to be relevant
- EMPIRICALLY OBSERVATIONAL 
STATEMENTS
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Figure 3.4: Possible approaches to the resolution of the circularity charge 
against Salmon 1984.
to a causal interaction. Moreover, it ought also to encapsulate the dynamics of the 
transmission of causal influences. We shall see in Chapter 4 that this indeed is the 
route that Dowe takes in his construction of the Conserved Quantity Theory.
3.3 .2  T h e P rob lem  o f C ounterfactuals
Counterfactual conditions are required by Salmon to delineate the right causal pro­
cesses and causal interactions, as we have already seen in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
However, we have also learnt that counterfactuals are not always effective in telling 
causal processes from non-causal ones (see the example of the “shadow of a scratched
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car in Section 3.3.1). The problem is closely connected with the ambiguities in de­
ciding which one should indeed be regarded as the right kind of characteristics that 
figure in causal interactions, which in turn find their ways into the definition of causal 
processes.
It is therefore appropriate to consider in some more details the use of counterfac­
tuals in Salmon’s 1984 theory since they are intimately bound up with the distinction 
between causal and pseudo-processes. Following Kitcher42, we consider the example 
of a baseball hitting and shattering a window. The two events of the bat hitting the 
ball and the ball shattering the window are connected by the causal process of the 
baseball in flight. Suppose we focus on the window alone and call this causal process 
P. Also let Pt denotes the point at which the window shatters on being hit by the 
ball and P/ be some earlier point at which its temperature is changed through the 
impact of a sudden gust of wind. Consider a segment of the causal process P  that 
links Pt and P/. There are interactions at both ends of this segment: the interaction 
with the gust of wind P/ and the subsequent one with the baseball at Pt. However, it 
is obvious that the existence of this particular structure of interactions and processes 
is not crucial to the causal history of the event of window shattering. As Kitcher 
maintains,
To specify the conditions under which c and e are causally re­
lated, we need to build into the account the idea that the in itial 
in teraction  produces the m odification that is responsible fo r  the 
characteristics o f the term inal in teraction . In tu itively, what is 
lacking is the kind o f articulated structure that I  envisaged in  
the building up o f complex processes out o f sim ple ones.
Why do we pick the interaction of the baseball rather than the temperature change 
resulting from the interaction with the gust of wind as the relevant event that con­
tributes to the window shattering? There is a good physical reason for it: the mo­
mentum of the baseball provides just the right impact force to break the window
42op. cit., p.470.
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while the temperature differential is not substantial enough for the same purpose.
Kitcher thus argues that in order to keep a good record of the relevant causal 
history leading up to the event of the window shattering, counterfactuals cannot be 
avoided in order to stipulate and keep track of the momentum exchanges within this 
particular history. He claims that the causal explanation should look something like 
the following,
(A) I f  the bat had not intersected P\ (the ball) then the momentum of Pi would 
have been different.
(B) I f  the momentum of P\ after its intersection with the bat had been different 
then the momentum of P\ just prior to its intersection with P2 (the window) 
would have been different.
(C) I f  the momentum of P\ just prior to its intersection with P2 had been 
different then the properties of P2 just after the intersection would have 
been different.
Kitcher aims to downplay the significance of causal processes and causal interac­
tions in favour of counterfactuals43,
The crucial point is that our claim  o f a causal relation between 
c and e depends not sim ply on the existence o f the in teractions  
and the processes but on our acceptance o f the counterfactu­
als (A)-(C) (or o f related weaker versions). W e have to invoke 
counterfactual notions not only in characterizing the concepts 
o f causal processes and causal in teraction  but also in  singling  
out the causal processes and causal in teractions that are rele­
vant to particu lar even ts.
But do we really need counterfactuals in so emphatical a manner as Kitcher has 
suggested, to specify the momentum in every stage of the causal structure? Probably 
not, if we hold to the principle of the conservation of momentum. The principle 
conveniently keeps track of the various quantities of momentum involved. Conceived 
as a law of nature, the principle would support counterfactual claims. So the appeal 
to precise statements of physical laws eliminates the need for counterfactuals.
43ibid.
93
This much being said, there is, however, a finer-grained worry when one places 
this rather idealized situation in a more realistic perspective. In practice, the baseball 
in flight intersects with numerous air molecules (on a most basic approximation) that 
get into its way and each of these molecules is potentially capable of imparting some 
of its momentum to the ball. It is conceivable that the momenta received by the 
baseball from all its surrounding air molecules may have a resultant effect on it so 
that it may be deflected from its original course of motion, or impinge on the window 
with a momentum which is not sufficient to break it.
There is an important moral to this scenario. The demand of no further subsequent 
interactions in M T  is unrealistic. In reality, the continuous interruptions from the 
environment make causal transmission a too idealized concept to gain full credibility 
on a practical level. Even though there is a genuine causal interaction in which a 
causal process is marked, the mark would simply fail to be transmitted further due to 
other immediate interfering interactions with the environment. This in turn calls into 
serious doubt the deployment of the criterion of transmission as a basis of distinction 
between causal and pseudo-processes. Kitcher seems to think that counterfactuals 
are again essential to deal with continuous interactions as he writes44,
...the characteristics o f a m acroscopic object are (a lm ost al­
w ays) sustained by fu rth er in teractions. Furtherm ore, the char­
acteristics o f such processes are often modified by subsequent 
in teractions, so that, when a process is “m arked” (in  the ordi­
nary sense) it  is likely that the m ark will be altered by a la ter  
in teraction  to produce a la ter mark.
And again45,
We have here a sequence o f causal processes and in teractions, 
and if, we say that the final organism  is m arked by the in itia l 
in teraction , that is because we envisage a sequence o f m arks
44ibid., p.468.
45ibid., p.469.
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such that each is transm itted  by a causal process that in teracts  
with another process to produce a successor m ark. Our a ttribu ­
tion is based on our acceptance o f a chain o f counterfactuals...
I f  Pn had not transm itted  Mn then Pn+ 1 would not have acquired
Mn +  1.
In building up a complex causal process out o f elem entary  
causal processes - that is , processes that do not in teract w ith  
other processes - we need to make heavy use o f counterfactu­
als. The sequence Pi...Pn constitu tes a complex causal process 
only i f  each Pr in teracts with Pr +  1 so that i f  Pr had not been 
modified to bear Qr then Pr + 1 would n o t have been m odified to  
bear Qr + 1.
However, the perennial problem haunting the enterprise of counterfactuals has 
been that of the determination of when a counterfactual is true, and Salmon has pro­
posed a method for justifying one’s beliefs in counterfactuals by means of controlled 
experiments. He suggests that science has a sound way of determining the truth 
and falsehood of these contrary-to-fact conditionals: by appealing to the very idea of 
controlled experiments so that some counterfactual statements may be determined as 
true and others as false.
An example of the kind of experiment offered by Salmon is as follows. Suppose 
in the case of the astrodome, the source is to be switched on and off one hundred 
times by one experimenter while a second experimenter is stationed half-way between 
the source and the wall whose sole task is to select at random, with the help of 
a random number generator he is equipped with, fifty trials in which he will mark 
the light ray by intercepting it with a red filter. Here, Salmon argues that if not 
all but only fifty trials in which the marks are made are those where the spot on 
the wall is red as well as the intervening stages in the beam between the point of 
the marking interaction and the wall, then one is justified to claim that in those 
fifty cases, the counterfactual athe beam would not have turned red if the marking
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operation had not occurred!” is true. Moreover, Salmon has taken care in formulating 
the example in such a way that the introduction of the random number generator 
serves to maintain the objectiveness of the situation by making sure that the selection 
procedure is not biased towards the experimenter’s subjective judgment. But are we 
really justified to fall back on experimental procedures to establish the truth and 
falsehood of counterfactual statements?
Several authors46 have voiced their objections to this issue, which are mostly 
concerned with how objectivity can be obtained if the truth values of counterfactuals 
may only be determined in an inductive manner by experimental methods. It is argued 
that one may just be depending too much on empirical generalizations and since 
such generalizations remain agnostic about the existence of necessary connections 
as supposed by counterfactuals; experiments may therefore not be a good way for 
determining the truth values of counterfactual statements. In particular, Dowe has 
argued that the appeal to experimentation provides only epistemic but not ontic 
grounds for the truth values of counterfactuals.
Problems arise as to whether knowledge of the truth or falsity of the counter- 
factual is epistemologically accessible to us or not. Established semantical accounts 
of counterfactuals, such as those advanced by Stalnaker47 and Lewis48, make use of 
possible worlds and similarity relations. Such approaches are, however, of no avail to 
the empiricist, for the knowledge of the happenings in our world is rather useless in 
trying to determine what goes on in the possible worlds; unless, of course, in this in­
stance the possible worlds serve merely as a summary of complicated facts about the 
real world. In practice, however, it is argued that if the various features of a possible 
world are made to be very similar to that in the actual world, one is then justified in 
applying our knowledge of the actual world to determine the “near-enough” truth- 
values of that particular possible world. This view supports the rationale behind 
Salmon’s design of controlled experiments to test the claim that a causal interaction
46See for example, Kitcher, P. (1989), Dowe, P. (1992a), Fetzer, J.H. (1987) and Giere, R.N. 
(1988).
47Stalnaker, R. (1968).
48Lewis, D. (1973).
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has obtained.
Imagine two billiard balls rolling across a table with a transparent surface and 
colliding. The table is illuminated from above and so that their respective shadows 
also intersect. Let the shadow of ball A be Pa and that of ball B  be Pb - The following 
pair of counterfactuals seems to be true:
(i) I f  the worldline of ball A had not intersected that of ball B, then the direc­
tion of motion of ball B  would not have altered.
(a) I f  the worldline of Pa had not intersected that of Pb , then the direction of 
motion Pb would not have altered.
Now we want to claim that whereas the collision between balls A  and B  causes 
a change in the direction of motion of B, the intersection of the shadow of A  with 
that of ball B  does not cause the change in the direction of the motion of the shadow 
of B. That is, we want to prove that the counterfactual in (ii) is wrong and that 
the direction of motion of Pb would have altered even if it had not intersected Pa- 
Turning this around, we must set out to look for cases where Pa is found not to 
have intersected Pb and observe, in those instances, what happens to the direction 
of motion of Pb - So, we would have to keep everything as before but to invent a 
way to “erase” Pa- It turns out that this may readily be achieved by having part of 
the surface of the floor illuminated from below so that Pa (the shadow of ball 4^) is 
duly obliterated. Observation shows that the direction of motion of Pb alters even 
in the absence of Pa- This, argues Salmon, provides solid ground for refuting the 
counterfactual in (ii).
The introduction of the extra light source from below the table seems the intu­
itively correct experiment to perform to check the validity of (ii). Kitcher suggests 
that although Salmon’s proposed experiment accords with our natural ideas about 
the causal character of this particular situation, we should be, however, looking for 
the basis of these ideas and so a separate theory is required to help us to select the 
correct kind of controlled experiments. In this vein, Kitcher asserts that the worldline 
Pa could alternatively have been erased by the removal of ball A  out of the picture
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altogether. The presence of ball A  is to be simulated instead by an appropriate im­
pulse at the very moment when it would have been collided with ball B. Under this 
circumstance, the counterfactual in (ii) is also found to be refuted and so our aim is, 
again, satisfied.
In Salmon’s experiment, there is an intersection of the paths of balls A and B, 
whereas in Kitcher’s one there is not. Both of these “actual occurrences” have given 
rise to the same result so that the counterfactual in clause (ii) above is refuted. 
However, one immediately comes to realise that the use of an impulse in place of 
ball A  in Kitcher’s example has made the counterfactual in (i) false as well. Since 
now that both counterfactuals are found to be false, they are no longer capable of 
distinguishing between causal interactions and non-causal ones. Therefore, if our 
sole aim is to provide a refutation of the counterfactual in (ii) - to eliminate the 
intersection there described as a pseudo-interaction - then actual interactions of very 
different natures would do. But if we want to probe deeper, to trace the origin of the 
actual interaction which led to the situation in (ii), the counterfactuals fail to be of 
any assistance.
Now Kitcher’s point is really that if one appeals to the similarities and differences 
between the experimental group and the controlled group, one must first need an 
account of how the trade-offs between the similarities and differences are to be made. 
At this juncture, we probably want to say that Salmon’s experiment is still the cor­
rect one, because according to our intuition, we want to claim that the interaction 
between ball A  and ball B  is, in fact, the relevant causal interaction. But here again, 
from where comes our intuition? It comes from none other than the background 
causal knowledge we have already possessed. In Salmon’s experiment, we know of 
the presence of both balls A  and B  and we are aware of the fact that their paths in 
spacetime have intersected. Such knowledge is, however, not to be obtained from the 
counterfactuals.
Once again, this drives us back to the very problem of how one first comes to know 
which one - “the intersection of balls A  and B” or “that of ball B  and the impulse” - 
should be deemed the correct genuine interaction. However, Kitcher is quick to note
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that Salmon’s experiment is one which would be endorsed by practicing scientists, who 
design their controlled experiments by drawing heavily on their background causal 
knowledge. Kitcher therefore concludes 49,
They endeavour to ensure that the control group and the ex­
perim ental group are sim ilar in  those aspects that they take to  
be poten tia lly  causally relevant.
And, continues Kitcher 50,
Once we have som e causal knowledge (perhaps a significant 
am ount) then that causal knowledge can be used in  the design  
o f control experim ents that w ill tes t counterfactuals in  ju s t the 
way that Salm on proposes. B u t i f  we are looking fo r  a theory  
o f how we ju s tify  counterfactuals from  scratch, then the appeal 
to the m ethod o f controlled experim ents is o f no avail.
So it would seem that Salmon’s intended use of controlled experiments to study 
the truths of counterfactuals appears not to be entirely satisfactory and poses prob­
lems for his theory of causation, as it draws heavily on counterfactuals to tell the 
causal situations from non-causal ones. It has been suggested earlier that the need 
for counterfactuals arises from the vagueness in the reference to the characteristics of 
the physical system that are to undergo changes upon interactions, which also leads 
to a circularity in Salmon’s theory. In order to be discharged from circularity, one 
may either specify the characteristics which are to undergo modifications in situa­
tions that are deemed causal or opt for a definition of causal processes that is quite 
independent of the notion of interaction. We shall see in Chapter 4 just how the issue 
of counterfactuals may be evaded by taking these routes.
49ibid., p.475 
50ibid.
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3.4 Discussions and Summary
In Scientific Explanation and Causal Structure of The World, Salmon has advanced a 
new model of scientific explanation that proves to be a marked improvement from his 
earlier program of statistical relevance (the Statistical Relevance or S-R model), which 
concerns the subsumption of facts under general laws for the purpose of explanation. 
In this new program he pays due attention to the explanation of particular facts and 
acknowledges the prime role that causality play in explanations. Now for Salmon, 
explanation is a two-tiered affair. The first level consists in the subsuming of the 
event-to-be-explained under a set of statistical relevance relations as in the older S-R 
model, but these statistical relevance relations are now to be explained in terms of 
the causal relations on the second level. In this chapter, we have focused on Salmon’s 
process theory of causation which has been specially devised to provide the causal 
relations in support of this model of explanation.
I find Salmon’s proposal attractive because it represents a serious attempt to over­
come the issue of temporal contiguity between cause and effect as raised by Russell in 
his 1913 analysis. Salmon, with his process theory, has furnished us with spatiotempo- 
rally continuous physical processes as the causal connection between two events; and 
these processes serve to eliminate the temporal gap that stands opposing to temporal 
contiguity. It also provides a prescription for defining localized events in spacetime by 
reference to the interaction of causal processes. The interactions of causal processes 
fix the locations of causes and effects in space and time. Spatio-temporal continuous 
processes seem to have rescued the Humean temporal contiguity thesis from Russell’s 
philosophical onslaught.
By appealing to the actual physical process involved in specific situations, Salmon’s 
theory is highly local and singular. We have introduced in this chapter the various 
building blocks of the theory such as process, the Mark Transmission (MT) criterion 
for distinguishing causal and non-causal processes and the mechanism of causal in­
teraction. In spite of the solid intuitions behind these concepts, there exist pressing 
philosophical issues as regard to the use of counterfactuals that beset the program.
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In the Chapter 4, we shall discuss in details the subsequent developments in process 
causation; in particular, the Conserved Quantity Theory (CQ) by Phil Dowe, whose 
chief aim is to resolve the problem of counterfactuals.
As it stands therefore, this theory is not to be seen as complete but may only be 
regarded as providing a general framework for an exciting exploration into the various 
aspects of causality from the perspective of causal processes. The good intuitions 
behind Salmon’s theory must remain significant for other variations of the process 
causal theory.
Chapter 4 
Process Theories: Subsequent 
D evelopm ents
4.1 Introduction
Wesley Salmon’s 1984 version of the process theory of causation was expounded in 
some detail and its relative merits and drawbacks were discussed in the previous chap­
ter. Salmon’s theory focuses on the singular aspect of physical causation by trading 
very heavily on the notion of spatio-temporal continuous processes. Changes in such 
processes occur through their physical interactions with other processes, resulting 
in subsequent modifications in their respective process structures. These changes, 
introduced through localised physical interactions, mark events in spacetime while 
causal processes provide the physical causal connection amongst these events. Recall 
that the major difficulty that underlies Russell’s “temporal gap” is the superposi­
tion of events happening at discrete points in time against a background of temporal 
continuum. It thus seems that a promising attempt to overcome this difficulty is 
to superpose continuous entities on the temporal continuum. And so the appeal to 
the spatio-temporal continuous characteristics of causal processes might just be the 
solution we have been seeking to bring a closure to Russell’s problematic temporal 
gap.
This seems plain sailing were it not for the fact that physical considerations de­
mand Salmon to make a distinction between causal and pseudo-processes. The crite­
rion of mark transmission is employed to distinguish causal regularities as exhibited
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in causal processes from the species of a sequence of “unlinked” regularities in pseudo­
processes that must be sustained by an external source. A moving spot of light across 
the circular wall of the astrodome consists really of a sequence of spots cast by light 
pulses travelling from the rotating source at the center. The actual act of transmis­
sion of causal influences (or marks) by causal processes provides the “link” to enable 
these regularities to be deemed causal. This is the crux of Salmon’s account: not 
all processes of a continuous spatio-temporal character are causal; only those that are 
able to transmit causal influences can at the same time by this very means provide 
the vital links within the processes themselves. The transmission of causal influences 
is of paramount importance to a process-singularist theory of causation for they en­
sure that all “parts” of a causal process are linked rather than it being a random 
conjunction of a sequence of events.
The immediate consequence of elevating the concept of transmission to the sta­
tus of a fundamental causal notion is the need for defining what indeed constitutes 
transmission. The “at-af theory, the original recipe of Russell to overcome the Zeno 
paradox of the flying arrow, is exploited by Salmon to provide the mechanism for 
causal transmission. The “at-af notion of causal transmission, which relies entirely 
upon physical laws that govern the motion of a system, poses insuperable difficulties 
as one considers the quantum regime where the notion of spatio-temporal continuity 
becomes untenable. But of course, the most devastating charge to Salmon’s crite­
rion of mark transmission (MT) is the indisputable element of counterfactualness 
that is seen to bring damage to the objectivity intended by Salmon for this causal 
notion. We have argued that the counterfactual condition has been introduced into 
the definition of M T  in order to make clear that the pseudo-processes would have 
been modified even if the interaction that is responsible for the modification resides 
outside the process itself. In this way, counterfactuals are essential for the distinction 
between causal and pseudo-processes.
However, as we have seen1, counterfactuals are not always effective in delineating
1Take for instance, the counterfactual concerned is unable to dismiss the characteristic change 
of the shadow of a car - from one being “the shadow of an un-scratched car” to that of being 
“the shadow of a scratched car”, due to the “local interaction” between the the shadow and the
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causal processes from their non-causal counterparts, which is due to the ambiguities 
involved in the determination of the relevant characteristics that changes in causal 
interactions, and causal interactions play a major role in defining causal processes. It 
is thus desirable to remove counterfactuals from the theory.
It is indeed this trouble with counterfactuals that Phil Dowe sought to resolve by 
his Conserved Quantity Theory (CQ) in 19922. CQ has succeeded in large measure 
in the simplification of Salmon’s account by the definitive identification of a causal 
process with the worldline of an object. Because of this explicit characterization, the 
need to decide which are the relevant characteristics for separating the class of causal 
from that of non-causal processes (that has led to the use of counterfactuals in the 
first place) receives immediate alleviation3. Moreover, it is Dowe’s intention for the 
notion of causal transmission be now incorporated in a physically natural way without 
the need for a separate treatment. However, in the picture that Dowe offers, changes 
in the causal structure of a physical process still come about as a consequence of 
interactions with other processes. We shall examine CQ in detail in Section 4.2.
Prompted by his own eagerness to eliminate the counterfactual element in the 
theory, Salmon welcomed the birth of CQ with zeal and enthusiasm. In his ensuing 
paper in 1994, “Causality Without Counterfactuals”4, Salmon generously acknowl­
edges Dowe’s achievement by an almost complete endorsement of the worldline view 
of causal process and by the abandonment of the comparatively vague notion of 
“marks” in favour of invariant quantities, a somewhat modest adjustment from the 
use of conserved quantities in CQ. The adoption of invariant quantities descended 
from Salmon’s desire to maintain causality as an objective notion. An objective no­
tion is thought to be one that takes on the same meaning relative to all points of 
view. Invariant quantities are the ones picked out by the theory of special relativity 
to remain frame-independent, in that they bear the same value to every observer
patch of ground on which it falls - as an illegitimate interaction that provides the mark for alleged 
transmission by the shadow (Section 3.3.1).
2Dowe, P. (1992a) and (1992b).
3This is in the strict sense that we have now an empirical criterion for identifying a causal process, 
but we make no claim at this stage that this is a correct criterion.
4Salmon, W.C. (1994).
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regardless of their state of motion. And so having the same value relative to all ob­
servers makes invariant quantities a suitable representation of objectivity in a physical 
context. This results in the In va r ia n t Theory o f  C ausation  (IQ). Apart from 
this rather superficial modification, Salmon nevertheless sees the need to retain the 
notion of transmission within IQ  despite his willingness to give up the concept of 
marks. The idea of causal transmission thus continues to play a central role in IQ.
Most recently in 19975, Salmon was convinced to give up his insistence on invariant 
quantities in favour of conserved quantities, chiefly in response to the efforts of the 
arguments put forth by Dowe6 and Hitchcock7 two years earlier in 1995. In spite 
of these periods of metamorphoses, Salmon has remained a dedicated disciple of the 
notion of causal transmission. He supports a C onserved Q uan tity  theory o f  
C ausation  w ith Transm ission  (CQT) in the latest episode on the philosophical 
scene of process causation. This latest version of Salmon’s theory will form the subject 
of Section 4.3. There, we endeavour to understand Salmon’s main argument for his 
seemingly obstinate hold on the notion of causal transmission. The reasonableness of 
the retainment of this notion within the new framework will also be assessed.
In view of the fact that the notion of a worldline plays such a prominent role in 
CQ, IQ and C Q T - since all three take causal processes to be worldlines of objects 
that carry certain physical quantities - a scrutiny of the notion will serve the purpose 
of revealing the subtleties involved in these accounts. In Section 4.4, I provide a 
critique of the Worldline View (WV) of causal processes and discuss the relevance of 
spatiotemporal continuity to the notion of identity over time, which as I shall argue, 
lies at the core of both the theories of Salmon and Dowe. I shall also point out a 
discrepancy between the usage of the term “worldline” in both CQ and C Q T  and that 
in physics, which leads to a confusion. To remedy the situation and be in anticipation 
for an extension of the notion of a causal process to the quantum domain - where 
there is the loss of spatiotemporal continuity - a History View of causal processes is 
proposed in Section 4.5. It is indeed this H isto ry  C onserved Q uan tity  theory
5Salmon W.C. (1997).
6Dowe, P. (1995).
7Hitchcock, C.R. (1995).
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with Transm ission  (HCQT) that we take as a basis for extending the notion of 
causal processes to the quantum realm.
4.2 The Conserved Quantity Theory
Since Salmon’s seminal 1984 programme on process causation, not much has taken 
place in this philosophical sphere until the publications of a series of papers by Phil 
Dowe in 1992 that aim chiefly to exorcise the specter of counterfactuals from Salmon’s 
account. This was a crucial turning point for process causal theories and with this 
came the birth of the Conserved Q uantity  Theory  (CQ).
Dowe makes it the main task of CQ to deliver Salmon’s process causality from the 
evil of the epistemological difficulties that gave rise to the need for counterfactuals 
in the first instance. It is these difficulties that lay Salmon’s programme open to the 
charge of circularity. The related arguments have been well rehearsed in Section 3.3.1 
and it is not my intention to duplicate them here. However, the reader ought to be 
reminded that it is indicated in that earlier section that there exist two natural ways 
of relieving Salmon’s theory from circularity and the use of counterfactuals. These 
are: (1) a definitive stipulation of what constitutes a causal process should be given 
independent of the notion of causal interaction, or, (2 ) the specification of which are 
indeed the characteristics relevant to a causal interaction (and causal processes are 
defined in terms of it). These two approaches are summarized diagrammatically in 
Figure 3-4.
Dowe opts for the strategy in (1). With this approach in mind, he introduces two 
definitions which comprise CQ8,
(1 ) A  causal in terac tion  is an in tersec tion  o f  world lines which involves 
exchange o f  a conserved quantity .
(2 ) A  causal process is a world line o f  an  object w hich m a n ifes ts  a 
conseiwed quantity .
8Dowe, P. (1992a), p.210.
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This “worldline view” (WV) of causal process is already embryonic9 in Salmon’s 
1984 treatment where he indicates what constitutes, in his view, a process10, “...while 
processes have much greater temporal duration, and in many cases, much greater spa­
tial extent. In space-time diagrams, events are represented by points, while processes 
are represented by lines”. We can also find signs of the idea in Kitcher’s 1989 critique, 
in the section where he argues that counterfactuals are more fundamental in the dis­
cussions of causation than causal processes and causal interactions11; and in there, he 
makes specific mention to the “worldlines” of objects. However, it is to Dowe and to 
Dowe alone that we owe the credit for taking the decisive step forward to make the 
definitive identification of a causal process with the worldline of an object.
4.2.1 Causal Processes
Let us proceed with definition (2) above. Dowe explains12, “A world line is the 
collection of points on a spacetime (Minkowski) diagram which represents the history 
of an object.” And a conserved quantity is13, “any quantity universally conserved 
according to current scientific theories. Some conserved quantities are mass-energy, 
linear momentum, angular momentum, and charge. ”.
In his definition of a worldline, Dowe has tactfully avoided making reference to 
a “continuous sequence” of points. The deliberate expression of “the collection of 
points” is intended to be applicable to cases where spatiotemporal continuity does 
not obtain, with the discontinuous processes in the quantum domain as the candidate 
examples14.
Dowe allows a wide sense of what may count as an object15, “An object can be any­
thing found in the ontology of science (such as particles, waves or fields), or common 
sense”, and also16, “The precise characterization of “object” is unimportant; what
9In fact, Dowe acknowledges that he has adopted the idea from Brian Skyrms in his discussions 
on related matters in Skyrms, B. (1980), p . l l l .
10Salmon, W.C. (1984), p.139.
11Kitcher, P. (1989), p.469.
12ibid., p.2 1 0 .
13ibid,
14Dowe, P. (1995), p.332.
15ibid. and Dowe, P. (2000), p.91.
16Dowe, P. (1992b), p.126.
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matters is whether it manifests17a conserved quantity.” And again18, 11 What counts 
as an object is unimportant; any old gerrymandered thing qualifies. What matters is 
whether it may possess the right type of quantity.” Being liberal and unrestrictive in 
his definition of an object, Dowe admits the worldline of something like a shadow as 
being, as presumably, “an object of common sense”.
For him, objects19 like shadows are allowed to have worldlines although their 
“worldlines” are not causal processes20, 11A process is the world line of an object, 
regardless of whether or not that object possesses conserved quantities”
Dowe distinguishes the “worldlines” of processes like shadows from the “world­
lines” of those with spatiotemporal stages that are genuinely “linked” dynamically, 
by stipulating that the latter - the genuine causal processes - are constituted out of 
events involving objects which possess conserved quantities21, “For example, a shadow 
is an object but it does not possess energy or momentum; it has shape but possesses 
no conserved quantities”22.
It is perhaps not hard to see why Dowe wishes to place no restriction on the notion 
of an object. Empirically, given the observation that the car and its shadow both 
exhibit spatiotemporally continuous motion; how are we to determine empirically, as
17In his 1995 paper, Dowe has switched to the use of “possesses” in place of “manifests” according 
to a suggestion by Armstrong for fear that the latter may lead to the mistaken impression that the 
quantity has to be experienced by human observers (Dowe, P. (1995), p.324).
18Dowe, P. (1995), p.323.
19Contrary to the usual meaning intended for an object in the (physics) definition of a worldline 
that takes the object’s identity over time as a primitive (as we shall argue in Section 4.4), Dowe 
does not make the same supposition at the outset when CQ was first introduced in 1992. All that is 
demanded of an object is its successive stages must possess a conserved quantity in order to qualify 
as a causal process.
20Dowe, P. (2000), p.90
21 Dowe, P. (1995), p.324.
22From a physical perspective, a shadow is not in possession of physical quantities like momentum 
or energy. It is therefore impossible for these quantities to be transmitted by a shadow. In circum­
stances where it is perceived to be moving, the shadow of a moving car for example, each “stage” 
of the “moving” shadow is the result of an interaction between a different patch of the wall and the 
light that is blocked by the car. A series of static interactions provides the visual impression of a 
moving object - the shadow of the moving car. For this reason, something like a shadow which is 
not in possession of energy or momentum is not normally assigned a worldline if the meaning in 
physics is strictly adhered to. Incidentally, in some physics discussions authors do unfortunately 
refer to “spacelike worldlines”, but those are only brought in to highlight the fact that they are not 
possible for there exists no genuine motion that involves transmission of energy or momentum (see 
for example Kopczynski, W. and Trautman, A., (1992), p.57-58.).
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a matter of fact, which one is a genuine moving object (one with its successive stages 
linked dynamically)?
The old question of being causally connected versus that of causal connectibility 
re-emerges at this juncture. Causal connectibility obtains for any two events that lie 
within the past or future lightcones23 of each other. Causal influences in the forms of 
energy, momentum or signals and so on may be transmitted from one event to another 
at a velocity less than or equal to the speed of light. However, being potentially 
connectible in this sense does not necessarily imply that there is an actual causal 
connection. Whether two particular events are causally connected or not depends on 
whether there is an actual transmission of causal influences between them.
Although the events that make up the moving shadow are spatiotemporally close 
to one another, as they lie in their respective past and future lightcones, there exists 
no actual transmission of causal influences. If the transmission of causal influences is 
made possible by the motion of the one and the same object that carries them, then 
in the absence of an act of transmission, there is no movement of the one and the 
same object. So there is no genuine movement of one and the same shadow. Why 
is there no genuine motion in this case? The apparent motion we perceive is only a 
false imagery of many individual and separate events (each corresponds to a different 
shadow) with no physical association at all, except for just the right spatiotemporal 
relations that they bear to each other that trick the naked eye24. Of course, the 
absence of transmission in this case is attributed either to (1) the fact that there 
is no causal influence - no conserved quantity as possessed by the shadow - to be 
transmitted, or (2 ) that the influences, the conserved quantities are not transmitted, 
despite the fact that they appear at different spacetime points. And Dowe’s reply is 
that the “moving” shadow does not possess any conserved quantity.
Hence, the idea of the possession  by an object o f  a conserved quantity  
is the CQ key to the identification of causal processes. The immediate philosophical
23Such two events are said to be “time-like” separated.
24 One “stage” of the shadow has to cease its existence before the next one comes into being in 
order to give the visual impression that the one and the same object has vacated its previous location 
and takes up a new position at a later time.
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concern is whether the stipulation of an object possessing a conserved quantity would 
serve the purpose of picking out only causal processes. So far, this seems to manage 
to distill out pseudo-processes like shadows25. However, we need to satisfy ourselves 
that the mere possession of a conserved quantity is indeed a sufficient condition to 
embody the fact that there is movement of causal influences so resulting in a causal 
process having one stage being the source of the next. We shall now subject this 
criterion to two kinds of tests.
Time-wise gerrymanders
A time-wise gerrymander is an “alleged” object that refers to different objects 
at different times. Consider Dowe’s example26 where the cue ball in a billiard game 
is struck at time ti, which collides with the red ball at time £2 and in turn hits
the black ball at £3 . It then subsequently finds it way into the pocket at £4 . We
are presented with a picture where there is transmission of energy and momentum 
along a spatiotemporally continuous sequence of events. Does this sequence of events 
constitute the successive stages of a persisting object? In particular, might one not 
conceive of an object x  that is defined as,
x  is the cue ball at £i<£2 , 
x  is the red ball at £2 <£3 , 
x  is the black ball at £3 < £ 4?
One immediately notices that the condition of possession of a conserved quantity 
is insufficient to rule out this time-wise gerrymander: each of the three balls that 
comprised the alleged object x does possess energy and momentum. Troubled by 
this deficiency, Dowe admits that an additional constraint has to be incorporated, 
which amounts to a restriction on the notion of an object27: anything that counts 
as an object must satisfy the condition of being wholly present at each time with no
25As Dowe claims that shadows do not possess conserved quantities. See Dowe, P. (1992b), p. 127.
26Dowe, P. (1995), p.323.
27In his more recent writings, Dowe P. (1995), p.329 and (1999), p.250.
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temporal parts28,
S tric t Iden tity  (SI): an object is wholly presen t a t each and 
every in stan t in its  history.
The “object” as referred to above obviously consists of temporal parts in the sense 
that a different part of the “object” exists at each different time. In other words, the 
“whole” object is not wholly present at each time (for example, at each time during 
the interval t\ and £2 only the cue ball part of the object is wholly present but neither 
is the red ball part nor the black ball part) and it is more appropriately viewed as 
comprising of three physical objects. The time-wise gerrymander is clearly depicted 
as consisting of three individual physical systems, each having its own worldline. For 
instance, the cue ball wholly exists at every moment between the times t\ and And 
so each of these physical objects - the cue ball, the red ball or the black ball - is wholly 
present in each time with no temporal parts and so carry with it an unambiguous 
meaning of identity over time.
Dowe thus concludes that the condition of the mere possession of a conserved 
quantity needs to be supplemented by some thesis of identity over time, in order that 
it may effectively distinguish causal processes29, “I  am not saying CQ theory needs 
SI. But it needs some thesis of identity...'1'.
Most recently, Dowe has taken a firm stand to impose the criterion of identity 
over time to restrict the scope of what is to be counted as an object in his dis­
course30, “An object is anything found in the ontology of science (such as particles, 
waves and fields), or common sense (such as chairs, buildings and people). This will 
include non-causal objects such spots and shadows. A process is the object's trajec­
tory through time. That a process is the world line of an object presumes that the 
various time slices of the process each represent the same object, at different times, 
thus it is required that the object have identity over time...On the present account a
28Dowe, P. (1999), p.250. SI carries the implication that the various time slices of the process 
each representing one and the same object at different times, and so the object has an identity over 
time.
29Dowe, P. (1999), p.250.
30Dowe, P. (2 0 0 0 ), p.91
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timewise gerrymander is not a process, for it is not the world line of an object, since 
objects must exhibit identity over tim e”. We shall examine this issue of identity over 
time in more details in Section 4.4, but for now we work with SI.
To be sure, being wholly present at each time31 is only one out of the many 
characteristics of the category of objects. Being wholly present at each time, though a 
necessary feature for an object, is nonetheless not adequate to characterize a persisting 
object. It conveys no information on how the successive stages of a persisting object 
are related. Stages of objects that display qualitative similarity and spatiotemporal 
continuity would satisfy the condition of being wholly present at each time and can 
be mistaken for being the successive stages of one single persisting object. Typical 
examples include objects like shadows or a spot of light, the subjects of the second 
test to which we shall now turn.
Shadows and Spots of Light
The shadow of a moving car cast on a wall is composed of a series of interactions 
arising from the blocking by the car of the light that is supposed to fall onto the wall. 
The “moving” shadow is considered as wholly present at each time but yet every one 
of these “events” or “stages”, as generated by a separate interaction, is an essentially 
different object. Entities like shadows, which satisfy the constraint of “being wholly 
present at each time” is to be ruled out by the criterion of the possession of a conserved 
quantity as an object that forms the proper subject of a causal process by virtue of 
CQ.
This is true also of the case of the moving spot of light across the wall of the 
astrodome. Recall that the spatiotemporal trajectory of this “moving” spot of light 
is everywhere continuous and hence entertains the visual impression that it is one 
and the same object that moves. How can one tell the motion of this object is 
after all an illusion? In particular, how is one to know that it is in fact not the 
“same” object that moves but instead an image projected from a static sequence of
31 SI represents only one way of analyzing identity over time and we shall have th occasion in 
section 4.4 to examine the issue.
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similar events? Dowe’s answer would be that this object, the “moving” spot of light, 
is not in possession of a conserved quantity. Rather, it is the patch of wall which 
acquires the energy from the light ray but this patch of wall does not move32, “The 
object which moves, the spot, doesn’t possess energy, so its worldline is not a causal 
process.” Conserved quantities are not possessed by the “moving” spot, it is the series 
of segments of the wall that possess energy. Processes - the worldlines of objects - are 
causal by virtue of the fact that a conserved quantity is possessed by it. On Dowe’s 
view, a series of world-points belonging to different physical objects are “unlinked” 
in a physical sense that a conserved quantity is not possessed by them.
What concerns us is whether there is much point in arguing that it is the wall and 
not the spot, which is in possession of energy. Whenever a patch of wall is illuminated 
by a light ray, there is a spot; the patch of illuminated wall is the spot. So there seems 
to be no real benefit to make a distinction between the two but as a mere linguistic 
maneuver. However, what is of real issue here is that even if we deem the spot of light 
to possess energy, there is no real action of 11 carrying alontf’ of this energy throughout 
all stages of the moving spot of light, for such a “pseudo-object” is the false image of 
a sequence of world-points corresponding to a sequence of independent interactions 
involving a different set of objects in each: a different patch of wall and a different 
light ray. The objects that take part in each of these interactions would not “go on” to 
participate in the next interaction and hence there is simply no physical connection to 
provide the transmission of a conserved quantity. In other words, the “spots” (more 
than one object) do not move! It seems therefore, from this physical view, there 
is a compelling reason for driving us back to the notion of transmission, which is a 
fundamental causal notion in Salmon 1984. This granted, the notion of “possession” 
that Dowe has appealed to has proved an insufficient condition for identifying causal 
processes, for it has not succeeded in capturing the essence that one stage of the 
process forms the source of the next.
Let us now summarize the basic structure of Dowe’s use of the criterion of “posses­
sion of a conserved quantity to identify causal processes (Figure 4-1). The worldline
32Dowe, P. (1999), p.251.
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Figure 4.1: The structure of the CQ definition of a causal process.
of an object that is in possession of both a conserved quantity and an identity over 
time is regarded as a causal process. However, not all objects in possession of a con­
served quantity qualify as causal processes, and likewise, not all entities having an 
identity over time qualify as causal processes. Time-wise gerrymanders that possess 
conserved quantities are ruled out as non-causal by the stipulation that they have 
temporal parts and so are not wholly present at each time.
Shadows and spots of light, on the other hand, are eliminated outright from the 
class of causal processes because they do not possess any conserved quantity. It is 
also worth pointing out that the fact that such objects do not possess any conserved 
quantity does not immediately condemn them to a situation of a lack of an identity 
over time33. Quite on the contrary, one needs the premise that the “object” remains 
the same object throughout its motion before even it is meaningful to put forward the 
claim that “the object” is in motion. Both the moving shadow and the moving spot 
of light display spatiotemporal continuity and qualitative similarity in the successive 
stages of their “motions”. Perceptually, this dose not seem any different from the 
motions of a moving car or any other objects that have mass and energy. But yet,
33ibid.
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shadows and light spots are, as we know, pseudo-processes that are incapable of 
propagating causal influences. Why is that so? Dowe argues that they cannot be 
propagating causal influences simply because they possess none in the first place; 
and so even as these objects move along their trajectories in spacetime, no causal 
influences are being transported. Hence on Dowe’s construal, even though they have 
identities over time, objects that do not possess any conserved quantities are, of 
course, unable to propagate any of these quantities!
Dowe’s strategy is clear: he intends to use “the possession of a conserved quantity 
and “identity over time” as complementary criteria. On occasions when the former 
fails to rule out pseudo-processes, like the case with time-wise gerrymanders, he needs 
to fall back on the latter. However, where spatiotemporal continuity and qualitative 
similarity amongst the different stages of a certain process render the latter criterion 
useless in identifying a genuine causal process, he relies on the former to achieve the 
purpose.
For Dowe, an object that has an identity over time which also possesses a conserved 
quantity qualifies as a genuine causal process. But the vital question is whether the 
conjunction of both of these two criteria is indeed sufficient for us to capture the 
physical picture that each of the stages of this object is actually causally connected 
(with one stage being the source of the next)?
To articulate further, we consider the following counterexample. Suppose in place 
of a rotating spotlight shining onto the wall of the astrodome, we consider the case 
where the surface of the wall is consisted of a series of mini LED cells closely tiled 
continuously one after another in a horizontal line, with each one of these cells wired 
to an independent electrical circuitry (Figure4-2)34. Provided that these circuitries 
are activated in a synchronized manner so that the successive light cells are lit in 
the order that the previous one goes out as the next is illuminated, one thus regains
34It might be objected that this arrangement of LED cells forms not a continuous process, but 
only a discrete one. However, the objection is not as severe as it seems in anticipation of Chapters 
5 to 7, where the spatiotemporal continuity in the motion of objects is relaxed in the quantum 
domain. This will let us focus on the real issue of how to capture our intuitions about what is wrong 
with such cases: either they do not constitute a worldline of an object, or they do not transmit a 
conserved quantity.
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a situation of a moving spot of light which no doubt possesses a genuine conserved 
quantity - energy. This gives a situation where we have an object - a moving spot of 
light - that presents itself as a persisting object that is in possession of a conserved 
quantity.
An
independen t 
circuit w ired 
to  a  LED cell
a  LED cell (size m uch 
exaggera ted )
Figure 4.2: A series of LED cells each connected to an independent circuit.
However, this is a pseudo-process as we know that physically, one spot is not the 
source of the next, but each gain its energy from an independent external source; the 
different “stages” of the spot are not in any way causally connected. On this occasion, 
it would seem that Dowe’s criterion cannot stand up to the test. This example is a 
variant of a counterexample discussed by Salmon35, “...we can take the worldline of 
the part of the wall surface that is absorbing the energy as result of being illuminated. 
This worldline manifests energy throughout the period during which the spot travels 
around the wall, but it is not the worldline of a causal process because energy is not 
being transmitted; it is being received from an exterior source.” In Salmon’s example, 
the point has been confused because he speaks of the “worldline” of the “parts” of the 
wall which illuminate wherever the light rays sweep across. Focusing on the worldline 
of this “object” that consists of patches of illuminated wall has left a lacuna for a 
defence from Dowe36, “ The series of segments of the wall, each of which does possess
35As he discusses the spot of light that moves across the wall of the astrodome, Salmon, W.C. 
(1994), p.308.
36Dowe, P. (1999), p.251.
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energy, is not wholly existent at each time, so it is not the worldline of an object” I 
suppose a scenario along similar lines to our present example of a series of LED cells 
is closer to what Salmon had intended; namely, there are independent worldlines of 
objects which are wholly existent at each instant in their own respective history. The 
moving spot in our example, is wholly present at each time but at the same time it is 
a series of world-points, each of which belongs to the worldline of a different object.
It may be concluded from the above analysis that the possession of a conserved 
quantity does not warrant the definitive identification of a causal process and it needs 
to be supplemented by some thesis of identity over time. But Dowe’s SI criterion has 
found to be too weak a condition as the last example shows. Dowe’s criteria are thus 
incapable of eliminating all cases of pseudo-processes.
4.2.2 Causal Interaction
The notion of interaction is explicated within Salmon 1984 in terms of the geometrical 
idea of intersection - the crossings and meetings of two processes - at a localised region 
of spacetime. At the location of intersection, certain characteristics of both processes 
are altered. This captures vividly the intuition of the “actions-by-contact” that bring 
changes to the motions of the objects that come into close encounters as in classical 
mechanics. CQ stays faithful to the intuition encapsulated in Salmon’s C l by allowing 
the geometrical concept of an intersection to continue to play a fundamental role in 
its definition of a causal interaction.
Leaving open the choice of what are to be counted as the relevant characteris­
tics of processes that are modified in an intersection makes it necessary for C l to 
be infected with counterfactual in much the same way as M T. By asserting that 
an exchange of a conserved quantity characterizes a point of intersection of processes 
in a genuine interaction37, Dowe has circumvented the need for counterfactuals. I 
judge this definition to have served its function well and to be physically sound.
37On Minkowski spacetime diagrams, physical interactions are represented by the crossings or 
the intersections of worldlines of objects that carry dynamical quantities like energy or momentum. 
These are the events in which the dynamical quantities of the participating processes are altered. 
There is an exchange - represented by a change in the numerical values - of conserved quantities at 
the point of intersection.
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There is also this obvious virtue: unlike Salmon’s C l, the notion of causal in­
teraction entertained by CQ is not defined with respect to two processes. Dowe 
explains38,
A n exchange m eans at least one incoming and a t least one out­
going process m anifest a change in the value o f the conserved  
quantity. “Outgoing” and “incom ing” are delineated on the 
spacetim e diagram  by the forw ard and backward light cones, 
but are essen tia lly  exchangeable. The exchange is governed by 
the conservation law.
The upshot of relaxing the stringent demand of C l to requiring two incoming 
processes for an interaction and two “modified” processes to emerging as a result, is 
that one may now handle Y- and A-type of processes. Salmon’s account fails miserably 
to deal with these cases precisely because C l requires exactly two incoming processes 
and two outgoing ones to participate in a causal interaction. So, C l effectively rules 
out interactions that correspond to the “creation” or “annihilation” of particles like 
those in atomic decays.
For CQ, not all intersections of worldlines are causal interactions but only those 
that involve an exchange of a conserved quantity. When the “worldlines” of pseudo­
objects (like shadows or the moving spot of light across the wall of the astrodome) 
intersect, the intersection would not, in principle, count as an interaction because 
there could not be any changes in the values of a conserved quantity, save the case 
that these objects do not possess any conserved quantities in the first place. The is­
sue is, unfortunately, by no means clear-cut. There can be intersections that involve 
processes that are deemed as causal on Dowe’s definition, are in fact, not so. Un­
doubtedly, any exchange of a conserved quantity associated with the intersection of 
these “causal” processes would be treated as a genuine interaction when they should 
not. The following scenario is a case in point.
We have shown how the criterion of the “possession of a conserved quantity,
38Dowe, P. (1992a), p.210.
118
combined with that of an identity over time, fail to eliminate all cases of pseudo­
processes with the illustration by the example of the series of tightly packed LED 
cells that are manipulated to be illuminated one after another. For the sake of the 
present argument, the reader is invited to consider a peculiar arrangement of LED 
cells set up like the ones in Figure 4-3. As before, each cell is wired to an independent 
circuitry and the lighting of each is synchronized in such a manner that one comes to 
light up after another goes out along the series. To the light cells located along the 
tracks B C  and B D , we have the energy of each cell reduced but demand that the 
total amount of energy of two light bulbs, one placed along B C  and the other along 
BD, to light up at the same time and be equal to the value of energy of any one light 
bulb that is situated along AB.
C
A
D
Figure 4.3: A demonstration that pseudo-processes can satisfy the CQ  defini­
tion of a causal interaction.
We are here presented with a scenario where there is one incoming process and two 
outgoing processes, one which is of the T-type interaction. Each of these processes 
possesses energy and thus qualifies as a causal process on Dowe’s definition. Moreover, 
at the point intersection B , there seems to be a change in the values of energy in 
accordance with the conservation law.
However, the disheartening fact is that all three processes A B , B C , B D  are, in
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fact, pseudo-processes but yet, the condition of the exchange of a conserved quantity 
is satisfied. Hence, the intersection at B  qualifies as a bona fide causal interaction 
according to the CQ definition. This, of course, would not, prima facie, violate 
Dowe’s definition of a causal interaction as it is not part and parcel of the definition to 
require the worldlines to correspond specifically to causal processes. It does, however, 
reveal the vexing difficulty of delineating the actual processes like the cells at B  and 
the electric current supplied by three independent circuits with respect to which the 
exchange has taken place, rather than the non-causal processes like AB, B C  and BD.
The failure to filter out “pseudo-intersections” can of course be traced back to the 
fact that the condition of mere possession of a conserved quantity has not succeeded 
in representing what takes to be a genuine causal connection. One natural response to 
this difficulty is to investigate whether the the notion of transmission, which Salmon 
has claimed to be the crucial element for capturing the very essence of a causal 
connection, would help to resolve the problem (see Section 4.3.2).
4.3 Towards a Conserved Quantity Theory with  
Transmission
4.3.1 A Quick Trip Through the Invariant Quantity Theory
Salmon responded positively to Dowe’s critique and proposal of CQ in his 1994 paper 
titled “Causality Without Counterfactuals”39. In this work, Salmon acknowledges 
that the requirement of his original 1984 theory to define causal processes as ones 
that persist in the absence of interactions leads him to adopt the notion of a “mark” 
and to introduce counterfactuals to both the formulations of M T and Cl. The use of 
counterfactuals has raised serious concerns of an epistemological nature as have been 
expounded masterfully by Kitcher40. Disturbed by these unsettling issues, Salmon 
welcomes CQ with the statement, “Dowe’s proposed conserved quantity theory is 
beautiful for its simplicity”41.
39Salmon, W.C. (1994).
40Kitcher, P. (1989).
41 Salmon, W.C. (1994), p.303.
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Inasmuch as he concurs with Dowe’s results, CQ has not received a complete 
endorsement from Salmon. There are two main modifications to CQ, both in relation 
to the identification of a causal process, which in Salmon’s opinion, that need to be 
made: (1) the replacement of conserved quantities by invariant quantities and, (2) 
the introduction of the notion of transmission.
In regard to (1), Salmon points out that a conserved quantity like energy is not 
invariant because its numerical value varies depending on the particular frame of 
reference concerned42, “To say that a quantity is conserved (within a given physical 
system) means that its value does not change over time; it is constant with respect to 
time translation. To say that a quantity is invariant (within a given physical system) 
means that it remains constant with respect to change of frame of reference” and43, 
“ When we ask about the ontological implications of a theory, one reasonable response 
is to look for its invariants. Since these do not change with the selection of different 
frames of reference - different perspectives or points of view - they possess a kind of 
objective status that seems more fundamental than that of non-invariants.”
To bring into focus the idea of causality as an invariant notion, he suggests the 
replacement of “conserved quantities” with “invariant quantities” in the CQ definition 
of a causal process44, 11A causal process is a worldline of an object that manifests an 
invariant quantity.” .
However, Salmon confesses that this modified definition at once lends itself to 
grave troubles. This is because the most basic of all invariant quantities in nature is 
the spacetime interval between two events. This particular invariant is, unfortunately, 
manifested by processes of all sorts - causal or not - provided that a finite duration has 
elapsed between an initial point and a final point in that process. Salmon argues that 
the term “manifests” is not an adequate concept to capture the fact that something 
is propagated within a causal process45: “A necessary condition for a quantity to 
be transmitted in a process is that it can meaningfully be said to characterize or be
42ibid., p.305. 
43ibid., p.310.
44ibid., p.305-306.
45ibid., p.306.
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possessed by that process at any given moment in its history.”.
Appealing to the idea that the quantity being transmitted ought to be mean­
ingfully specified at each moment in the history of the process would serve to bar an 
invariant quantity like the spacetime interval. This is because the spacetime interval 
is a quantity that can only be meaningfully assigned to a process globally (as a prop­
erty of two endpoints) rather than locally (as a property of every single point within 
the interval). While the notion of transmission encompasses exclusively the idea of 
possessing a property locally, that of “manifest” refers to the possession of a property 
either locally or globally.
Transmission therefore remains a fundamental notion and this is the important 
emendation of Dowe’s definition46,
A causal process is a worldline o f an object that tran sm its a 
non-zero am ount47 o f an invariant quantity a t each m om ent o f  
its  h istory  (each spacetim e poin t o f its  trajectory).
In addition, Salmon offers the following revised non-counterfactual criterion for 
transmission48,
A process transm its an invariant (or conserved) quantity from  
A to B  (A ^ B ) i f  it  possesses this quantity a t A and at B  and  
at every stage o f the process between A and B  w ithout any  
in teractions in  the half-open in terval (A ,B ]49 that involve an 
exchange o f that particu lar invariant (or conserved) quantity.
46ibid., p.308.
47The phrase “manifests a non-zero amount of an invariant quantity” has been inserted to block 
the kind of assertion that a pseudo-process (a shadow for example) manifests an invariant quantity 
(like an electric charge) whose value can be treated as zero in effect. This stipulation has the 
repercussion that genuine casual processes which, on some occasions, do manifest a zero-value of 
an invariant quantity are also excluded from the definition. The photon is a case in point. It has 
an electric charge that equals zero. Nevertheless, it is not disqualified by the above definition from 
being a causal process, for, although it does not possess an invariant quantity such as an electric 
charge, it does so with its invariant speed. We may indeed regard the insertion of this condition 
as a kind of constraint to decide what are the relevant invariant quantities to be possessed by a 
given causal process. The vital message is that a pseu do-process does n o t p o ssess  a n y  so r t  o f  
in v a r ia n t qu a n titie s  w hatsoever.
48ibid.
49The half-open interval (A , B](A<B)  has been introduced to allow for the possibility that there
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This two clauses above form the In va ria n t Q uantity  o f  C ausation  (IQ). Like 
M T, says Salmon50, “This definition embodies the “at-at” theory of transmission, 
which still seems to be fundamental to our understanding of physical causality”
It follows from the definitions above that a pseudo-process is one which either: 
(1) does not possess an invariant (or conserved) quantity or, (2) its possession of 
an invariant (or conserved) quantity involves “some” interactions concerning that 
particular quantity within the half-open interval [A, B\.
Shadows and “moving” light spots do not possess any invariant (or conserved) 
quantities and hence they both fall into the category of pseudo-processes. Others 
which do possess these quantities but are yet considered as non-causal because their 
possession of the quantity in question throughout the interval is parasitic upon the 
continuous replenishment of the quantity from an external source(s). The example 
in Section 4.2.1 of a moving light spot generated by an arrangement of mini light 
cells, set to illuminate one after another, illustrates. The event that gives rise to the 
possession of energy represents an interaction between the electric current and the 
filament in the light cell. As the filament heats up, it eventually reaches a point when 
a photon is emitted which we see as the spot of light. A similar account may be 
produced for the spot in the “next” position that is created by the same procedure 
with the details only differ in the involvement of the electric current from a different 
circuit and a different light cell. The resulting spot is, as a matter of fact, a series of 
independent interactions where there is emphatically the absence of the transmission 
of energy amongst them.
Likewise, the time-wise gerrymander consisted of a sequence of the motions of
three billiard balls discussed in Section 4.2.1 is an object that possesses energy and
momentum. This is again not a (single) causal process as there are interactions
between the balls (in addition to the lack of identity over time). In this case the
is an interaction at point A  that determines the amount of the quantity to be transmitted. This 
would also account for cases where the causal process comes into existence at A. The crucial point 
is that having acquired an invariant (or conserved) quantity at A, a causal process is, in principle, 
capable of transporting this quantity at every spacetime point between A  and B. And of course, the 
closed interval at B  gives the process the freedom to participate in interactions at B. There would 
be no more interactions for the rest of the spacetime points within this interval.
50ibid.
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pseudo-process may be re-analyzed in terms of the three separate causal processes 
that correspond to the respective motions of the three balls.
4.3.2 The Latest Episode: A Conserved Quantity Theory 
w ith Transmission
Renouncing the m ark-transm ission  and in varian t quantity cri­
teria , I  accept a conserved quantity theory sim ilar to D o w e’s - 
differing basically with respect to causal transm ission .
By 1997, Salmon has reverted to adopting conserved quantities in his process 
causal theory and put forth what I call his “ Conserved Q uantity Theory with  
Transm ission” (CQT). In this section, we recount the key issues leading up to the 
formulation of CQT.
CQT represents Salmon’s response to two major critiques on IQ from Phil Dowe51 
and Christopher Read Hitchcock52. Intended as a defence of CQ, Dowe enters into a 
debate over the sufficiency of the notions of “possession” and “transmission” of con­
served quantities and the closely related issues of the identity over time of persisting 
objects. Hitchcock’s comments are, however, of a broader nature and are addressed 
to both the process theories of Salmon and Dowe.
The basic definitions of CQT goes as follows53,
A causal in teraction  is an in tersection  o f  w orldlines that in­
volves exchange o f a conserved quantity.
A causal process is the worldline o f an object that tran sm its a 
non-zero am ount o f a conserved quantity a t each m om ent o f  
its  h istory  (each spacetim e poin t o f its  tra jectory).
and54,
51Dowe, P. (1995).
52Hitchcock, C. (1995).
53Salmon, W.C. (1997), p.468.
54ibid., p.462.
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A process transm its a conserved quantity between A and B 
(A^B) i f  and only i f  it  possesses [a fixed am ount o f] this quan­
tity  at A and at B and at every stage o f the process between 
A and B without any in teractions in the open in terval (A, B ) 
that involve an exchange o f that particu lar conserved quantity .
Seen as a response to Dowe’s 1995 criticisms on the notions of transmission and 
the invariant quantities, the motivation behind Salmon’s revised formulation of the 
process theory is clear. We shall now turn first to the definition of transmission.
First to notice is Salmon’s reversion to conserved quantities in his definitions. This 
move has resulted from the consideration of a series of entangled issues between the 
notions of conserved quantities and transmission as we shall now explain. He sees 
the need to abandon invariant quantities in favour of conserved ones for it enables 
him to deal with the counterexample raised by Hitchcock55. The counterexample 
involves a shadow of an object moving across a metal plate with a uniform non-zero 
change density on its surface. Hitchcock’s claim is that basically, the shadow may be 
considered to possess a constant electric charge that is both conserved and invariant, 
but as it glides across the plate, the shadow is not involved in any causal interaction. 
It thus qualifies as a causal process on both the definitions of Salmon and Dowe56.
The portion of the surface of the plate in the shadow is in possession of a constant 
amount of electric charge, which is similar to the portion of wall on which a light ray 
falls in the case of the astrodome that possesses energy. It could therefore, at first 
sight, be regarded as a causal process. However, there is a subtle difference between 
the two cases. For the patch of wall in the astrodome, the possession of energy 
arises because of its interaction with the light ray, the presence of an interaction 
therefore dismisses the patch of wall as a candidate for a causal process. But since the 
metal plate possesses a constant amount of electric charge without any interactions,
55Hitchcock, C.R. (1995), p.314-315.
56As Salmon has rightly observed, and I agree, this scenario does not pose any particular problem 
for Dowe (Salmon, W.C. (1997), p.472.), “Dowe will readily reject Hitchcock’s example on the ground 
that shadows do not have electric charges; in this case, the charge belongs to the metal plate. This 
response is, I  believe, correct.”
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it therefore appears that Salmon’s criterion of transmission fails to work on this 
occasion.
The resolution of the difficulty lies, as Salmon maintains, with the understanding 
of the essence behind the notion of transmission. It makes good sense to say that 
something has been transmitted or has moved from one spacetime region to another, 
provided only that something vacates the first region and appear in the other.
The point may be illustrated with our arrangement of mini light cells, with each 
of these cells being illuminated by an independent circuit in order to generate a spot 
of light, and these spots are synchronized in such a way that one goes out as the next 
is lit. This synchronized sequence conveys just the right impression for one to regard 
the situation as a spot moving (Figure 4-4).
Figure 4.4: A moving spot of light vacating the last position and taking up 
the next.
Consider the same arrangement but this time with each light cell staying lighted 
once being brought into illumination as in Figure 4-5.
Two observations ensue. First, the situation depicted by Figure 4-5 would not give 
us the impression of a “single” moving spot but rather that something is added to the 
sequence as each light cell is being illuminated. Second, specific to this situation, an 
additional amount of energy in the form of light is added to this “spreading” process. 
In other words, this process does not carry a constant amount of energy. Strictly 
speaking, therefore, additional amounts of energy would have to be added to each 
stage of the process, and so there is no transference of energy from one spacetime
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Figure 4.5: Each light cell stays lit once it is illuminated.
locale to another. Transmission then becomes an ambiguous term in this kind of 
situations. So although the movement of a constant amount of energy from one 
position to another does not guarantee57 the distinction of causal processes, it is, 
nonetheless, a prerequisite for transmission to obtain.
To say that additional amounts of energy are acquired as the process develops 
is tantamount to the statement that energy is not conserved within the process. 
The non-conservation of energy may be traced to the constant acquisition of energy 
from some other sources which is achieved through interactions. This is what in fact 
happens and the process is thus readily dismissed as a non-causal one.
The same line of reasoning58 can now be applied to discredit Hitchcock’s coun­
terexample. As the shadow moves along, the area of the plate in the shadow appears 
to possess a constant amount of charge. The main point remains that in order to re­
gard the portions in the shadow as possessing a constant amount59 of electric charge
57What makes us think that the light spot cast by the rotating beacon at the centre of the 
astrodome is “one single spot” that moves? Precisely because it appears to vacate one location as 
it takes up the next. We find this situation troublesome because a sequence of static interactions 
may, under such circumstance, bear just the correct spatiotemporal relation to satisfy an equation 
of motion, while having no real transfer of causal influences taking place amongst them. Both the 
causal programs of Salmon and Dowe aim to tell in a cogent manner, how this apparent moving 
object is indeed different from that of a moving physical material body. For them, the answer rests 
with the contention that there exist causal relations between the successive stages of the latter but 
not the former. Once this is recognized, the remaining tasks then amount to the expression of these 
causal relations in terms that abide by the empirical strictures: the relations of physics.
58Salmon, W.C. (1997), p.473.
59It has been pointed out to me that Hitchcock’s example may be modified so that a source 
of a positive charge (say) induces a negative charge on a localized area on the metal plate as it 
moves along from underneath the plate. This scenario would then produce the observation that the 
quantity of (negative) charge vacating one place and moving into another; as well as having the 
advantage that it is a continuous process. I owe this example to Dr. Carl Hoefer.
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without interaction, namely, that a constant amount of electric charge is transmitted, 
this quantity of charge has to vacate the previous portion and subsequently appears 
at the next portion where the shadow falls. As Salmon argues60,
Inform ally  we want to  say that electric charges are carried  
by particles like electrons and pro ton s; they are transm itted  
between different spatiotem poral regions by the m ovem ent o f  
such partic les. This involves the passage o f electric charges 
from  one locale to another, thereby augm enting the electric  
charges already there. The sam e consideration applies to  the 
in term ediate spacetim e locations - that is, the electric charge 
in  question m ust vacate its location a t one stage o f the process 
and appear at the other stages o f the process a t the appropriate  
tim es. Otherwise, the electric charge would n ot be a conserved  
quantity.
The contribution of conserved quantities to the thrust of his argument prompts 
Salmon to regard conserved quantities as the appropriate dynamical quantities that 
are possessed by causal processes.
In practice, however, argues Dowe, a physical object is generally not confined 
within a closed system that is shut off from all interactions. Especially, it undergoes 
continuous interactions with its environment. The constant bombardment by air 
molecules in its surroundings and the continuous gravitational interactions are not 
the only but two of the most encountered instances. These constant interactions 
render the concept of the transmission of a constant dynamical quantity61 (and in 
turn the notion of a causal process) vacuous. And Dowe concludes62,
For this reason the CQ theory does n ot require that a causal
60ibid., p.472-473.
61It would only be consistent, in the absence of interactions, to speak about a fixed (or constant) 
amount of a quantity to be transmitted. This is because the value of a quantity to be transmitted 
changes whenever there is an interaction. Hence, this reading of the meaning of transmission restricts 
one to a constant amount of a transmitted quantity.
62Dowe, P. (1995), p.331.
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possess a constant am ount o f the relevant quantity over the 
entire h istory  o f the process.
As part of his defence of the notion of “possession” against that of Salmon’s 
“transmission”, Dowe also takes issue with the direction of causation in the definition 
of transmission.
On the concept of transmission, Salmon remarks63, “Dowe says that it is unnec­
essary; I  claim that it is indispensable” And so much for the dichotomy in their 
respective positions.
Clearly, CQ takes a neutral position64 with respect to temporal direction and, 
can therefore be said to be essentially a temporally-symmetric theory65. The expres­
sion “from A  to B ” within Salmon’s new definition of transmission66 does, however, 
strongly suggests a temporal directionality in which transmission is to take place. 
This immediately finds itself at odds with the “at-at1 condition which is satisfied, as 
long as the quantity concerned (be it invariant or conserved) is possessed at every 
stage between A  and B. Thus, Dowe claims67, “Indeed, the notion of transmission 
turns out to involve no more than what is contained in the notion of “possession”. 
I  conclude that there is no advantage in appealing to “transmission” (as in the IQ  
theory) rather than “possession” (as in the CQ theory) ”
Responding to Dowe’s challenge to the notion of transmission, Salmon effected a 
change in the revised definition of transmission with the replacement of the directional 
expression “from A  to B ” by “between A  and B ”68. The aim is to restore temporal
63ibid., p.466.
64Both Salmon and Dowe have at times expressed wishes to pursue a process theory that is non­
committed to a preferred temporal direction on which a causal theory of time may be grounded. 
Any a priori commitment to a temporal direction is considered to place such a programme under 
threat.
65This is because “possession” is a temporally symmetrical concept.
66Salmon, W.C. (1994), p.308.
67Dowe, R  (1995), p.326.
68Another minor point of emendation to note is the alteration from a half-open interval (A,B\ 
(.A < x < B ) to an open interval (A,B) (A <  x <  B).  This serves to make precise the idea that 
a causal process is capable of transmitting causal influence without resorting to external sources 
in-between interactions. The half-open interval (A <  x < B ) may give the incorrect impression of 
the process entering upon an interaction at B.  Given that it has not taken part in any interaction, 
the process ought still to be possessing the conserved quantity in question at point B.  However, a 
genuine interaction at B  can run the risk of being ambiguously counted against the causal process,
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symmetry in order to facilitate the construction of a temporally-neutral causal theory 
on Dowe’s suggestion. This granted, however, Salmon still remains loyal to the notion 
of transmission69,
The issue concerns the concept o f tran sm ission , and it  is cen­
tered on the final clause o f the definition, uwithout any in ter­
actions... that involve an exchange o f that particu lar conserved  
quan tity” ...From  m y point o f view the crucial question regard­
ing causal processes is what they do on their own w ithout out­
side in tervention . M y answer is that they tran sm it som ething  
- e.g., conserved quantities, inform ation, or causal influence - 
and it  is by virtue o f such transm ission  that events a t A and  
B are causally related.
We shall now scrutinize this dispute of transmission over possession. In the ex­
ample of the three alignments of LEDs (Figure 4-3) given at the end of Section 4.2.2, 
Dowe’s criterion of mere possession has been shown to fail to disqualify AB, BC  and 
BD  as pseudo-processes. And also, the intersection at B is identified as a causal 
interaction by CQ; although, in fact, this causal interaction at B is due not to the 
intersection of the processes AB, BC  and BD, but rather to that between the three 
LED cells (each positioned along one process around the vicinity of point B) and the 
independent circuit that each is connected to.
Can CQ T do better70? Firstly, there are interactions that involve exchange of a 
conserved quantity within the processes AB, BC  and BD  and so there is no trans­
mission of a conserved quantity along each of these processes. Hence, all three are 
pseudo-processes. However, the intersection of these three “worldlines” , right at the 
localized point B, does involve an exchange.
which has been able to sustain its own existence and to transport causal influences of its own accord 
at every spacetime point from A up until the encounter at B. In order to remove this ambiguity 
and at the same time to allow for the fact that a proper interaction at B  should not frustrate our 
determination of whether a given process is genuinely causal, there is the need to exclude interactions 
at B.
69ibid.
70We ended the discussion in Section 4.2.2 by suggesting to investigate whether the notion of 
transmission would help to resolve the problem.
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So, we have arrived at the following situation. Dowe’s CQ criterion of mere 
possession cannot pick out AB, BC  and BD  as pseudo-processes and it also deems 
the interaction at B  as a genuine causal interaction. It is thus concluded that the 
intersection of the “causal process” (by virtue of CQ) AB, BC  and BD  has given 
rise to this interaction. On the other hand, Salmon’s C Q T can correctly identify AB, 
BC  and BD  as pseudo-processes, but it appears that we now have a peculiar scenario 
whereby the intersection of these pseudo-processes has given rise to a genuine causal 
interaction!
Therefore, even though it would seem that CQ T does offer more than CQ, since 
it has successfully identify AB, BC  and BD  as pseudo-processes with its criterion of 
transmission, it too, however, is incapable of expressing the fact that the intersection 
at B  is not an interaction with respect to these three specific processes in question.
How may one remedy the situation? What we really need to capture is the fact 
that the causal interaction - the intersection with an exchange of a conserved quantity 
- at B  has arisen from the intersections of the three LEDs and the current in the wires 
connecting each to their respective circuits; that is, from the intersections of causal 
processes!
A natural move is to state in explicit terms that only intersections of causal 
processes involving the exchange of a conserved quantity are deemed as causal inter­
actions.
Intuitively, when pseudo-processes interact, one would not expect any one of them 
to suffer any changes as a consequence of their intersections. Two shadows may mo­
mentarily overlap but as they “move” away from the point of intersection, they recover 
their respective shapes. However, the situation becomes more delicate with pseudo­
processes such as two spots of light moving across a wall intersecting for instance. At 
the point of intersection, there is exchange of energy, a conserved quantity; although 
the exchange takes place between each of the two light rays and the area of the wall 
on which they both fall.
A crucial observation ensues. In each of the above scenarios where there is an
131
actual exchange of a conserved quantity when two pseudo-processes intersect, the ex­
change is found to occur between the causal processes that the pseudo-ones originate. 
The two moving spots of light are the product of two light rays sweeping across the 
wall, and so are the processes AB, BC  and CD being the product of the interactions 
amongst the different light cells and circuitries.
Given that there is a change in the value of a conserved quantity in an interaction 
and the change has to obey the constraints imposed by the conservation laws; only 
causal processes with the capacities to transmit conserved quantities may participate in 
interactions. It is impossible for a pseudo-process that lacks the capability to transmit 
a conserved quantity71 to participate in an interaction - an intersection where there 
is an exchange of a conserved quantity.
To labor the point, imagine the following situation. A red-filter is placed a shade 
above the area of the wall of the astrodome where a beam of light falls and the spot of 
light becomes red as a result. There seems to be an exchange of a conserved quantity 
that involves a pseudo-process like the light spot. On careful reflection, at the very 
point of intersection, there are several processes at work. There are the red-filter, 
the light beam and also the patch of wall on which the beam falls. The red-filter 
absorbs all other wavelengths in the beam of white light and allows only red light 
through. As a “by-product”, the spot on the wall becomes red. The exchange of 
energy, a conserved quantity, has taken place between the red-filter and the beam 
of white light, with both of these being causal processes. But at this very point of 
intersection, is there much meaning in speaking about the spot as independent from 
the patch of wall that is illuminated by the red-filtered light? Especially as we are just 
concerned with the “light spot” at the point of intersection and that point only, and 
not the moving spot. The crux of the matter, as I see it, is this: insofar as the “static” 
spot is concerned, there is no physical difference between the illuminated patch of wall 
and the light spot itself, it is purely a linguistic maneuver to call the the illuminated
71It may be objected that an object like the gerrymander given in Section 4.2.1, although a pseudo­
process, does, however, possess conserved quantities. But since a pseudo-process of such kind may 
be easily re-analyzed as a composition of a number of causal processes, the term “pseudo-process” 
would be reserved for processes which involve objects that do not in fact possess any conserved 
quantity.
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patch of wall a “spot” of light. But it would matter as soon as the “movement’ of 
the spot comes into the picture, the moving spot thus becomes a process, albeit a 
pseudo-one, with its successive stages bearing no cause-effect relation to each other. 
The all important message is that at the static level, should there be an exchange of 
a conserved quantity on the point of intersection, the exchange is to be accounted for 
in terms of causal processes that also intersect at that very point. But how do we 
know which processes are causal? This is only possible through the consideration on 
the “dynamicar level of these processes, which concerns the relation and non-relation 
between the successive stages of the processes.
At the locus of the intersection, one may, of course, consider the part of the 
“worldline” of a pseudo-process, namely, the light spot. However, this pseudo-process 
plays a redundant role in the actual exchange for it neither receives nor dispatches 
any conserved quantity. I would therefore suggest a slight modification to Dowe’s 
definition of a causal interaction,
A causal in teraction  is an intersection  o f causal processes that 
involves exchange o f a conserved quantity.
The stipulation of causal processes as the proper participants in intersections that 
give rise to genuine interaction alleviates our difficulty and with this modification, 
CQ T is now capable of identifying all three processes AB, BC  and CD as pseudo­
processes, as well as dismissing intersection at B  as a genuine interaction with respect 
to these pseudo-processes.
But now, a deeper worry ensues. The incorporation of causal processes into the 
definition of causal interaction drives CQT to a circularity, because causal processes 
are themselves defined in terms of transmission, which is in turn defined with reference 
to interaction72. So, it does seem that an independent definition of causal processes
72The circularity runs as follows. The decision of the intersection at B  being a non-causal in­
teraction with respect to the processes A B , B C  and C D  hinges upon the premise that these three 
are pseudo-processes. Why are these non-causal processes? It is because they do not transmit con­
served quantities. Why do they not transmit conserved quantities? It is because their possession 
of conserved quantities obtain by the intersections of causal processes that involve an exchange of a 
conserved quantity.
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is required for circumventing the circularity73.
Recall that the one essential feature of causal processes that the notion of trans­
mission has all the while been trying to capture is that, causal processes have the 
ability to sustain themselves without any intervention from outside the process. And 
so the locution “without any interactions that involve an exchange of that particular 
conserved quantity” deserves a further scrutiny.
The understanding that a causal interaction is not just any odd intersection of 
processes74 but only those at which the exchange of a conserved quantity occurs, 
carries the implication that there can be intersections of processes which do not 
count as interactions. Hence, the following two75 propositions are true:
(i) there is no intersection of worldlines and hence no exchange of any conserved 
quantity.
(ii) there is an intersection of worldlines but without an actual exchange of a con­
served quantity.
Both propositions represent cases of no interaction and are therefore relevant to 
the definition of causal processes.
It turns out that a slight modification by incorporating (ii) into the definition 
would serve our purpose. This is attained simply by the replacement of the term 
“interaction” (that is defined by causal processes) by “intersection” , which results 
in the notion of transmission, and hence that of causal processes, being independent 
from the notion of interaction.
Let us now state the three definition of the revised form of CQT,
A causal process is the worldline o f an object that tran sm its a 
non-zero am ount o f a conserved quantity at each m om ent o f  
its  h istory (each spacetim e point o f its  tra jectory).
73Incidentally, this is one of the two ways out of the circularity charge as indicated earlier in 
Section 3.3.2 (Figure 3-4).
74We do not specify the exact nature of the processes at this point and the reason will be apparent 
from the discussion to follow.
75The possibility of an exchange of an invariant quantity without an intersection is discarded.
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A process trunsm its a conserved quantity between A and B  
(A^B) i f  and only i f  i t  possesses [a fixed am ount o f] this quan­
tity  at A and at B and at every stage o f the process between 
A and B without any in tersections in the open in terval (A, B )  
that involve an exchange o f that particu lar conserved quantity.
A causal in teraction  is an in tersection  o f causal processes that 
involves exchange o f a conserved quantity.
It remains to be shown how Salmon’s scheme works to identify casual processes 
in concrete settings. In particular, we are interested in whether Salmon’s criterion is 
capable of telling causal processes from non-causal ones.
Firstly, the worldlines of objects like shadows and a moving spot of light originating 
from a rotating beam some distance away are at once ruled out (as pseudo-processes) 
by the definition since they are not in possession of any conserved quantity.
The worldline of an object that possesses a conserved quantity would be regarded 
as a causal process even in the presence of an intersection with the worldline of another 
object, provided the other object is not in possession of any such conserved quantity 
so that no exchange can take place on intersection. An example is a ball placed in 
the shadow of a car. The ball is an object possessing energy while the shadow is not. 
There is no exchange of energy between the ball and the shadow. So the worldline of 
the ball is a causal process.
Yet another example is the meeting of two light rays which passes each other 
without any exchange of conserved quantity occurring. Both of these objects possess 
energy and momentum and since the intersection does not alter their dynamical 
makeups, these are not interactions which would count against their worldlines being 
causal processes.
The ultimate test, perhaps, rests with the kind of example such as a process that 
appears as a moving spot of light created by the successive illumination of a series of 
mini LED light cells aligned in a continuous array. Each stage of all three processes 
AB, BC  and BD  is an intersection involving the exchange of energy and it follows
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therefore that there is no transmission taking place along each of these processes, 
because possession of energy is by virtue of these intersections. And since there 
is no transmission of a conserved quantity, these three are considered not as causal 
processes. Hence, by our revised definition of causal interaction, which specifies causal 
processes as the proper subjects that undergo intersection in a legitimate interaction, 
the intersection of the processes AB, BC  and BD  is not a causal interaction; since 
the three are not proper worldlines of objects (which are now understood to be causal 
processes). That is, the exchange at B  should not count as a causal interaction with 
respect to the processes AB, BC  and BD.
However, relative to the particular light cells situated around point B  and the 
circuitries that they are connected to, the exchanges are indeed genuine interactions. 
It is because the processes of the light cells and the current contained in the wires 
can sustain themselves without any interaction, and as such are regarded as causal 
processes.
Given that an intersection of processes that involves an exchange of a conserved 
quantity has taken place in a localized region of spacetime, one would be able to 
declare it a genuine interaction with respect to only the causal processes that intersect.
In this section, we have shown that with a slight modification, the notion of 
transmission is more effective in delineating causal processes from non-causal ones, 
than the notion of possession.
4.4 Continuity, Identity Over Time and the World- 
line View of Causal Processes
In this section, I shall consider a cluster of closely related issues that are of direct 
importance to our present investigation. In particular, I shall argue that C Q T 76 and 
CQ both trade heavily on the notion of spatiotemporal continuity. This is because 
both adopt the view of a causal process as the worldline of an object, which is essen­
tially a continuous entity in spacetime. However, as we have seen, not the continuous 
motions in spacetime of all “objects” can be counted as causal processes, with the
76Now in its revised form given in Section 4.3.2.
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revolving spot of light as the candidate example of a pseudo-process. This is what 
has driven both Salmon and Dowe to resort to their respective criteria of “transmis­
sion” and “possession” to distinguish between causal and non-causal processes. Both 
criteria, must nevertheless, be complemented by a thesis of identity over time of an 
object - the stipulation that the object is one and the same.
With the foregoing in mind, this section is organized in two main parts. It is 
shown in Section 4.4.1 how the notions of causal processes, spatiotemporal continuity 
and identity over time are related. I shall argue that the kind of identity over time 
needed for causal processes must enter as a fundamental supposition. In Section 4.4.2 
that follows, a discrepancy between the usage of the term worldline in both CQT 
and CQ and that in physics will be pointed out. The clarification of this discrepancy 
helps to pave the way for extending the notion of causal processes to quantum physics.
4.4.1 Spatiotem poral Continuity, Identity Over Tim e and 
Causal Processes
In explaining how the notion of spatiotemporal continuity got bound up with that of 
causal processes, Salmon says77,
. . .I  shall assum e without fu rth er ado that we can observe m any  
m acroscopic physical objects, processes and even ts , and that 
we can legitim ately in fer the existence o f such en tities when 
they are not actually being observed. We in fer the continuous 
existence o f the kitchen clock while we are n o t a t hom e, and  
explain the positions o f its  hands in term s o f continuous pro­
cesses that have transpired in  our absence. W e m ain ta in  that 
the planet M ars exists and m oves in a continuous path during  
the day and at tim es when the sky is obscured by clouds... I f  
any serious question arises, i t  can in  principle always be settled  
by making an appropriate kind o f observation . This approach ,
77Salmon, W.C. (1984), p.206.
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which conform s to comm on sense, enables us to endow our world  
with a great deal o f spatiotem poral con tinu ity .
To explicate the inference to spatiotemporal continuity, Salmon considers C.J. 
Ducasse’s example of the mouse in the basement of his home. Upon the discovery 
of a little mouse in his basement, Professor Ducasse, a great animal lover, was said 
to have carefully constructed a special trap which enabled him to capture the mouse 
without bringing any harm to it. The creature was then duly released in a vacant 
field by the good professor while on his way to work. After this pattern of events 
had been repeated on a number of successive days with the mouse caught on each 
occasion looking very similar, the professor decided to “mark” the mouse he caught 
by a small blob of white paint before having it released in the usual manner. That 
same very night, the trap was set once again and much to his expectation, the mouse 
caught was one with a white mark on his head. In this example the physical process, 
the mouse, was observed by Ducasse only at disconnected times; but says Salmon78, 
“we have no doubt that the process itself possessed spatiotemporal continuity. Ducasse 
employed the mark method to ascertain whether he was dealing with a single causal 
process (rather than many different mice), and there is no doubt that the process 
itself possessed spatiotemporal continuity of the transmission of the mark.” And he 
seems to think that79, 11 This example is unproblematic, for the process is one which 
is in principle observable throughout its duration.”
So, M T, the criterion for mark transmission that embodies the “at-af theory of 
transmission is regarded as the first entry-point where the notion of spatiotemporal 
continuity comes into Salmon’s 1984 causal theory. According to the “at-af theory, 
the transmission of a mark or more generally of causal influences, is made possible by 
the correlation of the continuous one-dimensional time sequence with the term(s) of 
the three-dimensional continuous spatial sequence. In other words, there ought to be 
a continuous spatiotemporal trajectory of the mark in question and any suggestion 
of action-at-a-distance is unacceptable.
78ibid., p.208.
79ibid.
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As we have pointed out, transmission is a form of motion whereby causal influences 
move from one spacetime locale to another. This point merits further elucidation. To 
proceed, Russell’s “at-af theory of motion, on which the “at-af theory of transmis­
sion is based, deserves a closer examination.
The concept of motion, Russell remarks, is logically subsequent and founded on 
the idea of occupying a place at a time and also that of change. One sees, one senses 
or even feels something changes, from the changing moods of deciduous trees to 
the tragic feeling of love slipping away. In each and every instance when a change 
is perceived or sensed, a difference in the very object or state of affairs prior and 
subsequent to the change is what leads one to the conclusion that a change has taken 
place. This essential difference in time is what has been captured most vividly by 
Russell’s notion of change. Change, as defined by Russell80, is the difference, in 
respect of truth and falsehood, of the same proposition concerning an entity occurring 
at two different times. Thus, mere existence on this definition constitutes a basis for 
change since if the proposition “A  exists” is true at time T  but false at T\ when A 
ceases to exist, then this amounts to a difference in regard to the respective truth and 
falsity of the same proposition at two moments of time T  and T\.
Notice that the definition does not immediately lend itself to the conclusion that 
change ought to assume a continuous nature with respect to, at the very least, the 
continuity of time as taken in the Cantorian sense. For the difference is one that 
refers to two specific moments of time (with a certain order) and this is meaningful 
whether the temporal sequence is continuous or discrete. However, change can be of 
a continuous kind if the characteristic to undergo change forms a continuous sequence 
that is correlated with a corresponding continuous temporal sequence. Indeed, for 
a change to be considered as continuous, it is neither sufficient to have, (a) only a 
continuous sequence of the subject of the propositions alone81 nor (b) a continuous 
temporal sequence on its own, for if one of the two correlating sequences is discrete 
in nature, this would render the change to be discontinuous. However, it should be
80Russell B., (1903), p.469.
81 An example is the continuous sequence of spatial coordinates that is represented by the real 
number series.
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pointed out that the converse is not true since the correlation between two continuous 
sequences does not imply that a change need necessary be continuous. This point 
will receive a detailed analysis below.
The essence of motion rests upon the fact that different places are occupied at 
different times by an object From a dynamical viewpoint, the relevant purpose of 
the object is to establish a correlation between all moments of time and some points 
of space in order to generate functional dynamical laws.
It must be once again emphasized that up until now there exists no necessary 
demand for the notion of continuity in the definition of motion based on Russell’s 
criterion for change. In actual fact, this observation has been confirmed by Russell 
in the Principle of Mathematics82,
The m otion  is continuous i f  the correlating relation R defines 
a continuous function . I t is to be taken as part o f  the defini­
tion  o f m otion  that it  is continuous... This is an entirely new  
assum ption, having no kind o f necessity, but serving m erely the 
purpose o f giving a subject akin to rational dynam ics.
As the notion of continuity is neither a formal requirement for change nor motion 
but merely serves as an additional assumption, it is important to assess the impact of 
such a supposition. In particular, we ask what indeed is the role played by the notion 
of spatiotemporal continuity? We infer from the spatiotemporally continuous motion 
of an object that it is the one and the same object that moves through spacetime. 
In other words, spatiotemporal continuity is brought in to ensure that the object in 
motion has an identity over time. But is this inference a sound one?
Consider a moving billiard ball that collides head-on with one that stays at rest and 
promptly sets the latter into motion upon impact. There, what is displayed before 
our very eyes are continuous spatiotemporal tracks. Indeed, it is this perceptual 
impression of the continuous movements of the balls that lends us the confidence 
and belief in the causal inference from the moving ball to the collision and from
82Russell, B. (1903), 473.
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the collision to the subsequent setting into motion of the stationary ball. To quote 
Elizabeth Anscombe, “a causal explanation would be it (an object) went along some 
path from A to £ ” ,83 We are confident that the moving ball is the legitimate cause 
of the subsequent motion of the stationary one. Especially, if one thinks along the 
line of Anscombe, then the causal influence is made possible by a physical connection 
provided by the “same” object - the moving ball.
But is spatiotemporal continuity alone a sufficient condition for causal inference 
via a physical connection? Imagine, however, the somewhat miraculous scenario 
where right after the moment of impact, the previously stationary ball vanishes and in 
its place (at the same spatial point) pops into existence another ball which resembles 
the former in so remarkably every detail that no observable difference is detected. 
Are we to conclude that this is the same ball as the original granted that this “other” 
ball is to move off in the very same direction as the original one would have done, 
and with just the correct amount of momentum and energy? Given the knowledge 
that what appears to be the same ball is in actual fact not, we now ask whether we 
still find ourselves confident to make the causal inference of the “moving ball setting 
the one initially at rest into motion”? I think not. We have here an instance of 
spatiotemporal continuity but not physical connection. It seems plausible that the 
answer centers on whether additional information concerning the rather strange acts 
of disappearance and reappearance of the ball is accessible to us or not84. If we are 
not furnished with background knowledge of such kind, as it seems we never are, the 
spatiotemporal continuous paths of the balls would deem to be good reason for us to 
infer that it is the one and the same ball.
Or we may also imagine a world where there exist those rather strange fantasy 
machines like “table canceller” and “table creator” as thought up by Sidney Shoe­
maker85. The “table canceller” is supposed to make tables vanish instantly at desired
83Anscombe, G.E.M. (1974), p.150.
84For the observation of the spatiotemporal continuous motion of the ball may arise from either the 
scenario of being one and the same ball or being two indiscemable balls. Since both of these scenarios 
cannot be distinguished by spatiotemporal continuity, one therefore is not allowed to assert that the 
ball is, in fact, one and the same.
85Shoemaker, S. (1979). Reprinted in French, P.A., Uehling, T.E. Jr. and Wettstein, H.K. (eds.) 
(1984), p.326.
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locations and the “table creator” is to perform the reverse task of instantly creating 
tables at specified locations. Now consider a table standing in the middle of a din­
ning hall and the “table canceller” is set to cancel this very table whereas the “table 
creator” is set to create a table, that replicates the original in every aspect, to appear 
at the same spot. When the buttons on both machines are pressed simultaneously, an 
observer would not notice that the “original” table has been replaced by the “new” 
table. The stages of both the original and the new tables are in spatiotemporally 
continuous succession and display remarkable qualitative similarity and resemblance.
However, one would definitely not regard the stages of the “original” table and 
those of the “new” one as the successive stages of one persisting table if granted 
the knowledge of the presence of both the “table canceller” and the “table creator” 
machines and the fact that both machines were set to work at the same time. Without 
this knowledge, a spatiotemporally continuous sequence of events, which possesses so 
striking a qualitative similarity seems sufficient for one to conclude that there is 
indeed one persisting object. Here again, although spatiotemporal continuity does 
not warrant a physical connection, it seems a good enough reason for inferring that 
it is the one and the same table all along.
The proper relation between the notions of spatiotemporal continuity and causal 
transmission can be established as follows:
A: Being the same object
B: The assumption of spatiotemporal continuity
C: Causal transmission (as a kind of motion)
So the argument goes as follows:
(Pi) C —>A Being the same object is necessary for causal transmission.
(P2) A —>B Spatiotemporal continuity is necessary (on an empirical level)
to determine whether it is indeed the same object.
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Therefore , C —>B Spatiotemporal continuity is determined to be necessary for
causal transmission .
On the physical front, as one speaks of the motion of an object, one does, albeit in 
an implicit manner, make the assumption of the object being one and the same. And 
it seems that the observation of spatiotemporal continuity in the motion of an object 
grants us the confidence and justification for such doing. Even though, of course, on 
the empirical level, one still cannot be certain whether the scenario of being “one and 
the same object” obtains or not.
Therefore, on the basis of physics, the spatiotemporal continuous motion is the 
connection between events in spacetime86. And this connection is what we deem as 
the causal connection on a singular level. This is how the notion of spatiotemporal 
continuity is being tied to that of causation in the context of classical physics.
It should therefore come as no great surprise that the issue of spatiotemporal 
continuity has much to be blamed for the causality crisis brought on by the quan­
tum revolution. In non-relativistic quantum mechanics, one finds discontinuous leaps 
in the positions of a microscopic object while the characteristic of space and time 
as the respective three-dimensional and linear continua enters the theory at a most 
fundamental level. I have especially in mind the quantum mechanical phenomena of 
“tunneling” where a particle is confined within a given potential well that is clas­
sically forbidden for it to overcome since its total energy is lower than that of the 
well. Quantum mechanically, the particle may nevertheless be found to be able to 
“tunnel” through the well and appear on the other side of it. There is the pressing 
issue of how the particle gets from a location within the potential well to one out­
side without traversing the intermediate positions! These discontinuous leaps give a 
glimpse of the difficulty quantum theory poses for our much cherished intuitive cor­
respondence between continuity and causation. This is due essentially to the absence 
of spatiotemporal continuity, an absence of a well-defined trajectory. Our intuitions 
are not tutored to be at ease with the notion of discreteness.
86As this physical connection needs only be satisfied on one occasion for singular causal inference, 
it is deemed a sufficient condition for causation on a singular level to obtain.
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Now how can one even be certain that the particle found outside the barrier is 
one and the same that had been imprisoned inside it some moments ago? How then 
are we to suppose the continual existence of the particle?
The continual existence of the particle requires it to be existing in space as well 
as in time. However, it is sufficient for the claim of an object being one and the 
same if it enjoys only continual existence in time. Consider a simple case where an 
object, situated at a location A, vanishes at time and an “indiscernable” object, 
resembling the first in every imaginable aspect, appears at a different location B  at 
a later time ts  (Figure 4-6).
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Figure 4.6:
As no object is to be found anywhere in space between these two times, one is 
unable to lodge the claim of the object being one and the same as substantiated by 
the continual existence in space, for it is obviously not the case. One could, at best, 
resort to the continual existence in time of the object in order to carry through the 
claim of the object being one and the same. This is possible because we may entertain 
the thought that the object may still exist during the times between t^  and £#, not 
in physical space87 as we perceive it, but rather some other manifestations of it, for 
instance.
87Such a maneuver is bound to attract controversy, for although we have posited the continual 
existence or the persistence through time of the object, what meaning may be attached to it being 
“existing in time but not in physical space” ? Is it tenable to segregate existence in time from that 
in physical space? Events occupy specific spacetime locations as and when they occur, but some 
events have the tendency to remain in one’s memory over a period of time, usually ones that had 
brought great delight or tragedy, long after they had ceased existing in space. However, I should 
refrain from such discourse which concerns the mind and soul but rather restrict my reference to the 
phrase “existence in space” in a much narrower sense to ontological entities in the physical world. 
Physical events, objects and processes all exist in both space and time. Therefore, the possession 
of a location in both space and time is a vital precondition of physical existence. This is the picture 
presented to us by non-relativistic classical mechanics.
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The absence of a complete spatiotemporal record of a tunneling particle in a po­
tential well would seem to run contrary to our supposition of continuance in existence. 
If such a continuance is found to stand on shaky grounds, I ask, with what right are 
we to speak of the particle being 1 one and the same” object?
One notes that, as I have argued, the continuous path of a physical object in 
spacetime is vital to the claim that it is in fact the same object which takes up 
the different positions at different times. It is therefore essential and inherent in 
the classical idea of matter that the object persists through time and retains its 
identity when it is in motion. This is why the locution “the same object” loses its 
entire meaning when an “object” hops or leaps through space without visiting the 
intermediate positions. This is why we ought not to speak legitimately of (classical) 
“motion” when the object takes a leap through spacetime, recalling that our object, 
the material point, has been brought in to impose important kinematical conditions 
for capturing the essence of motion. This is how the evaporation of spatiotemporal 
continuity has rendered the concept of motion empty.
The difficulty, I maintain, is due to the fact that at least on a classical level, the 
idea of being the same object, which is crucial to the related ideas of motion and 
causal inference, is itself found to be parasitic upon the notion of continuity. But 
must it be so?
As we have seen, the notion of continuity enters into the “at-af theory of motion 
as an extra assumption. What is, however, of vital importance is that motion pre­
supposes the presence of a material thing or matter. By virtue of its occupation of 
different points in space at different times the material thing provides the correlations 
between space and time that represent states of rest and motion. In order to fulfill its 
role as a correlator, this material thing is to possess the feature of persisting through 
time and maintaining its identity during motion.
This is indeed the kind of identity over time we seek for causal processes: the 
stipulation that it is the one and the same object that is in motion. This is required 
before one may meaningfully speak of the notions of an object in motion and that of 
the transmission of causal influences. This supposition releases one’s thought from
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spatiotemporal continuity which is incidental to classical physics, one can begin to 
speculate on the kind of discrete motions of objects as portrayed in quantum physics.
I would like to end this section on a different note. Salmon’s process theory has 
also been criticized for its incapability to deal with cases of action-at-a-distance like 
Newtonian gravity; for there is seemingly no spatiotemporally continuous connection 
existing between the two objects involved in such an interaction. There appears to be 
an exchange of momentum without any actual spacetime encounter of the two objects. 
One finds an analogous situation in classical electromagnetism that had proved to be 
equally perplexing before Maxwell, who duly resolved the conundrum by introducing 
the model of an electromagnetic field, which acts as the mediator of the forces between 
two charged bodies. Electromagnetic fields prevail through spacetime and thus form 
a good example of causal processes88. Geodesics of objects, from the standpoint of 
Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity provide further support, as Salmon argues89, 
“...any such falling object is a single causal process that is free from interactions.”
To be sure, an object is in free fall unless some other force other than gravitation is 
exerted on it. Consider the simple case of a ball resting on a table top. The reaction 
exerted by the table prevents the ball from falling. The point where the ball touches 
the table top is an intersection between the two processes of the ball and the table 
top, which involves an exchange of momentum in a continuous manner. We are thus 
faced with the difficulty that the ball (or the table) cannot be regarded as a causal 
process on the CQ T definition.
But as with the continuous interactions with the air-molecules in its surround­
ing, the energy exchanged in these continuous interactions with gravity is considered 
as peripheral to the major “chunck” of energy that constitute the ball (our causal 
process), which is transmitted by the ball by virtue of its identity over time.
88It may be argued that the object whose worldline is causal process has finite spatial extent, and 
as such, electromagnetic fields would be disqualify. However, as we shall see, by the adoption of 
the “history” view in place of the worldline view would enable us to count electromagnetic fields as 
causal processes.
89ibid., p.465.
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4.4.2 A Critique on the “Worldline V iew ” o f Causal Pro­
cesses
In the present section we endeavour to acquire a better understanding of how causal 
processes come to get bound up with the worldlines of objects. The concept of 
a worldline defined as the collection of events happened at an object (its history) 
was introduced into physics through Einstein’s special theory of relativity (SRel). 
SRel rejects the view of absolute space and time in favour of the four-dimensional 
spacetime continuum. In this treatment, different observers assign different sets of 
spatial and temporal coordinates to a region of spacetime and each one of these 
coordinate systems corresponds to a different frame of reference. There are different 
descriptions of the same event for observers from different perspectives because of 
their different choices of the set of spacetime coordinates - the different frames of 
reference. In the theory, events are the ones that assume a concrete reality, for 
although described by different spacetime coordinates, they are the representations 
of the actual occurrences in the world and these are indisputable, empirical facts, 
irrespective of which frame of reference an observer happens to be in.
It was realized by Hermann Minkowski, a German mathematician, in the early 
1900’s90 that all the results of SRel can be represented geometrically in the so- 
called Minkowski spacetime diagram. In this diagram, the vertical-axis represents 
the time coordinates while the horizontal-axis represents the spatial coordinates91, 
and the spacetime locations of the occurrences of events are unambiguously de­
noted by points92 on the diagram. All the events happening to a physical sys­
tem - its history - form a continuous sequence of points in this diagram. This 
continuous sequence of points taken collectively is the “worldline” of the system. 
It is important to recognize the fact that the concept of the worldline is defined 
with respect to a single physical system or object.
Most textbook definitions of a worldline focus on this point and the aspect of
90Minkowski, H. (1908). Reprinted in Lorentz, H.A. et al. (1923), p.84.
91 This is usually understood to describe the three-dimensional location but since in practice, the 
diagram is presented on a two-dimensional plane, so the three spatial coordinates are “collapsed” 
into a one-dimensional coordinate without any loss of generality.
92Minkowski calls these “world-points”, ibid., p.76.
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spatiotemporal continuity that is associated with it. As an illustration, we need only 
examine a few of the definitions below,
The h istory  o f a particle consists o f a continuous sequence o f  
even ts. (Synge93)
Lines describing the h istory  o f poin t objects are called world- 
lines, or spacetim e trajectories. (Mermin94)
We can construct a sim ple x-t coordinate system , on which we 
draw “w orld lines” showing the developm ent o f the system  in  
space and tim e. The worldline o f any given particle is ju s t a 
graph o f its  position  as a function  o f  tim e, i t  provides a com­
plete p icture o f the h istory  o f the particle as observed within a 
given fram e o f reference. (French95)
The truck o f  a particle through four-d im ensional spacetim e is 
called its  worldline. (Eddington96)
We describe the world by listing events and showing how they  
relate to one another...N ow  we turn to  a whole chain o f events, 
events that track the passage o f a particle through spacetim e. 
Think o f a speeding sparkplug that em its a spark every m e­
te r  o f  tim e read on its  own wristwatch. Each spark is an 
event; the collection o f spark events fo rm s a chain that threads 
through spacetim e, like pearls. S tring the pearls together. The 
thread connecting the pearl events, tracing out the path o f a 
particle through spacetim e, has a w onderfully evocative name: 
worldline. The sparkplug travels through spacetim e trailing its 
worldline behind it. (Wheeler and Taylor97)
93Synge, J.L. (1972), p.9.
94Mermin, N.D. (1968), p.157.
95French, A.P. (1968), p.74.
96Eddington, A. (1978), p.78.
97Wheeler, J.A. and Taylor, E.F. (1992), p. 143-144.
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and last but not least, from the grand master himself,
To avoid saying “m a tte r” or “e lec tric ity” I  w ill use fo r  this 
som ething the word “substance”. We fix  our a tten tion  on the 
substantial point which is at the worldpoint x , y , z , t  and im ag­
ine that we are able to recognize this substantial poin t a t any 
tim e. Let the varia tions dx,dy,dz o f the space coordinates o f  
this substantial poin t correspond to a tim e elem ent dt. Then 
we obtain, as an im age, so to speak, o f the everlasting career 
o f  the substantial point, a curve in the world, a worldline, the 
poin ts o f which can be referred unequivocally to the param eter  
t  from  -oo to  -foo. (Minkowski98)
The above cited passages call our immediate attention to two important aspects 
of a worldline. First, a worldline is a continuous series of events occurred at a phys­
ical object or system. Second, the spatiotemporally continuous characteristics of a 
worldline is described by its dynamical trajectory in spacetime and this trajectory is 
governed by the laws of classical mechanics. This second point is evident from the 
expressions “...a graph of its position as a function of time” (French, op. cit.) and 
“the track of a particle through four-dimensional spacetime” (Eddingtion, op. cit.).
One simple but essential point to notice is that the notion of a worldline is defined 
for a single object (e.g. a particle, a sparkplug or a substantial point). We shall see 
in a little while that this seemingly trivial observation is in fact of paramount impor­
tance, as it is through this simple fact that the notion of identity over time becomes 
associated with what I shall call the “worldline view” (WV) of causal process.
A physical object or system has yet to receive a precise specification. From the 
above cited passages, a physical object is one that is often construed as a particle or 
in the usual abstraction of classical mechanics, a material point - one that possesses 
energy or momentum. The object acts as the carrier of this energy and momentum 
either when it is at rest or in motion. Minkowski speaks of an object as a “substantial”
98Minkowski, H. (1908). Reprinted in Lorentz, H.A. et al. (1923), p.76.
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point, one that is understood to be in possession of matter and energy. The sparkplug 
of Taylor and Wheeler is also one which possesses energy and momentum, and these 
quantities are transmitted along the spacetime trajectories of the sparkplug by virtue 
of its motion.
In summary, a worldline in the terms of physics is defined with respect to a material 
point particle"; one which is in possession of energy and momentum. As the particle 
moves along in spacetime, this energy and momentum is transported from one region 
of spacetime to another.
It ought to be put into strong emphasis that it is by means of the occupation of 
successive spacetime points by the one and the same object that energy and momen­
tum of the object can be meaningfully said to be transferred from one spacetime locale 
to another. This is because we may only speak of motion in a legitimate manner if we 
refer to the same object. Put simply, it is part and parcel of the definition of motion 
for the object to remain the same object throughout its motion100. Philosophically 
speaking, this concerns the identity over time of an object. The question arises as to 
how might one be sure that the sequence of successive events - the occupation of a 
different spatial point at each time by an entity - corresponds to the successive stages 
of one persisting object? Not any odd sequence will do, for that may result in one 
that consists of the stages of different objects. Intuitively, the successive stages of 
a persisting object must somehow hang together in a distinctive way. We conceive 
of some sort of special connection amongst the stages or events that belong to a 
persisting object.
In a similar vein, a worldline is not just any odd continuous sequence of events 
in spacetime but one in which the constituent events are linked together in a way 
that they can be rightfully regarded as the successive stages of a single persisting 
object. This special relation of connection, in physical terms, as I would argue, is the 
transmission of energy or momentum from one event to the next. Transmission of 
energy and momentum thus provides the connection that obtains between any two
"W ithout the loss of generality, I shall use the terms “particle” and “object” interchangeably on 
the understanding that they both refer to a point-particle in the usual sense of abstraction.
100Refer to the argument in Section 4.2.2.
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successive stages of a persisting physical object. It aims to capture the fact that one 
event is the source of the next within this special sequence.
For a sequence of events to correspond to the successive stages of a single object, 
each of these events would represent the object as occupying a certain spatial location 
at a certain time. This is, however, not too helpful since one is indeed supposing it 
is “the” (or one single) object that takes up those locations in spacetime. We shall 
therefore retreat to a weaker claim: given a spatiotemporal sequence of events, each of 
these events represents an object as occupying a certain spatial location at a certain 
time. This statement encompasses the possibility that each of these events may 
correspond to an object (or any object for that matter) - similar to the original one 
in every visual detail and possessing dynamically the right amount of energy and 
momentum, to be at the appropriate location at the appropriate time - in order to 
make it looks as if it is the one single object that is in motion. Of course, to opt for 
the weaker claim obliges one to subscribe to the notion of “possession” as the correct 
criterion, rather than the more elaborate concept of transmission. But is the notion 
of possession a sufficient criterion for our purposes?
At first sight, to investigate the issue of the identity over time of an object seems 
entirely a philosophically motivated pursuit that is of no physical relevance; since 
physics proceeds with the supposition of the one and the same object as the prereq­
uisite condition for motion. It is, however, far from being so. Recall our familiar 
example of the light ray and the spot of light it cast on a far wall in the astrodome. 
“ The spot of light” which evolves around the wall is an illusion: it is not the same 
spot that moves but rather, a sequence of all similar spots (in the sense that they 
are produced by the same physical mechanisms), each appearing at the right place at 
the appropriate time to create the image of one moving spot. In this instance, this 
continuous sequence of events corresponds not to the history of a single object, but 
rather, to a “pseudo-sequence” constituted out of different objects. Despite the fact 
that energy is found to appear (be possessed) at every stage of the pseudo-sequence, 
there is no actual movement of the same energy101 from one place to another. In
101Here, we take the view that the rest mass of an object, for example, is a form of energy by virtue
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contrast, the same energy of a single object - that of the photon - is transmitted from 
one place to another within the light ray; it captures the intuition that one event is 
the source of the next.
It is therefore reasonable, for a theory of physical causation, to associate causal 
processes with physical objects. The physical relation that connects the stages of a 
physical object provides the causal connection. Pseudo-processes are non-physical 
because of the lack of a physical connection amongst the stages of the process. So 
worldlines - which are essentially the histories of physical objects - constitute causal 
processes.
Both the theories of Salmon and Dowe place no restriction on the notion of an 
object at the outset. When it comes to be confronted with the decision as to what 
kinds of objects are physical (or causal) and what are non-physical (or non-causal), 
Dowe falls back on the criterion of the “possession of a conserved quantity (as sup­
plemented by identity over time) by the object in question while Salmon opts for 
the “transmission of a conserved quantity. In other words, both find it necessary 
to re-capture the physical relation by their respective criteria of “possession” and 
“transmission” as a trade-off to the “unqualified” notion of an object.
Being liberal in employing the notion of an object, Salmon and Dowe allow the 
assignments of “worldlines” to non-physical objects. This is a philosophical move 
prompted by the desire to distinguish between processes with none of its successive 
stages bearing any physical relation to each other, and those whose stages are gen­
uinely linked by physical relations; given that both types of processes exhibit a kind 
of constancy in their dynamical motions. The physical relations they aim to cap­
ture have to do with, of course, the transport of physical quantities like energy or 
momentum along the spacetime trajectories of physical objects.
The term “worldline” has, as we have seen, a more specific meaning in physics 
than what Salmon and Dowe have both intended. Let us recapitulate briefly the four 
main characteristics of a worldline of an object as conceived from the viewpoint of 
physics,
of E  =  me2, which then sanctions us to speak of an identity over time for this chunk of energy.
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(1) the worldline is a sequence of events that corresponds to the history of a physical 
object - an entity that is in possession of energy and/ or mass (which include 
both massive and massless entities).
(2) it is a continuous sequence of events happening at “the” object and it supposes 
an identity over time of a persisting object102.
(3) the worldline of an object need not be confined to an object being in uniform 
motion. It simply describes the motion of the object103.
(4) the different “worldpoints” that constitute the worldline are physically con­
nected in the sense that one serves as the source of the next as the object, 
the carrier of dynamical quantities like energy and momentum, moves from one 
spacetime point to the next. The physical connection is provided by the move­
ment of “one and the same” object. It is indeed this physical connection that 
makes possible the correspondence between worldlines and causal processes.
The term “worldline” as employed by Salmon and Dowe in their causal theories 
have been stripped-off all these fine physical properties but left only with the feature 
of it being a sequence of points in spacetime. Starting with this bare minimum, their 
strategy then consists in the recovery of all the other remaining physical details above 
by the respective criteria of “transmission” and “possession” of conserved quantities. 
An immediate question that is of interest to us is: are these criteria capable of recov­
ering the physical essence of a worldline? We now consider this question in relation 
to each criterion in turn.
Dowe: “the possession of a conserved quantity”
On an empirical level, the movement of a quantity of energy and momentum by 
means of the motion of a physical object from one spacetime locale to another seems
102This notion of identity over time as encapsulated in the concept of an object with respect to the 
worldline is quite different from Dowe’s SI. While SI requires the object to be wholly present at each 
time and can hence, in principle, admit indiscernable objects to be the stages of a single “moving” 
object (i.e. one that has spatiotemporal stages). Here, our requirement that being the one and the 
same object is a prerequisite for motion immediately rules out indiscernable objects.
103For example, it may describe the motion of an object under a constant conservative force.
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to, prima facie, consist in no more than the possession of these quantities successively 
at the appropriate spacetime points along the trajectory of the object. And so the 
condition of “the possession of a conserved quantity” conforms to feature (1) above 
of the physical worldline.
Counterexamples such as the series of successively illuminated light cells and 
Hitchcock’s shadow that moves over a uniformly charged metal plate, seem to pose 
too tremendous a difficulty for the criterion of possession to overcome. Both exam­
ples show that there can be processes that are in possession of conserved quantities 
and thereby satisfying Dowe’s condition of being causal, but yet whose stages are not 
physically connected. Hence, the condition cannot apply universally to distinguish 
causal processes.
Despite the failure to capture the important feature of a physical connection 
(clause (4) above), it is still useful to see how successful has Dowe been with CQ 
in recovering the other physical characteristics.
As regards the identity over time of a persisting object (clause (2) above), Dowe 
needs, as he admits, an additional premise of identity (e.g. SI)104 to dismiss cases like 
the above counterexamples (time-wise gerrymanders for instance). But I maintain 
that in order for the statement “a light spot (or a shadow) is in motion” to be 
meaningful, there is already the supposition of an identity over time of a persisting 
object.
Dowe has spoken specifically about his theory not requiring the object to possess
a constant amount of a conserved quantity. Practical cases of continuous interactions
of the object with its environment support this flexibility in his CQ theory. Physical
objects with respect to which worldlines are defined are not restricted to the possession
of a constant amount of a conserved quantity; that is, they are not constrained to
uniform motion. Therefore, Dowe’s condition agrees with clause (3) above.
104However, in his most recent writing, Dowe no longer wish to commit himself to SI but maintains 
that he prefers to leave the notion of identity of an object as primitive in his theory (Dowe, P. (2000), 
p.101-107).
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The term “worldline” as understood in physics, refers to a spatiotemporally con­
tinuous sequence of events, as contrary to Dowe’s argument otherwise105. Granted 
what Dowe really has in mind is a sequence of events corresponding to the successive 
stages of a moving object106, it would be far more cogent to abandon the use of the 
term “worldline” and adopt a comparatively neutral term, which will serve to convey 
the idea of a sequence of spacetime points but without committing to all the fine 
details of a worldline (see Section 4.5).
Salmon: “the transmission of a conserved quantity”
First of all, Salmon’s theory lacks but also stands in need of an identity over time of 
an object, for the same reason that it is not possible to speak about the motion of 
any object - both physical and non-physical - if that object is not considered as one 
persisting object.
He makes no scruples about the aspect of spatiotemporal continuity of his causal 
processes. In fact, as one may see, he has indicated at several places that he deploys 
the concept of spatiotemporal continuity to establish the identity over time of a 
persisting object (Section 4.4.1), in accordance with the usual empirical analysis of 
the concept of identity.
Although spatiotemporal continuity stands as a fundamental feature of Salmon’s 
causal processes, not all spatially and temporally continuous processes are causal: 
one needs only consider spatiotemporally continuous processes like a moving shadow 
or a moving light spot across the wall. Salmon realizes the important distinction that 
divides causal and non-causal processes and has brought his analysis closer to that in 
physics by appealing to the notion of transmission (clause (4) above).
In Salmon’s theory, transmission is explicated as the possession of a conserved 
quantity (therefore, clause (1) is satisfied) without any further interaction, except for 
the one which facilitates the acquisition of the said quantity in the first place. This 
is done in the hope of capturing the fact that genuine physical processes sustain their 
own existence and dynamical makeups so that an earlier stage of it provides the source
105Dowe, P. (1995), p.332.
106On which an identity over time is presumed.
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of a conserved quantity to be possessed by the next to come.
Transmission has also a spatiotemporal continuous nature, as Salmon has intended 
through the “at-af theory. The notions of spatiotemporal continuity and transmis­
sion coalesce to form the essence of a genuine persisting physical object (clause (2) 
above).
In spite of all these niceties, there is, however, one caveat. The notion of trans­
mission encompasses only a fixed amount of conserved quantity is to be transmitted. 
An object vacates one spacetime point as it takes up occupation of the next and at 
the same time, the conserved quantities it possesses leave one spacetime region and 
get delivered to the next. This is what is usually conceived as an essential part of the 
meaning of motion. As we have explained, it is not entirely feasible to restrict oneself 
to the stringent requirement of the transmission of a constant amount of a conserved 
quantity because of the non-practicality of completely closed systems in nature. The 
insistence of the transmission of a constant amount of a conserved quantity may thus 
be criticized as being too idealized.
For Salmon though, it remains essential to make such an abstraction in order to 
highlight the fact that any changes in the value of the conserved quantity in question 
is to be identified as the consequence of a causal interaction.
Notwithstanding this basic intuitive insight, the notion of a worldline as given in 
physics has not been restricted to the motion of a free particle - one that is free from 
the influence of interactions. A worldline may well represent the motion of a massive 
body under the influence of an applied force, most likely in which case, a changing 
amount of momentum (or energy) is transmitted along (clause (3) above).
Once again, as Salmon wishes to “build on” the concept of the “worldline” (a 
comparatively minimal notion that as it is defined by physics), it would also, as 
we shall immediately come to in the next section, be appropriate to trade the term 
“worldline” for a more neutral term.
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4.5 The “Histories View” of Causal Processes: A  
M odest Emendation
In the last section we bring to the reader’s attention that the definition of a worldline 
in physics refers not indiscriminatingly to any sequence of events with respect to an 
object in spacetime, but rather with quite a specific meaning attached to it.
Both the approaches of Salmon and Dowe take the intuition of a “sequence of 
events” of any object (either physical or non-physical) and then impose on their re­
spective conditions of the 11 transmission of a conserved quantity and the “possession 
of a conserved quantity to determine whether such a sequence does indeed represent 
a causal sequence or not.
To eliminate the confusion arising from the disparity on the notion of a worldline 
as understood from the physical viewpoint and the meaning as intended by Salmon 
and Dowe, I propose a slight adjustment to the terminology: the adoption of the 
comparatively less restrictive term “h is to ry” in place of “worldline”. I say less 
restrictive because a history is here understood to be a sequence of events that may 
or may not bear causal relations to each other. And the stages of a history need only 
be related in a temporal manner. In particular, one may now conceive of continuous 
as well as discrete histories.
Hence, I would suggest a slight emendation to the definition of a causal process 
as follows,
A  causal process is the h istory  o f  an object tha t tra n sm its  a 
conserved quantity.
With a “histonf understood to be “a sequence of events in spacetime”. On this 
definition, the worldline of a material particle qualifies as a causal process. Shadows 
and moving light spots have histories, their stages form spacetime sequences but 
there is no transmission of conserved quantities along them. These histories are not 
worldlines. There are both causal and non-causal histories in the world.
An object can be anything found in the ontology of science or common sense, 
but it must have an identity over time in the primitive sense that one may only
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meaningfully speak of the motion of an object if one refers to 11 the one and the same” 
entity107. On this definition, moving spots and shadows are objects, although their 
tracks through spacetime are not causal processes as ruled out by the condition of 
transmission.
As in Salmon’s CQT, the stipulation that transmission only obtains if the con­
served quantity in question is to be found at every spacetime point without further 
intersections that involve exchange of a particular conserved quantity at any of these 
points remains valid. In cases of pseudo-processes, the presence of further interactions 
is a prime requirement for the process to survive; and there are many objects, each 
coming into existence at the spacetime points where those interactions occur.
With a causal process now being construed as the history of a sequence of events 
with respect to an object that involves the transmission of a conserved quantity, our 
previous definition of a causal interaction still applies,
A causal in teraction  is an in tersection  o f causal processes that 
involves exchange o f a conserved quantity.
The clauses form the H istory  Conserved Q uantity theory with Transm is­
sion  (HCQT).
The move from “worldlines” to “histories” brings the analysis closer to the in­
tended strategies of both Salmon and Dowe. With the neutral notion of history as 
merely a sequence of points in spacetime, the analysis is effectively free from any 
presumed meaning attached to the term worldline and one may now impose an ex­
tra criterion of transmission for a history to enable it to qualify as a genuine causal 
process. This has also acquired the added benefit of being in line with the physical 
point of view.
Another important reason for favoring histories over worldlines in the definition 
for causal processes arises, of course, from the issue of spatiotemporal continuity. It 
has been pointed out that worldlines as conceived from the standpoint of physics 
refers to the spatiotemporally continuous trajectories of material objects. Histories,
107This supposition allows one to speak about an object in discrete motion.
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on the other hand, denotes sequences of events in spacetime that may or may not be 
continuous108.
Spatiotemporal continuity has been the main weapon engaged by critics of pro­
cess causal theories to claim that these theories not capable of dealing with physical 
processes in the quantum domain where discreteness in the dynamics of a physical 
system is a distinctive feature. We shall show in Chapters 6 and 7 how one may still 
be able to speak meaningfully about the history of a physical system in the context 
of quantum theory.
There are more subtle considerations for the preference of the term “histortf' . To 
illustrate the extreme, one approach to quantum gravity is to take the view that 
spacetime itself is a discrete entity that is endowed with a temporal structure109. 
Prom such a perspective, it remains sensible to speak about a history as a sequence 
of events, while on the other hand, calling such a sequence a worldline would be 
blatantly inappropriate. The change of terminology thus allows one to investigate 
the question of causality in these wider contexts of modern physics.
4.6 Interlude
There is one connecting theme for the previous chapters: the idea of a spatiotempo­
rally continuous path. This idea forges an intimate link between physical and causal 
connections. In the language of process theories, causal processes, which are essen­
tially the continuous motions of material objects, transmit causal influences across 
spacetime regions. This transmission of causal influences is regarded as the causal 
connection among physical events. The spatiotemporally continuous character of a 
causal process requires that it be present at every point in space and at every instant 
of time in the intermediate spacetime region between the two events it is supposed 
to connect.
So any program of causation that is founded on the notion of continuous paths in
108It is the very task of our analysis to lay down sufficient conditions to help identifying which of 
these sequences are indeed causal processes.
109See for example, Bombelli, L. et al. (1987).
159
spacetime is doomed to the most miserable fate in situations where spatiotemporal 
continuity seems untenable. The quantum revolution has given us ample reasons to 
believe that the classical notion of a definite spatiotemporal trajectory can no longer 
be preserved. With this untimely passing of spatiotemporal continuity, we ask: what 
is left of causality?
In their struggles to recover old, cherished classical intuitions from the new quan­
tum theory, the founding fathers of quantum mechanics addressed the same issue, as 
can be seen from the following excerpts110,
The very  nature o f the quantum, theory thus forces us to re­
gard the spacetim e coordination and the claim  o f causality, the 
union o f which characterizes the classical theories, as comple­
m en tary but elusive features o f the description , sym bolizing the 
idealization o f observation and definition respectively.
and commenting on the discrepancy between Einstein’s position and that of his own111,
Yet, a certain  difference in attitude and outlook remained, 
since, w ith his m astery  fo r  coordinating apparently contrasting  
experience without abandoning continuity and causality, E in­
ste in  was perhaps m ore reluctant to renounce such ideals than 
som eone fo r  whom renunciation in this respect appeared to  be 
the only w ay open to proceed with the in term edia te  task o f co­
ordinating the m ultifarious evidence regarding atom ic phenom ­
ena, which accumulated from  day to day in the exploration o f  
this new field  o f knowledge.
Compared to Bohr, Heisenberg took an even bolder attitude towards this issue of 
the continuous versus the discrete112,
110Bohr, N. (1928). Reprinted in Wheeler, J.A. and Zurek, W.H. (eds.) (1983), p.89.
111Bohr, N. (1949). Reprinted in Wheeler, J.A. and Zurek, W.H. (eds.) (1983), p. 14.
112Heisenberg, W. (1927). Translated into English as “The Physical Content of Quantum Kine­
matics and Mechanics” by J.A.W. and W.H.Z. (1981), reprinted in Wheeler, J.A. and Zurek, W.H. 
(1983), p.62.
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The physical in terpreta tion  o f quantum m echanics is s till fu ll 
o f in ternal discrepancies, which show them selves in  argum ents 
about continuity versus discontinuity and particle versus w ave.
and he continues113,
I f  one considers, fo r  example, the notion  o f a particle in  one 
dim ension, then in continuum  theory one w ill be able to  draw  
(Figure 4~^a)  a worldline x (t) fo r  the track o f the particle  
(m ore precisely, its  center o f gravity), the tangent o f which 
gives the velocity a t every instant. In  contrast, in  a theory  
based on discontinuity there m ight be in  place o f this curve a 
series o f poin ts at fin ite  separation (Figure 4~7b). In  this case 
it  is clearly m eaningless to speak about one velocity at one po­
sition  (1) because one velocity can only be defined by two posi­
tions and (2), conversely, because any one poin t is associated  
with two velocities.
(a) (b)
X
A
------------ ► f  ► *
Figure 4.7: Continuous versus discrete (diagrams reproduced from Heisen­
berg’s paper, in Wheeler-Zurek (1983), p.63.).
Causal influences, in the form of dynamical conserved quantities such as energy 
and momentum, get transported from one spacetime locale to another by the physical
113ibid., p.63.
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objects that possess them. The lack of definite object paths now makes it unclear 
how these quantities may be transmitted.
The difficulty has to do mainly with the fact that our “classical” notion of causality 
- which has been founded on the idea of the spatiotemporally continuous motions of 
physical objects - is employed in the attempt to understand quantum phenomena. In 
the effort to preserve this notion of causality, it is natural to recover this essence of 
spatiotemporal continuity within the quantum formalism.
Despite the absence of continuous spacetime paths of the physical objects, it is 
often thought that all is not lost for the notion of spatiotemporal continuous evolution 
in the quantum world. What evolve continuously in spacetime are no more the 
concrete physical objects we perceive, but in their places come instead some abstract 
mathematical construct - the wavefunction - the modulus square of which provides 
the probability of locating an object at a certain point in spacetime. The notion of an 
object being at a certain location in spacetime is now only meaningful insofar as an 
actual measurement is concerned. It is only through a measurement on the physical 
system that we “actualize” a value for a dynamical observable. The series of points 
depicted in Figure 4-7(b) above corresponds to these instances of measurements when 
the acts of measurement themselves contribute to “fixing” these values. Between 
successive measurements, one is not permitted to speak of the system as having 
definite values for a dynamical variable. As so, measurements thus furnish us with a 
sequence of discrete points with no possibility of interpolating between any two with 
a continuous spectrum of definite values.
Without continuous spectra of definite values for dynamical variables, we are left 
with no clear notion of a path of an object in physical spacetime. However, at every 
spacetime point between two measurements, we have a probability of locating the 
particle upon being measured. Moreover, this probability can be shown to evolve in 
spacetime as governed by the Schrodinger equation.
Granted that the notion of causal transmission is dependent upon the existence
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of a spatiotemporally continuous path114 and that now there is the continuous spa­
tiotemporal evolution of the probability function, might we not entertain the possi­
bility of recovering a notion of transmission of a physical quantity via this evolution 
of the probability function? This suggestion, of course, immediately commits one to 
the conviction that the probability function is a legitimate property of the physical 
system under investigation. This would undoubtedly involve the interpretation of 
probability in quantum mechanics, a subject which is by no means uncontroversial.
In particular, one ought first to be clear about which specific view of 'ip one is to 
adopt. For, an assessment of 'ip as a legitimate property of a physical system is only 
meaningful with reference to an interpretation of it.
The view taken in this work is based on the simple observation that there are 
two levels of superposition at work in nature, in both classical and quantum physics:
(1) the superposition of potentials and, (2) the superposition of the effects of these 
potentials.
Classically, these two levels coincide but the distinction becomes crucial in the 
quantum mechanical context. I shall argue that the superposition of potentials is 
fundamental to the understanding of the behaviour of ip.
With this understanding of ip, we are then able to proceed, in Chapter 6, to inves­
tigate if 'ip may indeed be regarded as a legitimate property of a physical system, and 
the extent to which its continuous evolution in spacetime satisfies the “at-a f criterion 
of causal transmission. Then in Chapter 7, we shall discuss how our interpretation 
of ip as the superposition of potentials fits naturally to the Feynman Path Integral 
formulation of quantum mechanics, which represents an appropriate description of 
causal processes in quantum physics.
To set the scene for these forthcoming discussions, Chapter 5 is devoted to the 
principle of superposition in quantum physics and how the principle makes contact 
with probabilities.
114This is because causal transmission in the manner of Salmon’s “a t-a f  theory consists in a 
dynamical variable (like position or momentum for example) of the physical system assuming some 
definite value at every spacetime point between two events. In other words, a spatiotemporally 
continuous path of values for the dynamical variable.
Chapter 5
On the Way to Quantum Paths: 
The Superposition of Potentials
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is about the principle of superposition. It defends two central distinc­
tions, each of which is often ignored or overlooked; and in both cases, conflating the 
distinctions can generate considerable confusion. The first begins from noting the 
simple distinction between effects and what brings them about, which I shall call 
“potentials”1. Though a simple distinction, it is one that is not always kept clearly 
in mind when it comes to discussions of the principle of superposition. In line with 
the distinction between effects and the “potentials” that produce them, I shall point 
out (Section 5.4.2) that there are two different principles of superposition - superpo­
sition of potentials and superposition of effects. In classical mechanics, with vector 
addition of forces (the “potentials”) and vector addition of accelerations (the effects), 
we see both principles at once. In classical waves, we see only the superposition of 
potentials but not that of effects. In quantum mechanics, it is again the principle of 
superposition of potentials that matters.
The second distinction is that between the sum-rule of probability and the super­
position principle. In many discussions of the two-slit experiment, it seems as if the 
sum-rule of probability is taken to express a special instance of superposition for the
use the word “potential” rather than “cause” because the former will also apply to probabilistic 
situations where one speaks of a tendency to generate a particular result. But I do not mean to 
refer to energy potentials.
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setup in which photons are known to pass through one slit or another. I defend this 
point by looking at how probabilistic potentials should be conceived in the case of a 
classical die, and I conclude the chapter by contrasting a classical die, for which the 
sum-rule of probability holds, and the principle of superposition fails, and a quantum 
die, for which the opposite is the case.
In order to set the stage for the arguments in Section 5.2, I begin by introducing 
the feature of superposition in quantum mechanics via the Schrodinger wavefunction. 
This quantum nature of superposition is very different from its classical counterpart, 
which is discussed in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, I illustrate the quantum nature 
of the principle of superposition by the two-slit experiment and we can see how the 
superposition of potentials is preserved in quantum phenomena even that on the level 
of effects fails.
5.2 Superposition and the Schrodinger Wavefunc­
tion
The beginning of the quantum era represents a curious conceptual struggle in the 
history of physics. In the transition from the classical to the quantum world, the 
issue of the continuous trajectories were fiercely debated.
Niels Bohr also found it necessary to inject the idea of discontinuous jumps in 
positions into the explanation of the stability of the atom. According to classical 
electrodynamics, the orbiting electron in an atom is destined to continuously radiate 
energy that would lead to its eventual spiraling into the nucleus. Bohr’s quantum 
hypothesis consists in two parts:
(1) the electrons move around the nucleus only in a certain number of allowed orbits 
(states), each with a well-defined energy. That is to say that the energy of the 
atom is quantized and,
(2) the electrons only radiate when they jump from one orbit to another (not passing 
through any point in between). The radiation associated with such a transition 
is thus expected to come in quanta of light (photons). An electron may emit a
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photon of energy hv when making a transition from a higher energy level to a 
lower one; and conversely, it would jump from a lower energy level to a higher 
one upon absorbing a photon,
Ei — E f = hv
with E i  and E f  being the energies of the initial and final stationary states respectively. 
The stability of an atom may now be explained by the assertion that if the atom finds 
itself in its lowest energy state (ground state), it cannot radiate and hence remains 
stable.
Bohr’s model of the atom also provides a fitting explanation for the appearance 
of the line structures in the spectrum of the hydrogen atom (the Balmer series) that 
is in contradiction with the classical theory.
The picture of electrons in captivity within the atom only being permitted to 
reside in specific energy states (stationary states) has a strong analogy in classical 
wave phenomena. Stationary waves are a property of waves in confinement. As a 
guitar string is plucked, the stationary waves form a discrete pattern of harmonics. 
This led de Broglie to the inspiration that atomic electrons are, after all, confined 
waves that produce a spectra of discrete stationary states. This marks the inception 
of the idea of wave-particle duality and the famous de Broglie wavelength for “matter 
waves” A:
A =  h/p
with h and p being Planck’s constant and the particle’s momentum respectively.
The route to the Shrodinger equation is now clear. If matter is capable of behaving 
as a wave, there should indeed be an accompanying wave equation to describe the 
evolution of such a matter wave. This is what Shrodinger proceeded to search for in 
19262.
2Schrodinger, E. (1926). English translation in Schrodinger E. (1928) and Ludwig, G. (ed.) 
(1968), p.94-105.
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Recall that the classical form of the equations describing wave phenomena is of a 
second-order differential3 character:
r5 ndx2 w2 at2 K 1
with uj being the speed of propagation of the wave under investigation.
The symmetry between the propagation of the wave in opposite directions (i.e. in 
both the + r  and -r directions) implies that the solutions to these equations should 
take the general form of a plane wave propagating in the r-direction with wavevector 
k and amplitude A:
y =  A exp [z(k • r  — ut)] (5.2)
Classically, we only admit the real part of the solution and discard the imaginary 
part. As a first step in deriving the wave equation for matter waves, we must in­
corporate the two quantum conditions for its momentum and energy. Given the de 
Broglie wavelength A(= h/p ) and that the wavevector k is related to A through the 
relation k = 2ir/\, we obtain,
p = hk (h = h/2ir) (5.3)
As for the energy of this matter wave, we start from the formula for a quantum 
of energy, E = hi/. With u  = 2m/, this can be re-written as E  = hu. Substituting 
for k and u  into equation (5.2) gives,
'ip — A exp [i(p • r  — Et)/h] (5.4)
3 The second-order differential nature stems from the consideration of the dynamics of the system 
by applying Newton’s second law (F  =  mo) to a small region of the system.
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We may now proceed in two steps:
Step 1: Differentiate (5.4) with respect to t4,
dt
Step 2: Differentiate equation (5.4) twice with respect to r,
, - i E ^i err-,
m  =  {— )4, (5-5)
i h - ^  = Ei> (5.6)
V ^  =  “ ft5 ' ^  (5'7)
=> (5.8)
(with the Laplacian V2 =  ^  +  ^ )
The energy term in equation (5.6) may also be written as the sum of a kinetic and a 
potential component (V ),
E - ^ V  (M )
Substitute equation (5.8) into equation (5.9) yields,
b - - ^ v' * * v <5i“>
Finally, replacing the E  term in equation (5.6) above by the expression in (5.10) 
leads to the celebrated Schrodinger (time-dependent) equation that governs the dy­
namics of a matter wave,
4A 2= 1 , as A is treated as a normalization constant.
168
d'lb h2 n
l h i  =  ~2m (5.11)
One immediately observes that this equation is linear - the variable ip and its 
derivatives appear only in the first power and in separate terms. Linearity gives rise 
to two important consequences.
First, being first-order in time, the equation uniquely defines the entire evolution 
of ip, provided the latter is specified at a given initial instant. The dynamical state of 
the physical system is determined once ip is known. For this reason, the wavefunction 
ip is commonly called the state function.
Second, the linearity of the Schrodinger equation carries the implication that any 
linear combination of the functions displaying the form of a plane wave as in equation 
(6.2) is also a solution for the same equation. This is the important property of 
superposition which, as we shall explain, plays a crucial role in determining quantum 
behaviours.
To be sure, one may speak sensibly about the temporal evolution of ip only pro­
vided one understands the meaning of ip and what it represents. A good grasp of its 
meaning is all the more essential if the evolution of ip is to be justifiably treated as the 
paradigm of a continuous spatiotemporal physical process in the quantum domain. 
Any attempt with a view to shedding light on the wavefunction ip invariably leads to 
the consideration of interpretational matters concerning its meaning.
One must, however, realise that we are, after all, supplying a description of matter 
(with a particle in the simplest form), and a natural question arises as to whether 
one can somehow reconcile this “spreading” wave form with the image of a particle 
being an entity that is relatively localized in space. In other words, one must find 
a way of making sense of how ip describes, at least to a good approximation, the 
classical motion of a particle having both reasonably definite values of momentum 
and energy. It turns out that a certain degree of localization may be achieved by the
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superposition5 of several of these different plane wave solutions to form what is known 
as a wavepacket,
/+oo A(k) exp [i(k • x  — ut)]dk (5.12)-oo
where u  = u(k). The linearity of the Schrodinger equation guarantees that the 
resulting wavepacket is also an acceptable solution.
The classical relation between the velocity and momentum of the particle should 
hold for the wavepacket for it to be a close analogue to a classical particle. This 
would mean for the wave group described by equation (5.12) to be traveling with 
one characteristic group velocity. Moreover, the condition of localization makes it 
a necessity to narrow the propagation vectors k included in the superposition to a 
fairly small range. That is, it is supposed that the function A(k) is nonzero only for 
a small range of values centered around a particular value of k,
A (k)^0, k0 — £ < k < k 0 + £, £ «  ka 
For a small range of values in the vicinity of kQ, u(k) can be expanded as,
u  = u>o + (k -  fco)~7r + — (5.13)dk k0
With the approximation of u  given in equation (5.13) and ignoring higher-order terms, 
equation (5.12) may be written as,
/+oo rlrjA(k) exp[i(kx — (u>0 +  (k — k0)— ))t]dk (5T4)
-oo dk
=  f  Aik) exp[ikx — iujQt — i k ^ - t  +  ika^-t]dk  (5.15)J—oo dk dk
5For the sake of simplicity, we consider only plane waves in the ^-direction, although the result 
may be readily generalized to cover three-dimensional waves.
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dw/+0° A(k) exp[ikx — ikQx — i(k — k0)-^rt\dk -oo dk (5.16)
/ +oo fhjj
A(k) exp[z(fc — k0)(x — —  t)]dk (5.17)
-oo dk
The integral in equation (5.17) when evaluated gives the form,
B [ x -  %t]
and equation (5.12) thus becomes,
G(x, t) = B [x — ^-t]  exp[z(A;0a: — u 0t) 1 (5.18)dk
Equation (5.18) represents a product of an envelope function B  and a plane wave as 
shown in Figure 5-1. It describes the propagation of a group of waves for which the 
envelope or group velocity is given by,
vg = dw/dk
and this velocity vg is to be identified as the velocity of the associated particle.
The visualization of a material particle as a localized wavepacket also paves the 
way for understanding the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Unlike its classical coun­
terpart, a particle so conceived is forbidden by its “wave-like” nature from possessing 
simultaneous precise values of position and momentum, and the construction of a 
wavepacket by means of superposition has unquestionably provided a powerful illus­
tration of wave-particle duality in quantum mechanics.
One should, however, be cautioned on the potential misrepresentation of this 
picture. This picture draws too strongly on the superposition principle as one that has
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Figure 5.1: Schematic representation of a complex wavepacket moving in the 
^-direction.
become familiar to us through classical wave phenomena. Indeed, it has been stressed 
many times in various expositions of the subject6 that the quantum treatment of the 
principle of superposition is of an entirely different character from that of classical 
physics and has in turn far reaching implications for the interpretation of ip. We must 
now elucidate the peculiar nature of this principle in relation to quantum mechanics. 
In order to be able to compare and contrast with its application to classical physics, 
we first introduce the principle of superposition in the classical context.
6Most notable and illuminating of which can be found in Dirac, P. A.M. (1958), Chapter 1, p.4-18.
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5.3 The Superposition of Classical Waves
The principle of superposition as a characteristic of physical systems described by 
linear equations, has long been recognized in classical wave phenomena. In that con­
text, the primary question of interest is the resultant produced by either two or more 
harmonic7 vibrations or non-periodic disturbances (single pulses for instance) that 
act together simultaneously in the same region of space and on the same medium8. 
A simple scenario is that of two pulses traveling down a piece of string for instance. 
The principle of superposition stipulates that the resultant pulse is simply taken to 
be the sum of the individual ones. In other words, the total displacement produced 
as a resultant of several disturbances is the vectorial sum of each of the individual 
constituent disturbances.
Superposition holds because the component forces acting are independent they 
all contribute towards the overall effect on the medium on which they act but each 
remains unaffected by the presence and actions of the others. The addition of forces in 
classical mechanics is also based on this supposition, although it is often considered 
most remarkably demonstrated in wave phenomena. Consider two opposite pulses 
that are equal in magnitude traveling towards each other (Figure 5-2). When these 
pulses meet, the resulting displacement is given as the sum of the separate displace­
ments of the pulses as in Figures 5-2 (b) and (c). But once they move through each 
other, both of them would in no way suffer any permanent alteration and behave as 
though the other is not present (Figure 5-2(d)).
It is illustrated in Figure 5-2(b) that at some points, the two pulses add to produce 
a maximum displacement of the resultant (aq and xf) while at some others (rzq), they 
do so to result in a minimum overall displacement. These phenomena are known as 
constructive superposition and destructive superposition respectively.
The phenomena of constructive and destructive superpositions in Figure 5-2 are 
of a transient nature - they appear only as and when the two pulses meet. However,
7We often associate periodic motions with sinusodal waves but it is important to note that the 
principle of superposition applies regardless of the shapes of the disturbances.
8Light waves, however, can act in the vacuum.
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Figure 5.2: The superposition of two equal but opposite pulses traveling to­
wards each other.
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if the two pulses are replaced by two wave trains that display periodicity, a steady 
pattern of constructive and destructive superpositions may then be maintained. This, 
as we often call it, is the phenomenon of interference. It applies commonly to water 
waves as well as light waves. Interference is a direct physical consequence of the 
superposition principle. In optical interference, this gives rise to the observation of 
bright and dark fringes when a number of light waves coexist in a region of space.
Interference can sometimes be a misleading word for it may suggest that the com­
ponent light waves really “interact” to produce the resulting fringes. A genuine in­
teraction, as we have emphasized, brings about permanent changes to the interacting 
systems beyond the locus of the interaction. However, interference is fundamentally 
a phenomenon of superposition and it is indeed a vital feature of the principle that 
the components act independently and do not suffer any alterations in their motions 
due to their encounters with each other. In this regard, A.A. Michelson issues a word 
of caution9,
When two sim ilar w ave-trains traveling in approxim ately the 
sam e direction are superposed, the resulting m otion  m ay be 
greater or less than that o f the components, according to  the 
difference o f phase o f the com ponents. Thus i f  the two wave- 
trains are sim ple harm onic and m eet in  the sam e phase, the 
am plitude w ill be doubled and the in ten sity  quadrupled. If, 
however, the phases be opposite, the resulting am plitude (and  
in ten sity) w ill be zero. In this case, the two w ave-trains are 
said  to “in terfere”, and the resulting phenom enon is known as 
“in terferen ce”. The term  is not very  well chosen, fo r  in  fa c t  
each train  produces its  own effect quite independently o f  the 
other, but i t  has been in use so long that it would not seem  
wise to  a lter it.
Michelson’s caution is echoed by R.E.I. Newton10,
9Michelson, A.A. (1927), p. 1 0 .
10Newton, R.E.I. (1990), p.78.
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Som etim es these phenom ena are called constructive and de­
structive interference respectively... The term  can be confusing, 
as we have seen, the waves do not in terfere11 but m ove through 
each other unaltered; a t the place o f m eeting, they act as though 
the other wave were not present and the to ta l d isplacem ent is 
obtained by adding together two separate displacem ents.
As a first impression, the adjectives “constructive” and “destructive” could be 
misleading since they may convey the impressions that the creation and destruction 
of energy have occurred. But this is certainly not the case because if less light is 
reaching a given point (of low intensity), more light will be reaching some other point 
correspondingly. Interference merely effects a re-distribution of light energy and the 
conservation of energy is therefore upheld, with the total (numerical sum) energy of 
the two waves to remain constant.
The bright and dark fringes in an optical interference pattern represent locations 
of reinforced and weakened intensities. Intensity is usually taken as the measure of 
the rate of energy flow per unit area perpendicular to the direction of propagation of 
a wave and it is proportional to the square of the amplitude of the wave,
Intensity  oc (amplitude)2
To show how interference is described mathematically, we consider the superpo­
sition (R) of two plane waves of the same frequency u, but allow for the different 
phases <j>i and </>212,
R = Aicos(ut +  0i) +  A 2 Cos(ut +  <^2) (5.19)
This is equivalent to13,
11 This, I take it as the common usage of the word “interfere” as a somewhat genuine interaction 
in which interacting agents suffer permanent changes beyond the focus of encounter.
12(f> 1 and <f>2 are normally called phase constants. Changing the values of these quantities merely 
makes all the events in the cycle happen earlier or later by the same amount without altering the 
physical relation or the sequential order of events within the cycle.
13For classical waves, only the real part of the linear combination of the two wave solutions is 
admitted.
176
R  =  Re[Aiexpi(ujt + fa) + A 2 expi(u)t +  fa)]
R  =  [Aiexp(i(f)i) +  A 2 exp(i(f)2 )\-exp(iut) — ARexp(i(pR)-exp(iut) (5.20)
with,
ARexp(i(/)R) = Aiexp(ifa) +  i42exp(z</>2) (5.21)
Since the intensity is proportional to the square of the amplitude, it follows therefore
that the resultant intensity due to the superposition of the two waves is given by,
[ARexp(i<f>R)-ARexp(-i<l>R)] =  [A1exp(ifa)+A2exp(ifa)][A1exp(-ifa )+ A 2 exp(-ifa)]
A% = A\ +  A\ +  A iA 2[exp(i(<t>2 -  f a ) ) ]  4- A iA 2[exp(-i(fa  -  f a ) ) ]
=  A\ +  A\ +  A iA 2{[cx^(i(fa -  fa))] +  [exp(~ i(fa  -  <M)]
Given that: exp(i0) +  exp(—i6) =  cos# +  isin0 +  cos0 — zsin# =  2cos0, therefore,
A 'r  =  A2 +  A 2 4- 2^4iA2cos(02 — fa) (5.22)
Let 7r, I\ and / 2 denote A2R, A 2 and A2 respectively, we have,
I r  = Ii + I 2 + 2 yj I iI2cos(fa — fa) (5.23)
In the special case where the amplitudes of the two waves are equal with I  =  I\ =  / 2,
IR =  4/cos2[i(0 2 -  &)] (5.24)
The influence of the phase difference (fa — fa) is obvious from equation (5.24).
Depending on the value of cos2 (fa — fa)], which varies between -1 and +1, I r  can
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take on any value between 0 and 4I. These represent cases of alternating dark and 
bright fringes observed at the locations of minimum and maximum intensities within 
the interference pattern. One sees that when (02 — <f) 1) equals zero (when there is 
no phase difference between the two waves and they are said to be in phaseu ), a 
reinforcement of intensities that amounts to four times the original intensities due to 
the aggregation of the two waves obtains.
The crossed-term 2j4iA2COs(</>2 —(j>i) in equation (5.22) and the corresponding term 
2\Z/i/2cos(02 — <M in equation (5.23) both describe the appearance of interference 
effects. They represent a correction to the discrepancy between the resultant of the 
two waves as obtained by the simple addition of the two intensities and that which 
is actually observed - the alternate bright and dark fringes. This correction explains 
how the difference in the phases of the two waves accounts for the variation in the 
resulting intensity that has not arisen from the direct sum of the separate intensities. 
This is what interference consists in and to quote Feynman15,
This correction we call the interference effect. I t  is really only 
the difference between what we get sim ply by adding the in ten ­
sitie s j and what actually happens.
It ought to be pointed out that although the principle of superposition is widely 
applicable to any linear system, only those that follow periodic motions may exhibit 
phase differences (which are essentially the time differences in the phases of the wave 
motions), and so only such systems are capable of displaying interference effects. This 
is why interference is considered a characteristic feature of periodic or wave motions.
Optical interference is most readily observed in the famous Young’s double-slit 
experiment (Figure 5-3). In its paradigmatic form, the apparatus consists of a source 
of monochromatic light (to ensure coherence) and light emitted from this source is 
to meet a screen on which there are two narrow slits. These slits, Si and S2, divide 
the original wavefront into two separate ones and light subsequently emanating from 
them are exactly in phase and constitute two coherent secondary sources. These
14Two waves that are in phase are called coherent.
15Feynman, R.P. (1963a), p.29-7.
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waves then superpose to give an interference pattern in the form of bright and dark 
fringes on a second (detection) screen placed some distance away.
Monochromatic
source
Screen with 
double-slits
Detection
screen
Figure 5.3: Schematic of the Young’s double-slit experiment.
The presence of interference in this setup is attributed to the mis-matches of the 
phases of the two light waves as introduced by a path difference16 relative to a specific 
point in space, as in Figure 5-4 below.
In order to superpose constructively at P , the two waves must be found to be 
in phase at that point. For this to happen, the path difference d must equal to an 
integral number of whole wavelengths. Conversely, if d is equal to an odd number of 
half-wavelengths, the two waves arriving at P  would be found to be out of phase and a 
case of destructive interference obtains. These events of constructive and destructive 
superpositions produce an alternate pattern of bright and dark fringes on the detection 
screen which are equally spaced.
It can be shown that for this experimental arrangement, the resultant intensity 
varies between maxima and minima according to the square of the cosine of the phase 
difference between the two components, which is similar to the more general form of 
equation (5.24) given earlier,
16The slight difference between the corresponding successive parts of both waves to reach a certain 
point in space.
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Monochromatic
source
SiA
Screen with 
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Detection
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Figure 5.4: Light rays emanating from slits Si and S 2 are in phase but in 
order to reach a certain P  on the screen, light from S 2 is required to traverse 
an extra distance d, the path difference.
I  = 4I0cos2(ysir/D \) (5.25)
where y is the distance of point P  from the horizontal central axis, s is the separation 
between the two slits and D is the distance between the two-slits and the detection 
screen.
This predicts, in theory, a constant alternating picture of bright and dark fringes 
(non-localized fringes) as shown in Figure 5-5.
In practice, the fringes are only significant where the intensity from each slit is large 
and where the intensities are approximately equal. And so the actual observed pattern 
often shows that the brightness of these fringes being modulated by the diffraction 
pattern17 (Figure 5-6) dominated by a central maximum.
We have gone into quite some length to explain the principle of superposition
17Diffraction occurs whenever a portion of the wavefront is obstructed in some way. The various 
segments of the wavefront that propagate beyond the obstacle interfere, causing the particular 
energy-density distribution referred to as the diffraction pattern. There is, however, no significant 
physical distinction between interference and diffraction.
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Figure 5.5: Idealized plot of intensity-versus-distance from the central axis in 
a double-slit interference pattern.
Qlrad
Figure 5.6: Actual interference observed in double-slit interferometers due to 
effects of diffraction.
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as it is understood in classical physics. This sets the stage for a fuller appreciation 
of the very different quantum treatment of the superposition principle. Let us now 
summarize the essential features of the classical principle of superposition.
The principle applies to physical systems that obey linear equations. The essence 
consists in the fact that the component forces acting in a superposition stay unaltered 
and act in an independent manner so that their resultant effect on the system can be 
represented as a direct sum of the separate individual effects, as produced by each of 
the constituent forces.
In statics, forces acting concurrently on a body in equilibrium give a resultant 
effect of zero as the individual force vectors cancel each other. Likewise in dynamics, 
the resultant force on a body has an effect that is equivalent to the combined effects 
of the constituent forces. All these work because Newton’s second law is a linear 
equation.
Thus viewed, the principle of superposition can be applied very generally. How­
ever, when applied to systems that undergo periodic motions like waves, the mecha­
nism of superposition leads to the consequence of interference that is unique to these 
modes of motion. Interference phenomena are possible only for periodic motions be­
cause these are the ones which have the privilege of enjoying the prospects of sharing 
possible differences in phases with other similar motions of its kind. Non-periodic mo­
tions do not entertain any possibility of incurring phase differences and hence while 
the principle of superposition works for both kinds of motions, only periodic ones 
exhibit interference effects.
Wave-like periodic motions spread out in space. Being a phenomenon characteris­
tic of and unique to wave-like motion, interference is a non-localized affair that cannot 
happen at only one single point in space. In fact, its non-local character ensures that 
where energy seems to vanish at points of minimal intensity, it is compensated corre­
spondingly at points of maximal intensity. Because of its prevalence through space, 
conservation of energy within a wave is upheld in an instance of interference.
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5.4 The “Quantum” Principle o f Superposition and 
the probabilistic interpretation of
5.4.1 The Strange Case of Quantum Interference
In the preceding discussion, the principle of superposition has been introduced in 
the context of wave motions. For waves produced by coherent sources, the principle 
leads to the observation of the classic phenomenon of interference, which has been 
well-demonstrated in the Young’s double-slit experiment.
It is, indeed, a central claim of quantum mechanics that under appropriate con­
ditions, particles (or waves) can exhibit wave-like (or particle-like) behaviours. As 
we have already shown, superposition enables us to conceive of a particle as being 
manifested as a localized wavepacket. The introduction of the wavepacket concept 
is an attempt to bring into reconciliation two seemingly contradictory characters of 
a particle: its localization in space and its exhibition of wave-like behaviours under 
certain appropriate conditions. For an electron, one such condition that brings out 
its wave-like manifestation would be its confinement within an atom, as described 
above. Of course, one may raise the immediate objection that the existence of sta­
tionary states of an atomic electron merely supplies de Broglie with the inspiration 
to draw the bold analogy with confined classical waves. Nevertheless, the analogy 
seems a good one. The subsequent formulation of the wave equation by Schrodinger 
and its impressive agreements with the bulk of experimental evidence confirm the 
validity of this inference. However, this wave-like behaviour is not to be confused 
with a physical wave as conceived in the classical sense. As it happens, the “wave” 
nature of an electron is far removed from the usual conception. In this section, we 
endeavour to probe further into the realm of the quantum “wave”.
Light waves superpose to give interference patterns. No one finds it necessary to 
dispute this wavy behaviour of light. The quantum revolution has, however, brought 
to our knowledge another mode of manifestation of light: as photons - the discrete
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quanta of light energy having the hallmark particle characteristic of localized posi­
tions18 in space. It is a legitimate question to ask what sanctions us to infer the 
existence of this corpuscular manifestation of light?
Modern versions of the Young’s double-slit experiments employ photo detectors 
that ride on motor-driven slides that scan the interference patterns. These photode­
tectors detect “whole” photons: the detector issues a “clicK' every time a (whole) 
photon with a specified amount of energy (and not a fraction of it) is received. It is 
an “all-or-nothing” event: either the detector receives a photon of a specific energy 
or it doesn’t. Because photodetectors have dimensions that take up relatively local­
ized positions in space, the registration of each photon establishes the corresponding 
particle-like localization of these photons. The detection of photons by photodetectors 
therefore confirms for us their particle nature. As Dirac has put it most elegantly19, 
“the individuality of the photons are preserved.”
Taking into account the reality of photons, a beam of light may now be thought of 
as made up of a large number of photons aggregating to give the beam its appearance 
of a continuous character.
Light, both as waves or as photons, undoubtedly produces optical interference 
in the Young’s double-slit apparatus. It turns out that re-analyzing the interference 
results on a photon basis reveals disturbing quantum features of these “particles”. In 
particular, it leads us to the appreciation of the nature of quantum superposition and 
the probabilistic interpretation of the wavefunction ip.
One important assumption one needs to bear in mind as one switches from a 
wave-ontology to a particle-ontology is the notion of localization in space. Entities 
having localized positions in space are expected to trace out more or less definite paths 
during their motions, as represented by a sequence of localized positions in spacetime. 
In the Young’s double-slit setup, this corresponds to the association of a definite 
“continuous” trajectory with each of the photons leaving the source, traversing “one”
18To be precise, these localized positions are established only when the photons are detected. 
Although energy quantization does not suggest localization, observation has indicated that photons 
can follow narrow paths and that they are not spread out everywhere.
19Dirac, P.A.M. (1958), p.6 .
184
of the slits and eventually reaching the detector.
Our immediate challenge is this: how might one utilize the idea of a discrete 
unit (a photon) having localized spatial extent that follows a definite trajectory in 
spacetime, to explain the appearance of the alternating bright and dark fringes as 
observed in the double-slits interference pattern?
A basic observation ensues. Since only spatially localized photons are detected, the 
“spread-out” interference pattern is generated and gradually built up from the arrival 
of photons at the detector. In other words, the “spread-out” pattern suggests itself 
as some kind of a measure relating the photons and their locations; the distribution 
thus lends itself naturally to statistical and probabilistic considerations.
Interference as a Measure of the Probable Number of Photons Present at 
a Location
There are two sorts of measures one may establish between the photons and their 
locations. First, we note that the “intensity o fligh f is defined as the time average of 
the amount of energy crossing in unit time a unit area perpendicular to the direction 
of energy flora20. Expressed in terms of photons,
Intensity =  Number of photons arriving x Energy of each photon
(E  =  hu)
This leads to the association of the measure with the population density of photons 
at a certain location y along the vertical-axis on which the detector is scanning. This 
rather straightforward interpretation of the interference pattern gives us information 
of the likely or probable number of photons present at a certain point Hidden in this 
apparent intuitive simplicity is a subtle point the recognition of which would no doubt 
save us from committing a significant error.
By the “probable number of photons present at a point”, we may seem to refer 
specifically to photons that are simultaneously21 present at that point.
20Born, M. and Wolf, E. (1980).
21 When speaking about the probability of a number of photons at a certain location, we have as 
yet made no scruples of the relative timing of arrivals of these photons at that location. With respect
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To proceed, we make the identification that a maximum (a bright fringe) within 
the interference pattern corresponds to the place frequented by the highest number 
of photons (either simultaneously or successively) and a minimum (a dark fringe) 
represents a position where there should hardly be any photons in presence (Figure 
5-7).
Monochromatic
source
Screen with Detection
double-slits screen
Figure 5.7: Young’s double-slit experiment - can the interference pattern ob­
served be explained by the photon basis?
In particular, the locations of minima may correspond either to points at which 
not a single photon has called or photons that are simultaneously present somehow 
interact to result in the consequence of a nil number of photons.
We first examine this possibility of “interactions” amongst photons on their si­
multaneous22 arrivals at the detectors.
to timing, it is reasonable to make the assertion of two photons emerging from a different slit may 
arrive at the same location at the same time, although we are most inclined to think that photons 
from the same slit would have to arrive at a specific spot one after another in a successive sequence. 
Still, due to the finite spatial dimension of the detector and the slit-width, we also allow for the 
possibility of two (or more) photons reaching the detector at the same time given that they have 
both passed through the same slit. There are photodetection devices that are capable of detecting 
two photons arriving (at the same spatial point) at the same time. These are normally characterized 
by the appearance of “two photon” peaks on their responsivity curves. I thank Professor Yanhua 
Shih for this information.
22Since a photon is annihilated upon its detection by the photodetection device, it follows therefore 
that any possible interactions between two photons arriving successively can be safely ruled out. 
And strictly speaking, the interaction should happen just before the photons are annihilated by the 
detector.
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To be sure, the photons are, of course, entitled to “interact” well before reaching 
the detector, but here, we focus on the possibility of their interactions at the detector 
as we endeavour to establish the the interference pattern as a measure of the probable 
number of photons present at a point; with such a point being a position of the 
detector and the collection of detection events at these points make up the interference 
pattern.
An explanation is called for as to how two photons23 are supposed to “interact’ in 
such a way that no photon is found at the minima as a result. An obvious suggestion 
is the two photons would have to annihilate24 each other so that no photon is left at 
these spots. Similarly, the two photons would have to interact to produce a total of 
four photons at the central maxima (equation (5.25)25). But where does the energy 
go in the former case and from where comes the extra energy in the latter? Bearing in 
mind the fact that unlike a physical wave, these photons are particle-like entities with 
no “continuous” spatial extension and hence offer no opportunity for “squeezing” or 
“re-distribution” of energy from one spot to another. The respective annihilation and 
creation of photons at the various minima and maxima would then have to mean that 
energy conservation is blatantly violated at these locations. One therefore concludes 
that no interaction of the right sort is possible for the interference pattern to stand 
for the measure of the probable number of photons simultaneously present at one 
place.
One is perhaps quick to respond by insisting that, because of possible scattering 
actions at the slits, no photon needs arrive at points of minima and several photons 
may get scattered to be collected at places of maxima, which accumulate to produce 
the intensity at the maxima.
Given this line of reasoning, most photons of a definite energy are expected to 
pass through the the slits in a straight line unhindered, while only a relatively small
23 As a minimum (at least in a classical sense), one requires two entities for an interaction to take 
place.
24 Here, we are not using the term annihilation as in the formal sense of quantum field theory.
25It can be seen from the equation that at a maxima, the cosine function takes on its maximum
value 1 where the overall intensity equals four times the initial intensity. Since the intensity serves 
as an indication of the number of photons present (with the initial intensity corresponding to the 
presence of one photon) it follows that there is a total of four present at a maxima.
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proportion of them would hit the edge of the slit at such angles and get deflected 
off their prescribed courses. In other words, the two “centered” regions that are in 
line with the center of both slits is predicted to receive the highest concentration of 
photons (Figure 5-8).
Now it turns out that this kind of scattering hypothesis may be readily tested 
by examining what happens at each slit and the resulting scattering pattern. This 
procedure is easily carried out by having the other slit blocked off while observing 
one of them.
S2 blocked
A high concentration 
of photons
Si blocked
Figure 5.8: Results of scattering of photons at the slits.
Two sharp peaks indicating the concentration of photons around the central-axes 
through the two slits support our prediction which, I hasten to emphasize, is based on
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the classical scattering of a particle-like entity having quite definite momentum and 
location in space. With no hesitation, one would confidently apply the principle of 
superposition to both of these distributions to obtain the resultant scattering pattern 
when both slits are open, which is shown in Figure 5-9 below.
A high concentration 
of photons
Figure 5.9: The overall distribution of photons (as indicated by the dotted 
curve) through both slits according to the prediction of classical scattering.
The resultant distribution shows a “normal” curve peaking at the central axis 
mid-way between the two slits. It does not result in the interference pattern as it is 
observed experimentally! From this observation we conclude that both the classical 
model of scattering, and the hypothesis of “no interaction amongst photons arriv­
ing at the same location” , fail on this occasion to support the proposition that the 
interference pattern represents a measure of the probable number of photons present 
simultaneously at a location.
There remains a potential loophole that must be amended. In the course of 
exploring the possibility of interactions amongst the simultaneously arriving photons, 
we have supposed that those photons that arrive in succession do not interact. As 
a confirmation of this supposition, the intensity of the source is greatly reduced to
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such an extent that, at any one time, only one photon is allowed to “pass through 
the screen with the slits” and reach the detector26.
However, one is surprised to find the most baffling consequence! An interference 
pattern, much like the one obtained in the case of high photon intensity, is gradually 
built up even in this low photon intensity case. Reducing the intensity serves merely 
to reduce the rate at which the pattern builds up. Interestingly, the first experiment of 
this kind was performed in 1909 by G.I.Taylor (later Sir Geoffrey) at Trinity College, 
Cambridge27 from which he concluded, “/n no case was there any diminution in the 
sharpness of the pattern...”
With photons reaching the detector one at a time, the suspicion of any interaction 
amongst photons simultaneously arriving at the same spot can be dispelled. The only 
other possibility one may reasonably entertain in this situation is that the photons 
suffer scattering as they pass through their respective slits in such a way that each 
of them gets delivered to take up its rightful position within the interference pattern. 
To examine this hypothesis, we resort to the procedures of observing each slit (with 
the other one closed) in turn.
The observation of each slit on its own provides convincing evidence of the clas­
sical scattering of photons of a certain momentum and energy, as has been already 
demonstrated above in the case of high photon intensity. With both slits kept open, 
one should again expect the resultant effect of scattering to obtain as a result of the 
superposition of the two individual results (as in Figure 5-9 above). But once again 
disappointingly, the application of the principle of superposition on this occasion is 
unable to reproduce the interference pattern observed experimentally.
It may now be supposed that the act of closing one of the slits might have had 
an influence on the final observation so that the interference pattern becomes effec­
tively “washed out”. This contention is countered by the results of an experimental 
arrangement with three-level atoms28 used as detectors at the slits, that are employed
26In this circumstance, one should expect the detector to register distinct “click’s upon the indi­
vidual arrival of each photon.
27Taylor, G.I., (1909), p.115. For an up-to-date account of Taylor’s vast contributions to different 
areas of physics, see Brenner, M.P. and Stone, H.A. (2 0 0 0 ).
28Scully, M.O. and Driihl, K. (1982).
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to track the photons while having both slits kept open at the same time. This arrange­
ment also fails to reproduce the interference pattern. It seems that whenever we care 
to look to obtain some information about the photon’s trajectory (by locating it at 
the slit for example), the interference pattern disappears. It is only when we are 
complacent enough to remain ignorant about the photon’s whereabouts between the 
two events of its emission by the source and its arrival at the photodetector, that we 
are able to retain the interference pattern.
This state of affairs is all very puzzling, for our notion of a particle having a definite 
trajectory now appears to depend on our observation of it. Classically, a particle does 
have a definite trajectory. Our measurement, for instance, of its position x  in space, 
is regarded as a faithful reproduction of its already “prescribed value” of position. We 
can be certain about this because given a value a; at a time t, we may predict another 
value x\ at any later times t\ by the equation that governs its motion. If at time ti, a 
measurement of its position is carried out, one would then find the value to agree with 
our predicted value x\. In other words, the particle takes up all the predicted positions 
with probability one. This is possible because the particle possesses these attributes. 
And so, irrespective of whether any actual position measurement is performed, the 
particle follows an already prescribed trajectory.
In the case of a photon traversing the two-slit apparatus, our measurement appears 
to be capable of changing the final positions of the photon from a “smooth” scattering 
distribution to one showing interference.
What conclusion might one draw from this case of low photon intensity?
Interference as a measure of the probability of locating a particle
Recall that earlier in the discussion, we have indicated there are two sorts of mea­
sures associated with the photons and their locations within the interference pattern. 
Because of the violation of energy conservation, we have argued that the interference 
pattern is n o t a measure of the total number of photons that are simultaneously 
present at a point. This is an appropriate point to explore the possibility of the sec­
ond kind of measure. The distinct and successive arrivals of the individual photons, in
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the case of low photon intensity, have quite unambiguously suggested the association 
of the distribution of photons within the interference pattern with a measure of the 
probable number of photons arriving at a certain point99.
Put slightly differently, the measure tells us how likely a certain place is for a 
photon to land. The interference pattern thus measures the probability of locating the 
photon at a certain point We have seen that the interference pattern is described 
by the intensity (equation (5.25)) that results from the overlapping (superposition) 
of two plane wave solutions ip 1 and ip2 . Granted the intensity is proportional to the 
modulus square of the amplitudes, it follows that the probability of finding a photon 
at a certain point is to be associated with |*0i H- *0 2 12- In other words, it is the modulus 
square of a wavefunction that is given a probabilistic interpretation as the measure 
of the probability of locating a particle (in our particular case, a photon) at a certain 
point upon our measurement. This, incidentally, is the usual statistical interpretation 
of the wavefunction ip via l^l2.
To understand fully how the idea of a wave is integrated into the notion of prob­
ability, we need to probe deeper into their intricate relation as presented in quantum 
mechanics.
It is observed that although on the level of the wavefunction ip, the principle 
of superposition remains valid in the sense that the two wavefunctions ip\ and ip2 
add to produce a resultant whose modulus square describes the interference pattern, 
it is important to stress that ontologically speaking, ip does in no way stand for a 
physical wave, as in the sense of classical physics. This is because the interference 
pattern observed consists, after all, of individual photons whose “discrete” reality 
we have so convincingly established. The particle nature of photons - its distinctive 
aspect of localization in space - prevents any possibility of a re-distribution of energy 
and thus, in theory, inhibits the attainment of interference patterns. In contrast, a 
physical wave provides a continuous medium so that re-distribution of energy can be 
duly effected. The wavefunction is therefore best conceived only as an instrument by 
which probabilities are introduced into the quantum formalism.
29Either simultaneously or successively.
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This somewhat “instrumentalist” construal receives further support as one consid­
ers carefully the two “waves”, one “emanating” from each of the slits supposingly, to 
be simultaneously present and superpose to result in the observation of the interfer­
ence pattern. One may feel, at this juncture, persuaded by the concept of wavepackets 
to associate each of the “waves” with one photon. This appears a sound possibility 
at first sight when one refers to cases with two different photons - each traverses a 
different slit at the same time - where one may unambiguously identify each of the 
two waves with each of the two photons.
However, in the case of low photon intensity where individual photons arrive 
at the detector successively one after another, this rather simple-minded one-to-one 
association of “a” photon with “a” wave through the wavepacket concept is no longer 
feasible. The reason is this: there is no doubt that the interference pattern only 
obtains when two “waves” are introduced and superposed. For low photon density, it 
now appears that we are left with no other option but to relate both of these “waves” 
at the slit to one photon. Speaking in a figurative manner, this would have to mean 
something like associating the two wavepackets at the slits with the same photon. One 
perhaps would not find this entirely unacceptable, for might it not be the case that a 
photon - the wavepacket - leaves the source, gets divided into two when reaching the 
slits and later re-combine to one wavepacket upon detection? This kind of reasoning 
would be deemed sound in cases where a particle is composed of “physical waves” and 
the localized feature of the particle arises from the superposition of these “extended” 
physical waves30.
If there should be a one-to-one correspondence between a wavepacket and a parti­
cle, then in the situation just pictured, the two wavepackets resulting from the division 
of the original one at the slits are to be associated with a part of the photon that 
the original wavepacket represents. In other words, should this state of affairs really
30A good example is that of solitons. These are relatively stable nonlinear waves with their 
envelopes (which itself is of periodic wave form) formed of several waves of different amplitudes. 
The term was first used by Zabusky and Kurskal in a paper published in 1964 and the authors 
discovered that these solitary waves can pass through one another without deformations due to 
collisions and hence the name “solitons” to signify their behaviours as particles. See, Hasegawa, A. 
(1992), especially chapters 1-4.
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obtain, one would then be able to observe, say, a “half-photon” - one that is of half 
the amount of energy of the original photon for instance - at each of the slits. But as 
far as the evidence goes, when a detector is placed near each slit, one receives distinct 
“click” s that record photons coming from either slit but never both. Moreover, each 
click indicates that there is no variation in the energies of the photons detected. Both 
of these observations confirm that the photons do not get split at the slits. What is 
more, is the interference pattern vanishes once we start trying to track down which 
path - through either slit 1  or slit 2 - a photon follows!
The conclusion is somewhat mind-boggling. Two “waves” must be simultaneously 
present in order to superpose to achieve the observed interference pattern. But on the 
other hand, we are compelled to accept the association of both waves simultaneously 
with the same photon. Here goes Dirac’s famous dictum31, ueach photon then interfere 
only with its e lf . The one-to-one correspondence between a wavepacket and a particle 
is indeed too simplified for the understanding of the present situation. Yet, we must 
strive to devise an “intelligible” means to associate two simultaneous waves with one 
and the same photon.
The interpretation of the interference pattern as a measure of the probability of 
locating a photon at a certain point provides an important clue. Analogously, it 
seems plausible to associate the “wave” at each of the two slits with a measure of the 
probability of locating the photon at that particular slit.
If this procedure is followed, one is landed with the advantage of relating two 
potential alternatives rather than two hard-fact eventualities32 to the same photon. 
The two subsets of events: “the photon passes through slit 1” and “the photon passes 
through slit 2F are treated as mutually exclusive33 and together they form a sample 
space for the probability measures in accordance with the classical (Kolmogorovian)
31Dirac, P.A.M. (1958), p.9.
32Here, we refer to two “physical waves” that carry energy, and hence the conservation of energy 
needs to be taken into account when they are both associated with the same photon that is observed 
to traverse only one slit.
33Two sets are said to be mutually exclusive or disjoint if they share no common element. The 
fact that each photon (as a particle) is found to traverse either slit 1 or slit 2 but not both at the 
same time sanctions the partition into two mutually exclusive subsets.
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probability theory34.
If indeed the two alternative subsets of events corresponding to “the photon passing 
through slit 1 ” and “the photon passing through slit 2 ' are mutually exclusive, so that 
the photon may either come through slit 1 or slit 2 but not both at the same time, 
then the classical theory of probability stipulates that:
P (l)  +  P(2) =  P(1 or 2) (5.26)
where P (l) , P (2) and P(1 or 2) denote the probabilities for the photon traversing slit 
1 , slit 2  and either slit 1  or slit 2  respectively.
Equation (5.26) represents the important property of finite additivity that ob­
tains as a consequence of the disjointness of the subsets (the two alternatives) under 
consideration.
Now if the probabilities are represented by the physical distribution of photons 
(due to scattering), then it would seem, as similar to our previous argument, that the 
probability of the photon going through either slit 1 or slit 2 (P (l or 2))is equal to 
the sum of the two physical distributions of scattering (P (l) +  P(2)). As it should 
be expected, photons coming through either slit 1 or slit 2 would be scattered into 
positions independent of the presence of the other slit
This is often seen to be the “rendezvous” for the sum-rule of probability (equation 
(5.26)) and the principle of superposition. In such a regard, one thinks of the physical 
scattering distributions as representing the “individual effects” of a photon coming 
through slit 1 or slit 2 and the direct sum of the two distributions as representing 
the “resultant effect” of both slits being open so that both possibilities are made 
available. Thus viewed, the sum-rule would seem to be expressing the same content 
as the physical principle of superposition. As attractive as it may seem, this simple 
correspondence is not exact though it does bring to our attention one vital element of 
our analysis; namely, probabilistic considerations ought somehow be connected to the 
physical situations through the principle of superposition. The question that concerns
34This property of disjointness of the subsets of events makes possible the finite additive property 
of probability measures. See Kolmogorov, A.N. (1950), Chapter 1 .
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us immediately is how should such a connection be made?
5.4.2 W hen Physics m eets Probability: the Superposition of 
Potentials
Before attempting an answer to the last question posed in the foregoing section, we 
need first understand some relevant aspects about both the principle of superposition 
and the simple concept of probabilities. As a useful and instructive illustration, we 
compare and contrast the cases of applied forces on a mass and the classic example 
of the casting of a die.
Forces acting on a mass m
////
/
m ^
a  Fr
Figure 5.10: Two forces acting simultaneously on the mass m.
Consider a case where two external forces Fi and F 2 are applied simultaneously 
to a mass m. The laws of mechanics tell us that the resultant effect generated may 
be attributed to the effect of a single force F r  (which is given by the vectorial sum 
of Fi and F 2) as in the diagram (Figure 5-10) above. This is because the concerted 
effort of both of these forces equals the sum of the effect of each component force.
The principle of superposition is at work: the sum of the individual effects pro­
duced by the separate forces equals the one resultant effect generated by the forces 
acting together. This principle holds because the resultant force ( F r ) is the sum of 
the individual constituent forces (Fi +  F 2) and this fact has manifested itself in the
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effects that the forces produce collectively on the mass. Now we ask the deceptively 
trivial question of how does one ascertain the principle quantitatively?
Strictly speaking, the measurements we make of the so-called “forces” are only in 
a sense indirect. Following Newton’s second law of motion, we measure “forces” by 
their effects - the accelerations they produce on physical systems that reduce finally 
to spatial and temporal measurements.
We may at this juncture alter our vocabulary slightly and in place of “forces”, 
we say that the measurements of acceleration produced on the system represent the 
effects of the “potentials” or “capacities” to produce these accelerations. One may 
be suspicious whether there is any real advantage attached to what appears to be a 
mere change of terminology. The reader is, however, assured that the motive for this 
change will become apparent as the discussion develops. In the meantime, I would 
remain unspecific about the exact meaning and nature of these potentials, which we 
shall have occasion to elucidate shortly.
In order to establish the validity of the principle of superposition, the following 
steps are followed. First, we measure the acceleration produced by the potential Fi 
by subjecting the mass m  to the influence of Fi alone. Next, the same procedure is 
repeated but this time with m  being placed under the influence of F 2 alone. Now we 
may combine (mathematically) the two potentials Fi and F 2 to arrive at the resultant 
potential F^. This is achieved by taking the vectorial sum of F i and F 2 to obtain F r . 
The crucial point underlying this step is that Fr is computed on the tacit assumption 
that the potentials Fi and F 2 co-exist and act simultaneously on m. Moreover, Fi 
and F 2 both act on m independently in the sense that one potential does not come 
under the influence of the other or its action is not affected by the other.
The final step consists in subjecting m  to both the potentials F i and F 2 (actually) 
acting simultaneously and measuring the overall acceleration of m. One should then 
find,
(5.27)
m srn/
measured computed
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The combined effect of Fi and F 2 acting together is no different from the re­
sultant effect of the separate effects due to Fi and F 2 individually. Thus, we have 
demonstrated, empirically, the validity of the principle of superposition. The principle 
applies because the two potentials giving rise to the resultant effect act simultaneously 
and  independently.
The principle of superposition can be quite unambiguously demonstrated to hold 
in the case of (non-periodic) potentials as in the above because the effects we measure 
as produced by these potentials also obey the simple additive rule that exists between 
the potentials. For two potentials that both exhibit periodicity, the relation between 
the effects are, however, not as straightforward. In such circumstances, the principle 
of superposition fails to apply on the level of the observed effects, despite the fact 
that the underlying potentials still follows a simple additive sum as in the previous 
example of non-periodic mechanical potentials. There is not the slightest doubt that 
each of these periodic potentials is capable of acting on the medium independently as 
one may readily verify by the closure of one of the slits, for instance, in the double­
slit experiment for light waves. However, observable interference effects are present 
when both potentials35 are found to act together simultaneously in the same region 
of spacetime (or on the same medium). This resultant effect of the two potentials 
acting concurrently is not simply the direct sum of the two individual effects of each 
potential acting independently. Does it mean that, after all, the two potentials affect 
each other when being put to work at the same?
The reply to this question hinges on one important fact: the relation between 
the potential and the measure of its effect In the case of classical mechanics, the 
potentials, (the forces) bear a linear relation to the effect (the accelerations we mea­
sure) they each produce. On the other hand, in an optical interference experiment, 
the effect we measure is the intensity I  of the electric-field E that bears a quadratic 
relation (as I  oc |E |2) to the potential E that gives rise to it. In spite of this quadratic 
dependence, useful information of the underlying relation between the potentials may, 
however, be extracted as follows. The intensities 7(1) and 7(2) are measured by the
35With the proviso that these are in coherent motions.
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alternative closure of one slit while observing the other. Prom the values of these mea­
surements, one computes Ei and E 2 respectively. The next step consists in taking 
the vectorial sum of Ei and E 2 to give E^, the resultant electric-field. The quantity 
I r , the intensity of the resultant can now be calculated theoretically and its value is 
compared against the actual observed intensity 7(1 + 2) when both slits are open and 
the two wavy potentials through the slits are allowed to act together. One finds,
7(1 +  2) =  IR (5.28)
The absence of discrepancy in the observed and theoretical values of the resultant 
intensity of the two light waves brings out a crucial point. In this case, even though 
the observed effects 7(1), 7(2) and 7(1 +  2) being measured do not in fact stand in 
a relation of superposition (i.e. 7(1 +  2)^7(1) +  7(2)), the underlying potentials Ei, 
E 2 and Er that give rise to them do satisfy such a relation (Ei +  E 2 =  E#), for if 
they do not, taking the modulus square of E# (obtained by simply adding Ei and 
E 2) then provide us with an intensity, say, I'R, that would not have been the same as 
the observed intensity 7(1 +  2). In that circumstance, Ir would then be seen as an 
indication of some kind of interaction that has taken place between Ei and E 2 when 
they are put together to work (see Figure 5-11). Hence, the very fact that equation 
(5.28) above holds is good evidence for the assertion that the direct sum E r of the two 
independent potentials36 Ei and E 2 is indeed the correct potential that is responsible 
for the observed interference effect.
The conclusion one may draw from the above argument is that the two periodic 
potentials remain physically independent of each other as they operate at the same 
time, in pretty much the same way that mechanical forces do. What is remarkable is 
that since the potentials are of a periodic nature, the difference in their phases, which 
is a relation only existing when both are present, manifests itself in the effect37 (the
36These act independently as may be verified by the fact that they can be separately subjected 
to individual measurements as in the above.
37The crossed-terms responsible for the interference effects appear as we take the modulus squares 
of E i and E 2 to obtain the intensity that agrees with the observed quantity.
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h  I2
Theoretical Observed
I r  zfz 1( 1+ 2 )
^   ^ It may be possible
+  C2 ► C/7 that there has been
some Interaction 
between Ei and E2
__________________________   as they both operate
| at the same time
Computed
Figure 5.11: Possible interaction between two electric-fields
interference pattern observed) when they are brought together to act at the same 
time.
Painstakingly, we have gone into great length to discuss the principle of super­
position in both the contexts of non-periodic and periodic potentials. The point I 
am trying to put across is this: the principle of superposition is often stated as 
applied to the effects with respect to the potentials from which they originate. How­
ever, it is amply clear that there are two levels of superposition at work. One is the 
superposition of the effects and the other is what I would call the superposition of the 
potentials that produce these effects. In the previous example of non-periodic me­
chanical forces, the principle of superposition applies on both the level of effects 
(ai + 8L2 =  s l r ) as well as that of the potentials (Fi +  F 2 =  F#) because both the 
potentials and their effects are related in a linear manner. But in the case of periodic 
potentials, the principle fails on the level of effects ( /( l)  +  / ( 2 ) ^ / ( l  +  2)) while it is 
still found to hold on the level of potentials (Ei +  E 2 =  E^).
We can therefore have situations where potentials acting independently at the 
same time to produce an overall effect that differs from the addition of the individual 
effects produced separately by each of the potentials acting alone. The “difference” 
between the observed resultant effect and the simple theoretical sum of the individual 
effects consists in the important fact that a special kind of relation (it is the phase
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difference in the case of waves) manifests itself only when all the potentials are in 
action simultaneously, as a consequence of which this “ aggregate property gets trans­
lated into the observable effect, while the respective actions of the potentials remain 
unaffected by those of the others38.
Of these two levels of superposition, it seems to me that the superposition of 
potentials is more fundamental because it provides the assurance that the potentials 
maintain their physical independence when they operate simultaneously in the same 
region of space (and on the same medium); and much of our physics is founded on 
this important supposition. One may still suspect that the distinction of these two 
levels of superposition is merely a verbal exercise. This distinction, however, is of a 
significant impact when one comes to consider the concept of probability, the subject 
to which we would promptly turn.
The cast of a die
Consider the simple case of throwing a fair die. Given the perfect symmetry of the 
die, we assert that there are six equally likely possible outcomes but only one would 
materialize in the next throw of the die. By the six possible outcomes, we mean the 
six possibilities that correspond to each of the six faces of the die to show in the 
action of one throw of the die. These are six “potential1 eventualities associated with 
this physical situation.
The six possibilities are said to be of equal chance to occur given the symmetry of 
the die. The phrase “of equal chance” may be operationalized by conducting a long 
sequence of throws of the same die39 and recording the number of throws in which 
each face obtains. If the total number of throws is sufficiently large, the proportion of 
the number of throws in which a particular face shows to the total number of throws 
would become very close to one-sixth in the long run40. The fraction is thus taken
38Otherwise, a constant phase difference may not be maintained and the interference effects become 
unattainable.
39 Theoretically speaking, one may also adopt the equivalent procedure of throwing a large number 
of unbiased dice of the same kind simultaneously.
40 Strictly speaking, this is only achieved in the limit where the number of throws approaches 
infinity but in practice, a large number of throws is usually considered acceptable. See the discussion 
of the Laws of Large Number by Renyi (1970). Renyi, A. (1970).
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as a numerical measure of the potential of, say, the face 4 of the die showing.
This immediately leads us to the characteristic feature of indeterministic, chancy 
events: one may speak of the potential of a given situation being present or manifest­
ing but there is no certainty of a potential to actualize a particular result, in contrast 
to the cases of both the non-periodic mechanical and periodic wavy potentials. The 
“probabilistic” potential, which nevertheless represents a tendency to realise a specific 
result, only reveals itself retrospectively in a long sequence of repetitive measurements.
One often speaks about an entity tending towards a particular position when all 
that is meant is the entity needs not necessarily take up that particular position 
but in a large proportion of times it does. Thus, the “particular position” provides 
a reference point for the entity to tend towards in the long run. The concept of 
tendency (a potential in the probabilistic context) presupposes the idea of repeated 
measurements; one is only able to measure such a tendency through a sequence of 
repeated measurements.
In the limit, a potential like a mechanical force is found to always produce the 
same result - the same acceleration on a physical system. In this deterministic setting, 
we see an extreme degree of tendency of the system to move at a certain acceleration 
when it comes under the influence of a particular force. Here, the system would be 
left with no alternative but to accelerate by the same amount when the same force is 
applied.
One usually finds this not too illuminating as one can quite easily supply the 
argument that, after all, we know that there is one potential - the one mechanical 
force acting - and this always provides the same acceleration. To raise the question 
of how one knows that this potential “always produces” the same acceleration would 
no doubt provoke an extensive excursion into the terrain of the problem of induction. 
We shall not detain ourselves with such a consideration.
But what I would focus on is a subtle difference between a deterministic potential 
in classical mechanics and a probabilistic one such as, for instance, the tendency of 
the face “4” of a die showing in one throw. In the former, we are confident that the 
acceleration of the mass is produced by the applied force because we are certain about
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the action of this one potential, and also because that we are at will to subject the 
mass to the influence of this one potential; to manipulate the potential so to speak. 
In contrast, in the latter case of the cast of an unbiased die, we are faced with six 
potentials or tendencies and there is only one possible outcome out of the six that 
would be realised upon the throw41. There is therefore, a one-to-one correspondence 
between the acting potential and its effect in the former but this correspondence is 
found to be absent in the latter: before the throw of the unbiased die, the six potentials 
( ( f )a , (f>b, (f>c, 0 e ,  < t> f)  are all present but only one outcome materializes once it is cast
(Figure 5-12).
"Face 1"
0b
Cast■ W
0 d
<t*'
Figure 5.12: Six probabilistic potentials present before the casting of an unbi­
ased die.
The claim that the six potentials co-exist before the throw is based on the physical 
symmetry of the system in question and hence, there does not seem to be any contrary 
reason for us to think that there should be a smaller or greater number of potentials 
in operation. The co-presence of the six potentials does, however, in no way commit
41 Moreover, these probabilistic potentials may not be manipulated in the sense that one cannot 
be sure which one of the six possible outcomes would realise in the next throw of the die. One 
may perhaps suggest at this point that the potentials may be “manipulated” by physically altering 
the die to a biased one in which all other potentials but one are effectively eliminated. However, 
since the biased die represents a very different physical situation to the unbiased one, this sort of 
manipulation can then be ruled out.
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them to be in action at the same time or for each of them to be in a one-to-one 
correspondence with the six possible outcomes42. Several tentative scenarios thus 
arise. (1) One may take the view that all the 0’s operate in such a manner to result 
in just one outcome materializing. This would mean, for example in Figure 5-12 that, 
the potentials 0O, 0&, 0C, 0 <2> <t>e and 0/ all operate to generate the outcome that “face 
1” results upon a cast of the die. This is in analogy with the case of mechanical 
forces where the component potentials act together to produce a single resultant 
effect. Here, the outcome that has materialized is thought of as the resultant effect 
of the actions of all the potentials. And in order to account for the reason why this 
particular outcome has come to dominate rather than the other five43, some intricate 
mechanisms of the potentials in actions would have to be supposed. (2) One may also 
take the view that only some of the 0’s are in action. An example would be that, 
say, only the potentials 0a, 0c, 0d, 0e have operated (but not 0&, 0/) to generate the 
outcome of “face 1” of the die resulting. As similar to the reasoning in (1), how this 
outcome has come to be realized as a consequence of the aggregate effort of these 
0’s must again be explained. (3) Given the fact that, say, “face 1” has actualized in 
one throw of the die, we infer retrospectively that only the potential 0a, the tendency 
exclusive to the production of the outcome “face 1”, and no other, has acted on this 
particular throw.
Our usual method of measurement of these probabilistic tendencies (or potentials) 
- the assignment of probability measures - by reference to relative frequencies has a 
great deal to do with why it seems more reasonable for us to favour the view given 
in (3) over those of (1) or (2). We shall now try and provide a justification of this 
reasoning.
To dispose of the views in (1) or (2), it is useful to consider an analogous situation 
in the case of physical potentials. Let us suppose there are two forces Fi and F 2 
present at the same time but unlike F i, F 2 is not acting on the mass m  (Figure 5-13). 
As a illustration, we may think of F i as an ordinary mechanical force and F 2 as,
42Hence, lower-case letters a, 6 , c, d, e, /  have been used to label the six potentials in order to avoid 
possible confusion if these are labeled by the numbers 1 to 6 instead.
43That is, it is “face 1” that turns up rather than the five remaining faces of the die.
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perhaps a magnetic force generated by a small magnet. Provided the mass m  is not 
composed of magnetic material (but a small plastic sphere, say), the motion of m  
would not be affected by the presence of F 2 on a macroscopic level.
\ 
f 2
Figure 5.13: Two physical forces enjoy a simultaneous presence but not in
operation at the same time.
In this circumstance, the acceleration of mass m  in the presence of both F x and 
F 2 is measured to be of the same value as the one due to Fi acting alone (with the 
magnet removed for example). That is, only the effect ai (the acceleration of mass m  
produced by Fi) of Fi manifests, given that Fi and F 2 are both present. One may 
then infer that Fi alone acts on the occasion even in the presence of F 2.
This kind of reasoning motivates the analogy with probabilistic potentials as 
sketched under view (3) above: although six probabilistic potentials </>a, <t>b, <t>c, <fid, 4>e 
and (j)f may all be present, it is, however, due solely to the action of 4>a that the 
outcome of “face 1” shows. Similar to the case of mechanical potentials, such a view 
is, of course, based on the assumption that there exists a one-to-one correspondence 
between the potential and its effect. This one-to-one correspondence is what underlies 
the relative frequency method as a means of measuring probabilities. For the case of 
the casting of a die, we take the fraction,
F,
Number o f throws with uface  1” 
Total number o f  throws
(5.29)
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as meaning the tendency for the die, out of a long sequence of throws, to produce a 
certain number of outcomes with “face 1” showing.
In order words, we choose this fraction, this number, as measuring the one poten­
tial that gives rise to this particular outcome and hence a one-to-one correspondence 
is established. Likewise, we collect all the results with “face 2”, “face 3” and so on, to 
obtain similar fractions as the measures of the respective tendencies of “face 2 show­
ing” , “face 3 showing” etc. Such one-to-one correspondences between the tendencies 
towards particular results and the results themselves are implied by the method we 
adopt for the measurements of these tendencies. So on each occasion where a certain 
“tendency” has been seen to have operated, the other five potentials, though with 
their presence prior to the cast as real as F 2 as in the above example, have somehow 
become “barred” from their actions.
The difficulties that plague the views expressed in (1) and (2) (and thus induce 
us to pursue view (3)) can be traced to the property of mutual exclusiveness of the 
outcomes of an experiment of probabilistic character. It is, indeed, a hallmark feature 
of probabilistic considerations that the causes for mutually exclusive possibilities (the 
tendencies or potentials) can co-exist before an event but the same cannot be said of 
the respective eventualities that each of them leads to. The problem hinges upon the 
usual, and perhaps misguided, impression that being co-existing, all tendencies would 
have to exert influence or to act on the die at the same time. Following this direction 
of thought, we find ourselves in deep puzzlement with regard to the transition that 
would have to take place in order to go from a situation where all potentials act prior 
to the cast, to one where only a single potential has arguably been in actual action as 
known from after the cast. However, by carefully distinguishing between a situation 
where all potentials may be present but not acting and one that where they are all 
present and acting, one is able to relieve oneself from such a confusion.
In a metaphysical vein, one may proceed further and argue that the very fact 
that “six” (and no more or no less) distinct potentials have been associated with the 
die is due entirely to the six distinct outcomes used as the measures according to 
the relative frequencies method. Hence, this one-to-one correspondence is implicit
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when “six” potentials are referred to. It follows that the question of whether all these 
six potentials or any combination of them act concurrently on the die to produce a 
certain result would become automatically dissolved.
To make our argument more transparent, we consider a number of probabilistic 
potentials 0/, 0 / j , ..., 0n where n can be any natural number (n€N).  We do not require 
any one of these 0 ’s to be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the eventual 
outcomes. Under such a circumstance, the 0s in action must “interact” in some ways 
in order to produce the six outcomes. Given this flexibility, the ideas expressed in 
views (1) and (2) thus become plausible. There are, however, two difficulties. First, 
an explanation, most probably a mechanism in terms of some intricate “interactions” 
amongst the 0’s must be provided. Second, there exists, in theory, no upper limit to 
the number of potentials that can be brought in, and hence, there is every possibility 
of an infinite number of the various combinations of the deifferent 0 ’s that may lead 
to the same outcome. I am inclined to reject both of these hypotheses on the grounds 
of their inherent non-testability.
As discussed, our method of measuring these probabilistic potentials and their 
observed outcomes affords us with the view of a one-to-one correspondence between 
a probabilistic potential and “its” effect. Of course, the fact that prompts us to feel 
even the slightest discomfort in imposing this correspondence is due entirely to our 
inability to “isolate” one single potential and place the die under the influence of this 
particular potential. Unlike mechanical forces, these probabilistic potentials are not 
open to being isolated. It is worth emphasizing that it is characteristic of probabilistic 
potentials to be known to have operated only after their outcomes are actualized.
A further worry ensues. The discussion so far on probabilistic potentials has 
undoubtedly conveyed to the reader an image of a reality of these potentials that 
seems to be on a par with that of a “real” physical potential like a mechanical force. 
The worry concerns the justification of conferring on these probabilistic potentials 
such an ontological status. As a mark of prudence, we ought to provide some rationale 
for why one is permitted to think in this manner.
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There is at least one well-known view on probability theory that takes an affirma­
tive attitude on this issue. In his development of an objective concept of probability 
in physics and the sciences, Sir Karl Popper adopts this view44,
P ropensities, it is assumed, are not m ere possib ilities but are 
physical realities. They are as real as forces, or fields o f  forces.
A nd vice versa: forces are propensities. They are propensities 
fo r  setting  bodies in  m otion. Forces are propensities to ac­
celerate, and fields o f forces are propensities d istributed over  
som e region o f space and perhaps changing continuously over  
this region. Fields o f forces are fields o f  propensities. They 
are real, they exist.
If the one-to-one correspondence between a probabilistic potential and the effect 
it generates is assumed, we are then led to conclude that in each throw of the die, 
all six potentials 0 ’s are co-present but only one out of the six actually operates to 
bring about the outcome. I should, however, point out that the supposition of such 
a one-to-one correspondence does not come into any conflict with the doctrine of 
indeterminism. The crucial point is, after all, the knowledge of a particular 0 has 
acted on a particular occasion is obtained only after the corresponding outcome has 
materialized45. Since the supposition that a certain potential 0 has acted may only be 
inferred retrospectively after the throw and not before, our knowledge of a particular 
0 to operate in the next trial remains entirely dictated by chance.
In the language of sets, the mutually exclusive or disjoint sets of outcomes lead 
directly to the property of finite additivity of probability measures - the sum-rule 
of probabilities. The sum-rule is an expression of the fact that the members of the 
union of a collection of disjoint sets is equal to the sum of the individual members 
belonging to each of the constituent sets. In the example of the cast of a perfect die, 
the sum-rule is stated as follows,
44Popper, K.R. (1990), p.12.
45With mechanical potentials, we may at will subject the system to one single potential and 
measure its result. With probabilistic potentials, we cannot “isolate” one potential 0  from the 
others and “subject” the die to this particular potential.
208
P( 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6) =  P (l)  +  P(2) +  P(3) +  P (4) +  P(5) +  P(6) (5.30)
If each of the P(l), P(2), P(6) represents a fraction of the total number of
throws, this would simply mean that the sum of the number of throws in which “face 
1” or “face 2” or so on obtains is equal to the total number of throws carried out. 
This is a trivially true statement as we have measured each of the individual P(l), 
P(2),...etc. by partitioning the total number of throws that have been performed.
However, notice the use of the disjunctive connective “or” in the above. This is 
essential because the possible outcomes are mutually exclusive with respect to one 
throw. Two or more outcomes cannot be occurring at the same time. This means 
that the sum-rule of probability is not an expression of the principle of superposition 
in probabilistic examples - neither superposition of potentials nor superposition of 
effects. This is a vital point to bear in mind when one comes to unravel the intricate 
relationship between the principle of superposition and the sum-rule of probability in 
the double-slit experiment.
The Double-Slit Experiment Revisited: the Sum-Rule - versus - the Prin­
ciple of Superposition
In the double-slit experiment, the randomness lies with the emission of photons from 
the source. The source emits each photon in a random direction but once it is emitted 
in a particular direction, the photon would follow a definite trajectory was it to behave 
as a corpuscular entity on a particle picture. The two slits, thus, merely serve as filters 
to select out those photons that travel in these two specific directions out of the total 
number of photons, which have been emitted in all the different directions. Their 
function resembles our selection by inspection of the number of throws of a die in 
which “face 1” or “face 2” shows in a sequence of throws for example (the sequence, 
of course, includes throws with faces other than these two faces showing). As selectors 
of two particular subsets of photons, the presence of the slits does not influence the 
photons in any other significant way apart from the scattering occurring at the edges
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of the slits. The two distributions of photons coming through slit 1, D(l),  and through 
slit 2, D(2), show two distinctly separate subsets out of the set of all the photons 
generated at the source. One should then expect to find the total number of photons 
passing through slit 1 or slit 2 to be equal to D(l)  +  D(2) given the two assumptions 
that:
(i) each photon has a definite trajectory in a certain direction once emitted in that 
direction and,
(ii) the presence of the slits serves only the function of selecting out the photons 
which travel in two specific directions (out of the total number emitted) and 
they do not in any way alter the motions of the photons significantly.
So, one expects the simple relation D(lor2)  =  D(l) + D(2) to hold with D(lor2)} 
D( 1) and D(2) denoting the total number of photons passing through either slit 1 or 
slit 2 , the number of photons passing through slit 1  and the number of photons passing 
through slit 2  respectively.
Translating these values into probability measures that are taken as relative fre­
quencies, we obtain,
g(lor2> = m  + m  (5.3i)
N  N  N  y '
where N  is the total number of photons emitted by the source in any direction.
Now equation (5.31) may readily be rewritten as,
P( 1 or 2) =  P (l)  +  P{2) (5.32)
with P (lo r2 ), P (l) and P(2) denoting the corresponding fractions in equation (5.31) 
respectively.
We have arrived at the 11 sum-rule of probability (equation (5.32)) via the physical 
distributions of photons and the two assumptions (i) and (ii) stated above. Hence, 
the validity of the sum-rule for the probability of photons at the slits is dependent
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on these two assumptions. In particular, the assumption in (i) that each photon 
follows a definite trajectory has served the important purpose of “partitioning” the 
photons into disjoint subsets; that is, once it is sent travelling in a specific direction, 
a photon would continue in that direction if its motion is left unhindered (albeit 
the possible scattering as it traverses a slit). We shall, however, see below that this 
assumption, and in fact, both of the assumptions (i) and (ii) are to be abandoned in 
the reconciliation of our thinking with quantum phenomena.
Because of the fact that the D 's are representations of physical effects, it would 
perhaps seem natural for one to associate the relation D(1 or 2) =  D(l)  +  D(2) with 
the superposition principle. Above all, is it not so that the relation expresses the 
fact that the combined effect equals the sum of the individual constituent effects? To 
entertain such a correspondence, as we shall see, would be a mistake, for, as we argued 
in the last sections, the crux of the principle of superposition (whether of potentials or 
of effects) is that the resultant is supposed to be the aggregate result of the individual 
effects happening at the same time due to the simultaneous actions of the respective 
potentials that give rise to them. One sees at once that this character of the principle of 
superposition is at odds with the idea of disjointness, which implies that the potentials 
cannot be simultaneously in operation. But there are more subtleties to consider 
before a conclusion may be reached.
It is customary to think that whenever the principle of superposition obtains, one 
“observes” several effects present at the same time, each due to a different potential. 
In reality, however, one never observes these several effects simultaneously in a strict 
sense. One perceives only the resultant, the one effect that can be proved to be equal 
to the sum of the individual effects indirectly, as has been already discussed above in 
both the situations of non-periodic mechanical forces and periodic wavy potentials. 
Despite this reality (which incidentally forms a crucial point of our argument to come), 
it seems harmless to continue thinking that “several effects occur at the same time 
whenever the resultant obtains” provided the principle of superposition holds. But 
this thought is immediately met with a difficulty when one considers probabilistic 
potentials.
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In the classic probabilistic situation of die casting and also in the double-slit 
scenario (particularly apparent with the low photon density case with one-photon 
being emitted at a time), it would be very odd to think of two simultaneous effects of 
the same kind46 existing in the same system because of the mutually exclusive nature 
of these effects.
In the case of die casting, I have argued that it is incorrect to say that each of the 
results, which corresponds to the showing of each face of the die, is a “combined” or 
“resultant” effect of the potentials. This is in part because it is not possible to subject 
the die exclusively to any individual one of these potentials and then ascertain the 
particular effect due to it47. Our knowledge of these potentials is only retrospective. 
The best one can achieve is to infer from the observation of an outcome that the 
one potential, which has given rise to the outcome48, has operated in that particular 
instance. Our method of assignment of the probability measures has induced this 
kind of inference. The difficulty lies in the fact that we are not free to manipulate the 
die (before the cast) so that we may know that just one or several of these potentials 
are acting.
Furthermore, because of this one-to-one correspondence we have assumed for a 
particular outcome i  and the potential fa that is supposed to bring it about, the 
disjointness of the set of all outcomes {z} implies also the disjointness of the operating 
fa’s. In physical terms, this is tantamount to the statement that the fa’s are prohibited 
from acting together at the same time. But the ability of the potentials to be in action 
at the same time is necessary if the corresponding effects are to be produced together, 
which is vital to the idea behind the principle of superposition, we therefore conclude
46By simultaneous effects, we require that more than one potential are acting on the system 
at the same time. Since we have assumed that there are one-to-one correspondences between the 
potentials and their outcomes, it follows therefore that the disjoint outcomes make it impossible for 
two potentials to act simultaneously on the die in one throw.
47In the case of non-periodic mechanical forces, the resultant we observe (albeit it appears to do 
not harm to think of it as several effects occurring at the same time) is one single effect when the 
system is placed under the influence of more than one potential at the same time. In principle, the 
resultant is one single individual effect in its own right, it is equal to the sum of the effects only in 
the sense that the former has been found to be empirically equivalent to the latter. We observe just 
the overall effect and not the several individual effects at the same time.
48Assuming, of course, a one-to-one correspondence between the potential and the effect it 
generates.
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that the relation -D(lor2) =  D(l)+D(2)49 and its derivative, the sum-rule in equation 
(5.31) that arises from the disjointness property of the potentials, are not expressions 
of the principle of superposition (neither of potentials nor of effects).
Now comes the new twist in the tale. Experimentally, we find when both slits are 
open, we do not obtain the resultant distribution D(1 or 2) as given by the simple 
sum, D( 1) +  D(2), when no attempt is made to observe which slit each photon has 
come through. Rather, we observe a “resultant” distribution D(1 or 2) that exhibits 
an interference pattern characteristic of the superposition of two periodic potentials 
or forces.
Recall that earlier in our analysis, we argued that in the two-slit experiment, su­
perposition does not apply on the level of effects (interference), it nonetheless applies 
on the level of the potentials that generate these effects. In addition, the phase dif­
ference, a kind of “relational” property brought about by the simultaneous presence 
of both potentials that act together on the same system, manifests itself in the re­
sultant effect. We also note that in the case of optical interference, the underlying 
potentials obey the superposition relation: Eir =  Ei +  E 2 , which states explicitly the 
fact that the potential resulting from the two potentials acting together is simply the 
(vectorial) sum of the two individual potentials.
Applying the same reasoning to the double-slit experiment, we now demand both 
of the potentials 0(1) and 0(2), which correspond to the two tendencies for the photon 
to pass through slit 1 and slit 2 respectively, to act together on the same photon at 
the same time in order to produce the interference pattern, that is,
0(1 or 2) =  0(1 )+  0(2) (5.33)
As similar to the foregoing discussion on real physical waves, it may be readily 
verified50 that,
49Which strictly, is a relation amongst the effects but is deemed to hold also for the potentials 
because of the one-to-one correspondence between the potential and the effect.
5(V(1) and <f)(2) are obtained separately by observing the two distributions D( 1) and D (2). Since 
D (l)  and D (2) represent the physical intensities we measure, they are thus proportional to the 
potentials (f)(1) and (f)(2) that give rise to them. Having evaluated (f)(1) and (f)(2), the sum of these 
two quantities are taken to give (j>(l)+(f>(2) and the modulus square |0 (l)+</>(2 ) |2 of which is compared
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|0(1 +  2)|2 =  |0(1) +  0(2)|2 = |0(1)|2 + |0(2)|2 +  crossed terms (5.34)
At this juncture we find ourselves landed on unfamiliar landscape. The probabilis­
tic potentialities whose actions are supposedly mutually exclusive can nevertheless be 
in operation on the same physical system (the photon) at the same time51!
The Quantum Priniciple of Superposition
Now that quantum mechanics has revealed to us such strange modes of behaviours of 
the probabilistic potentials, it is appropriate to assess its impact on our conception 
of physics. We are concerned with, in particular, the status of the assumptions in 
(i) and (ii) in light of these new results. In this regard, one must look into the two 
contexts of “observation” and “non-observation!' of photons at the two slits; as these 
are the conditions under which the two modes of action of the potentials are brought 
to light and would have important repercussions for both assumptions. Let us first 
state the relevant facts with respect to each of these scenarios.
(a) Observation of photons at the slits
Each photon is observed to traverse one of the two slits when appropriate devices 
are situated at each of the two slits. The consequence of the assumption in (i) 
that photons follow definite trajectories agrees with the observations. Moreover, 
the overall distribution of photons with respect to both slits staying open is 
found equal to the sum of the two individual distributions obtained by observing 
each individual slit in turn. In this case, the sum D(l) + D(2) =  D(lor2)  holds 
and it may be translated trivially, as we have seen in equation 5.31, into the 
sum-rule of probability. The very fact that this simple sum holds provides 
convincing evidence for the slits behaving as mere “selectors” of two subsets of
to |0 (1  +  2) |2 as observed.
51 When no effort is spent to find out which slit the photon has come through.
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photons that are emitted in these particular directions; for they merely help us 
to pay attention to photons travelling in these two directions. The presence of 
the slits is supposed not to affect the prescribed trajectories of the photons in 
this case.
We have argued previously that the sum D(l)  +  D(2) =  D(1 or 2) is not a 
statement of the principle of superposition (neither of potentials nor of effects). 
As far as actual observations at the slits are concerned, the probability of finding 
a photon at a location x  (on the detection screen) obeys the simple sum-rule of 
the classical probability calculus. The respective observed photon distributions 
at the two slits conform to the assumption that each photon has followed a 
definite trajectory all along. The definiteness of the photon trajectories make 
us certain about the mutual exclusiveness of the probabilistic potentials. No 
two potentials are in operation on the same system at the same time52. In the 
presence of observational procedures carried out in the vicinity of the slits, the 
probabilistic potentials seem to behave as if  the photons have had well-defined 
definite trajectories once they are emitted from the source.
(b) Non-observation of photons at the slits
In the event where no effort is made to observe which of the two slits a photon 
has traversed, one is left with a very different overall distribution of photons: one 
that shows the characteristic pattern of optical interference. The appearance 
of this “interference modulation” leads us to reject the assumption that the 
photons have, after all, followed definite trajectories all along53.
Since a distribution of photons without interference modulation is a consequence 
of the hypothesis that each photon travels a definite path, the appearance of 
interference would then mean that this hypothesis is to be given up in the first 
instance. Hence, we conclude that if no attempt is made to locate the photons
52As evidenced by the distinct clicks at the detectors placed at the slits.
53For if they had, the overall distribution with both slits open would equal to the sum of the 
individual distributions that correspond to photons observed to have traversed each separate slit 
(such as in case (a) above).
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at the slits, it cannot be said from which respective slit each photon has come 
through, and therefore, we are not allowed to claim that the photons have been 
following definite trajectories.
The presence of interference modulation of the overall photon distribution is 
attributed to the superposition of the probabilistic potentials (f)(1 ) and (f)(2 ). 
As long as no observation is made to discover through which slit a photon 
has passed, these potentials, far from enjoying a mutually exclusive relation 
in their operations, now act in a simultaneous54 manner on the photon. The 
superposition of probabilistic potentials is preserved insofar as one shows no 
attempt to track down the photon.
However, when no observation is made to locate the photons at the slits, both 
slits seem to play an active role in attaining the interference effects55. The 
observed distribution is one that is characteristic of double-slit interference. 
One could have also worked with a larger number of slits, three or four for 
example, and been able to obtain patterns that show the characteristics of 
three and four-slit interference respectively.
In the light of the evidence, it seems inevitable that we would have to, at the very 
least, re-adjust our conviction on the much cherished assumptions of (i) and (ii) that 
are attached to a classical particle. Classically, our investigation into the nature of a 
physical system through the various performances of measurement on it is deemed to 
be an exact representation of its underlying reality. Our observations thus faithfully 
reveal this underlying reality. The reality is thought to be objective and this amounts 
to a statement of the kind that the moon is there with a definite position (relative to 
some vantage point) even if not a single soul cares to gaze at it. In the quantum realm, 
it is no longer possible for us to say that the quantity we measure is what it is as if 
the measurement had not happened. To put the point bluntly, our observation of an
54 As characteristic of being in a superposition.
55 Contrast this with the occasion where a photon has been observed to traverse a slit and followed 
a definite trajectory, the slit serves mainly the function of selecting and helping us to concentrate on 
that particular subset of photons (out of the total number emitted by the source). The slit does not 
in any significant way influence the emitted photons except for minor scattering effects at its edges.
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electron seems to force it into a behaviour that is not what it would have manifested 
if left on its own.
I shall now sum up the main findings in this section. Potentials are dispositions 
or capacities arising from a given physical situation that induce a physical system to 
generate certain observable effects. There are probabilistic as well as non-probabilistic 
potentials. A mechanical force acting on a mass produces an acceleration of the latter 
is a good example of a non-probabilistic potential; while the disposition to produce 
“face 1” (say) in a long sequence of die rolling counts as a probabilistic potential.
Probabilistic potentials differ mainly from their non-probabilistic counterparts in 
that their actions may only come to be known retrospectively after a long sequence 
of measurements. Our usual method of assigning probabilities through the relative 
frequencies of a set of mutually exclusive outcomes leads us to the conclusion that one 
and only one probabilistic potential may operate in a particular trial In other words, a 
one-to-one correspondence is established between each probabilistic potential and the 
outcome that it gives rise to, which thus means that these potentials themselves form a 
mutually exclusive set. This feature of mutual exclusivity applies not to the possibility 
of co-existence of the potentials but rather to their respective actions on the same 
physical system at a time: the potentials may co-exist but yet may not necessarily 
be in concurrent operations. In fact, implicit in the frequency interpretation is the 
message that the potentials cannot be in concurrent operations, which is in accordance 
with classical probabilistic reasoning. As such, the sum-rule is not a statement of the 
principle of superposition, since potentials in a superposition must act concurrently.
Quantum mechanics reveals to us a very different facet of these probabilistic po­
tentials, but certainly not one that should have taken us by great surprise as generally 
is popularized56. When speaking about the dynamics of a system in the probabilistic
56 Since our knowledge with regard to the actions of probabilistic potentials can only be gained ret­
rospectively, we are thus incapable of isolating one particular potential and controlling its operation 
on a system in order to bring about a particular outcome. Because of this, we cannot determine, 
before the event (or experiment), which of the two possibilities - of the potentials being mutually 
exclusive in their actions in one trial o r  whether they all (or any combination of them) act simul­
taneously to produce the desired result - really obtains. Our assignments of probability measures in 
terms of relative frequencies seem to have eliminated the latter possibility in favour of the former: 
the probabilistic potentials do not act together according to our usual interpretation of probabilities
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context, as in the Young’s double-slit illustration, the origin of the mutual exclusive­
ness of the probabilistic potentials is attributed to the physical fact that classical 
particles follow definite trajectories in space and time. In the absence of any effort to 
find out about the information regarding the spacetime trajectory of a quantum par­
ticle (without observations at the slits for instance), we uncover that the probabilistic 
potentials can indeed all act concurrently to produce the interference distribution 
that is observed. The conception of a particle having a definite spacetime path must 
be given up.
The foregoing observations can be visualized pictorially in the contexts of the 
“classical die” (Figure 5-14) and the “quantum die” (Figure 5-15).
For the classical die, the probabilistic potentials are measured by the frequencies 
of their outcomes relative to the total number of throws. In figure 5-14, only after, 
and not before the outcome “face 1” has shown are we able to infer that <j>\ has acted. 
We are unable to exert any control over which particular 0 ’s is to operate on the die 
in the next trial. This feature of retrospective knowledge contributes largely to the 
shaping of probabilistic reasoning.
Especially, because of our lack of control of these potentials, it is meaningless 
to speak about which outcome is to actualize in the next throw of the die. The 
“strength” of these potentials are measured by the frequencies of occurrence relative 
to each other in a long sequence of trials. Chance lies in the fact we cannot know for 
sure which outcome is to materialize in the next trial to come.
The quantum mechanical results bestow on us an entirely novel feature of these 
probabilistic potentials. On every occasion, all six potentials operate concurrently 
on the “quantum die” (Figures 5-15 and 5-16). Furthermore, these potentials must 
exhibit periodicity by necessity, for it is the overall difference in their relative phases 
when the potentials are operating simultaneously, which accounts for the modulation 
of the distribution of the outcomes by interference, 
as relative frequencies.
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Figure 5.14: The classical die. 
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Figure 5.15: The quantum die.
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This is equivalent to
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Figure 5.16: The quantum die.
Granted that all potentials must act simultaneously to result in a statistical dis­
tribution with interference modulation, would this signal the return of a sort of de­
terminism (with respect to the behaviours of the potentials) in the naive sense that 
it can be determined that all potentials are to operate conjointly on every occasion? 
The reply to this question is an emphatic “NO”. This is because we know not which 
phase difference dominates each time the die is rolled (or, as each photon is emitted 
in the more realistic double-slit experiment). Similar to the classical case, the nature 
of such knowledge is only retrospective, acquired only when the outcomes have been 
known. It is in this sense that quantum probabilistic potentials are chancy.
Chapter 6
The W avefunction and Causal 
Processes
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I first argue (Sections 6.2-6.4) that the Schrodinger evolution of the 
wavefunction ^  (as a representation of mutually acting potentials) of a physical system 
may be regarded as a causal process (in the manner of H CQ T), which transmits a 
conserved quantity \ip\2 according to the “at-af criterion.
I then proceed (Section 6.5) to point out that this view is not entirely satisfactory 
because of the conceptual problems associated with both ip and \ip\2. First, the need 
to satisfy the “at-af criterion for causal transmission means that \ip\2 must be locally 
conserved, and this in turn implies that ip is a complex quantity1. It is argued that by 
treating seriously the distinction between potentials and their effects, one is then able 
to dissolve this worry. Second, and more importantly, \ip\2 as a probability measure 
represents strictly an aggregate property relative to an ensemble of systems of the 
same kind. I maintain that one can take a single-case propensity interpretation of 
the potential ip such that its effect \ip\2 can be viewed as ascribing a property to a 
single system, as in line with the singular aspect of process causation. Once again, 
this drives home the relevance of the distinction between potentials and their effects.
1We shall see in Section 6.3 that being a locally conserved quantity requires \ip\2 to satisfy a 
continuity equation to the effect that the sum of the two terms corresponding to the time rate of 
change of \ip\2 and a probability current density defined in terms of ip is equal to zero. In order 
to ensure that the probability current density is not always equal to zero, ip must be a complex 
mathematical quantity.
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Third, as illustrated in the two-slit experiment, the way the probabilistic poten­
tials act at the source (or at least before the slits) depends on whether there “will be” 
measurements at the slit. This, I contest, is more reasonably expressed by maintain­
ing that the behaviours of the potentials depend on the entire situation from start 
to finish. This situational dependence of the behaviours of probabilistic potentials 
undermines the Schrodinger wavefunction as a causal process because of the wave- 
function’s differential nature that focuses on one event at any one time. A more 
suitable candidate for a causal process in quantum mechanics, as I argue (Section 
6.6), is via an integral approach to quantum mechanics that takes into account this 
essential situational aspect of probabilistic potentials, as we shall see in Chapter 7.
6.2 Process causation and Quantum Physics
As I remarked in the interlude (Section 4.6), the harmonious link between causa­
tion and continuity has suffered a brutal severance in the face of quantum mechanics 
when the notion of a continuous spacetime path becomes untenable. This is nowhere 
expressed as vehemently as by Ernst Cassirer in a discussion on “Causality and Con­
tinuity”2,
I f  one reflects once m ore on the evolution o f philosophical and 
physical thought, in  which the concepts o f causality and con­
tin u ity  are m ore and m ore welded together, i t  becomes under­
standable how difficult i t  m ust have been to rend asunder the 
bonds holding them  together. For this nothing less than the 
m ighty explosive o f the quantum theory was necessary. A nd in  
the m eantim e the belief that causality and continuity are in ­
dissolubly bound together and interdependently had taken such 
deep roots that an abolition o f this union was considered by 
the representation  o f the new view  as an abolition o f causality  
itself. The scission  which separated continuity fro m  causality
2Cassirer, E. (1956), p.163.
222
was considered fatal.
Fatality, I suppose, applies to both continuity and causality. Quantum considera­
tions point to every evidence that the dynamics of objects in the world is by its very 
nature a discrete one and discontinuity, having dethroned continuity, has assumed its 
rightful place as the ruling monarch of microphysical processes.
Continuity, inasmuch as it has been a beautiful concept adhered to, is now, in this 
cruel sense, dead and gone. Causality, which had all those times enjoyed a faithful 
partnership with it, has been naturally regarded by many to suffer the same terrible 
doom and has been driven to its demise.
The motivation of this chapter and the next stems from the somewhat grandiose 
hope of making sense of the concept of causality with respect to the quantum domain. 
While the attitude I take in the present work is optimistic, it is, however, not one 
without caution.
To assess the degree of devastation the teachings of quantum mechanics has 
brought to the well-entrenched traditional thoughts on physics and philosophy, we 
need examine, so to speak, the manner of the alleged death of continuity. We need 
to understand how exactly the formalism of quantum theory has introduced and en­
couraged the vision of discontinuity. We need to gain this understanding in order to 
be able to identify within the quantum formalism the degree to which the notion of 
continuity has failed. Only then are we entitled to make an informed judgement on 
whether causality may still be awarded a sensible meaning in the realm of quantum 
physics.
The process causal theories of Salmon and Dowe have contributed much towards 
formalising a precise relation between causation and physical processes within the 
classical setting. This is especially true of Salmon’s latest C onserved Quan­
tity  Theory with Transm ission  (CQT) and my proposed H istory  Conserved  
Q uantity Theory with Transm ission  (HCQT), where one sees in a clear manner 
the crystallization of the idea of transmission of causal influences via the continuous 
paths of objects in spacetime. These theories thus provide a solid platform for in­
vestigating the departure from the traditional views of causality under the regime of
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quantum mechanics.
As preluded in the opening section of the last chapter, a notion of continuity in 
terms of a spatiotemporally continuous course of some entity does exist in quantum 
mechanics. And indeed, it plays a crucial role in the usual formulations of the theory.
In particular, I have in mind the formulation of quantum mechanics in terms of the 
evolution in spacetime of the complex mathematical entity, the so-called wavefunction, 
according to the Schrodinger equation, as we have discussed in Section 5.2.
We note that the appeal to the Schrodinger dynamics of the wavefunction of 
a physical system has already been suggested in the writings of several critics of 
Salmon’s original 1984 process theory as the issue of spatiotemporal continuity was 
addressed. Amongst these, the critiques of Woodward3 and Forge4 axe most telling. 
Woodward, especially, proposes the treatment of a determinate probability distribu­
tion5 evolving continuously in spacetime as a causal process in line with Salmon’s 
theory6.
This idea of a wavefunction evolving in spacetime also finds its echoes in a recent 
collection of papers by Salmon on the subject7,
(a) I  do not believe that quantum indeterm inacy poses any particu lar  
problem s fo r  a probabilistic theory o f causality, or fo r  the m otion  
o f continuous casual processes. This quantum  indeterm inacy is, 
in  fact, the m ost compelling reason fo r  insisting  on the need fo r  
probabilistic causation.
In discussing the example of atomic transitions, Salmon says8,
(b) B ut in the absence o f outside influence, o f  that sort, i t  sim ply  
“tran sm its” the probability d istribution through a span o f tim e.
3Woodward, J. (1989).
4Forge, J.C. (1982).
5This is usually interpreted as the modulus square of the wavefunction.
6Woodward, J. (1989), p.376.
7Salmon, W.C. (1980b). Reprinted as a newly extended version with additional footnotes in 
Salmon (1998a). See (1998a), p.231, footnote n.19.
8ibid., p.227.
224
And on speaking about the system of the decaying atom9,
(c) ...the  case is analyzed as a semes o f causal processes, succeeding 
one another in tim e , each o f which transm its a definite probability  
distribution - a d istribution that turns out to give the probabilities 
o f certain types o f in teractions. Transm ission o f a determ inate  
probability distribution  is, I  believe, the essen tia l fu n ction  o f  causal 
processes with respect to the theory o f probabilistic causality.
As he further speculates10,
(d) Each transition  event can be considered as an in tersection  o f  causal 
processes, and it  is the se t o f probabilities o f  various outcom es o f  
such in teractions that constitu te the transm itted  d istribu tion ... While 
it  is true that the photon, whose em ission  m arks the tran sition  from  
one process to another, does not exist as a separate en tity  p rio r to  
its  em ission , it does constitu te a causal process from  that tim e on. 
The in tersection  is like a fork  where a road divides in to  tw o d istinct 
branches - indeed, it  qualifies, I  believe, as a bona fide in teractive  
fork. The atom  with its  em itted photons (and absorbed photons as 
well) exem plifies the in terplay o f causal processes and causal in ter­
actions upon which, it  seem s to me, a viable theory o f probabilistic  
causality m ust be built.
He is even more precise in his recent essay “Indeterminacy, Indeterminism and 
Quantum Mechanics”11,
Schrodinger introduced a wave equation to characterize the 
evolution o f a quantum mechanical system . W ith this equa­
tion  it  is possible to calculate the sta te  o f  the system  at a la ter
9ibid., p.227-228.
10ibid.
11 Salmon, W.C. (1998b), p.270-271.
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tim e , given its  sta te  a t an earlier tim e. Schrodinger}s equation  
establishes a determ in istic  relationship between the sta te  o f the 
system  at one tim e and its  sta te  at a la ter tim e. O f course , 
this la ter sta te  does not embody precise values fo r  both position  
and m om entum .
I think everyone would agree that the Schrodinger evolution of the wavefunction 
of a physical system, or the probability distribution it generates (as suggested by 
Salmon and Woodward) are natural choices to consider in the attempt to extend the 
notion of a spatiotemporally continuous process to the quantum realm.
6.3 The W avefunction and Conserved Quantity
We note from several of Salmon’s remarks (Section 6.2) his suggestion of a possible 
generalization of the process causal theory to the domain of quantum physics via the 
Schrodinger dynamics of the wavefunction ip. In particular, he maintains that the 
transmission of a definite probability distribution is the essential function of quantum 
causal processes. By a “definite probability distribution”, Salmon refers to, of course, 
the modulus square12 of the wavefunction ip, with its usual interpretation as the 
probability of finding a particle at a position x  upon a measurement carried out at a 
time t.
A number of comments are in order. The entity that undergoes transmission - that 
evolves in spacetime (according to the Schrodinger equation) - is not the probability 
distribution \ip\2 but ip13 itself. And so we have this picture: a quantum process ip 
transmitting a quantity \ip\2.
In order to qualify as a causal process a la H C Q T  (and CQT), the condition of 
the “transmission of a conserved quantity must be fulfilled. So if indeed transmission
12Mathematically, it is the modulus square of the wavefunction \ip\2 and not the wavefunction ip 
itself that represents the measure of probability.
13Following our arguments in the previous chapter, one conceives of some kind of probabilistic 
potentials (or propensities) that provide the physical system with the tendencies to manifest different 
values of a dynamical variable, whose relative frequencies in the distribution are the measures of the 
probabilities of the individual values being attained, ip may now be associated with such probabilistic 
potentials.
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is achieved by following a Schrodinger evolution and ifr is the quantity that evolves 
as so, then we are faced with the immediate task of showing: (1) \ip\2 (as a property 
of the system) is a conserved quantity and, (2) its dynamical evolution in spacetime 
does indeed satisfy the “at-af criterion of causal transmission. To my knowledge, 
this treatment is lacking in Salmon’s recent arguments and it is my hope to fill in the 
lacunae in this section.
We deal first with the issue of whether the quantity \'ip\2 may indeed be considered 
a conserved quantity.
Given that the wavefunction tj; is to be interpreted as a probability amplitude14
in relation to the location of a particle, the “motion” of rj) is closely related to the
motion of the particle in spacetime. It is useful, therefore, to introduce the concept 
of a probability density current to describe the flow of probability - to describe how 
probability changes in space and time.
Consider an infinitesimal region of space with volume dxdydz = dr and we denote 
the probability density - the probability per unit volume evaluated at a point r  at time 
t - to be p(r, t). The probability that a particle is located within this tiny region at 
time t is thus given by,
p(r, t)dr (6.1)
We must now impose the important condition that there is definitely one particle 
somewhere at time t,
J J jp (r ,t)d ,T  =  1 (6.2)
The integral is then to be taken over all regions where the particle might be found.
14The term “probability amplitude” is used in quantum mechanics to denote a quantity whose 
modulus square gives the probability measure.
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Since the probability density p(r, t) for finding the particle is proportional15 to 
|^ ( r ,t) |2, it follows therefore,
/  /  = 1 (6-3)
provided that particles are neither added nor removed. In other words, equation (6.3)
must hold true at all times and not just at t = to. Furthermore, the probability of
finding the particle over all spacetime regions must be conserved. In particular, if the 
probability of finding the particle in the same bounded region of space decreases as 
time goes on, then the probability of finding it outside of this region must increase 
correspondingly by the same amount. This implies that we may indeed define a 
probability density current j and show that the quantities j and p(j, t) together satisfy 
a continuity equation. This can be shown by examining the time rate of change of
dp .dip* N
i  =  ( - £ ) *  +  * * ( ■ £ )  (6.4)
Using the Schrodinger equation (5.11) in the form of,
S - <6-5>
Equation (6.5) is substituted into equation (6.4) to obtain,
I  = +^  T  (6 '6)
15We have taken p(r, £) =  |-0(r, t)\2. Strictly speaking, however, \ip(r, t)\2 is only proportional to 
p(r, t) if not for the condition we impose on ip(r, t) that if there is one particle at an initial time to, 
then J J £o)|2d r  = 1. For those ^ ’s that do not satisfy this condition, they can nevertheless be 
normalized (achieved by the multiplication by an appropriate constant) in order to be kept consistent 
with this condition.
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The last two terms cancel because the usual potential energy V  is a real multi­
plying function. The remaining two terms can be rearranged to give,
Tt = ~ (V ,W ! (6'7)
Thus, if the probability current density is defined as,
j =  "  ( V W 1  {6'8)
This would then result in the continuity equation,
%  +  V-j =  o (6.9)
This equation represents the general form whenever something is described by a 
density p (“so much” per unit volume), a current density j (“so much” per unit 
time per unit area perpendicular to the flow) and conservation, in the sense that 
our something is neither created nor destroyed. Generally speaking, equation (6.9) 
applies not only to quantum probabilities, but also to a diverse variety of situations 
like the flows of electric charge, gas or even traffic.
Examing carefully the expression for j  above (see equation (6.8)), we note that 'ip
is, by necessity, a complex quantity. For if it is a real function instead, then j would
always be zero.
In the above, the presence of a continuity equation is utilized as an indication of 
the existence of a conservation law. There are, however, two kinds of conservation 
laws: global and local ones, the distinction of which is of relevance to our discussion. 
To illustrate the difference between these two kinds of conservation laws, we take for 
instance the simple case of electric charge. The statement that the total charge in the 
universe is a constant (independent of time) is an example of a global conservation 
law. It implies that any decrease of charge in one region of the universe is compensated 
by an increase of the same amount of charge in another region at the same time. In 
particular, if these two are vastly separated spacelike regions, then this would mean
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action-at-a-distance. Non-local processes are thus sanctioned by global conservation 
laws per se.
Contrary to common thought, it is worth noting that aside from our demand that 
the probability of locating the particle in a region of space decreases as that in an 
adjacent region increases, there is no a priori logical requirement for the probability 
of locating a particle in a region of spacetime to obey both global and local conser­
vation laws. In particular, the probabilistic interpretation does not prohibit cases of 
global-and-not-local conservation. It makes perfect sense to ask if the probability of 
locating the particle in one region of spacetime is reduced, then does the probability 
of finding it in a region spacelike-separated from the first increase correspondingly? 
The complex character of ip appears to have been forced upon us by the demand to 
preserve the local conservation of its effect, the probability density \ip\2 (see equation 
(6.8) above). A net transport is also essential for the condition of transmission to 
be fulfilled, granted that the notion of transmission requires its subject to vacate a 
previous occupied location in spacetime to take up a different one.
To eliminate non-local effects, one needs also local conservation laws and these are 
expressible in terms of continuity equations that bear the form of equation (6.9). This 
equation is often used in hydrodynamics for a fluid of density P  and current j in a 
medium without source or sink?-6. To satisfy the condition of conservation locally, we 
take a small region of the fluid with a closed surface. The locality condition is then 
brought in by the consideration of the flux out of one volume (say 1) over this surface 
moving into an adjacent and neighboring volume (2) over the same surface (Figure 
6- 1).
The continuity equation is intended to capture this aspect of local conservation 
of a physical quantity: the flux coming out of one side of the surface immediately
16It is useful to introduce the concept “flux lines” or “streamlines” in such a context; these are 
directed lines (or curves) that indicate at each point the direction of a vector field. The flux of a 
vector field is analogous to the flow of an incompressible fluid such as water. Now for a volume with 
an enclosed surface found within the fluid, there will be an excess of outward or inward flow through 
the surface only when the volume contains, respectively, a source or a sink. That is, a net positive 
divergence indicates the presence of a source (a region where the flux lines originate) of fluid inside 
the volume, whereas a net negative divergence indicates the presence of a sink (where the flux lines 
terminate).
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Surface S
Figure 6.1: Flux lines “flowing” out of one volume (1) into a neighboring 
volume (2) over the same surface S.
passes through to the other side of the same surface. It is in this way that the 
spatiotemporal continuity in the motion of the flux lines is secured. Our interpretation 
of the probability of finding a particle somewhere in a region of spacetime as |^ |2 
leads to the continuity equation (6.7) with the V -terms being conveniently cancelled 
out. This continuity equation describes the local conservation of probability density.
Incidentally, the total probability for finding the particle anywhere in the universe 
is also a globally conserved quantity. This can be easily shown as follows,
(ip(t)l'ifi(t)) = ('ip(Q)\U](t)U(t)\ip(0)) =  constant (6.10)
constant = m  (ii(t)\x, y, z) (x, y , z\i>(t))dxdydz (6.11)
- / / /  <V’(*)|r><r|V'(*))rf3r (6-12)
= JJJ^< r ,t)^ (r ,t)d 3r - h i  P (r,t)d3r (6.13)
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We have thus arrived at the following situation. The quantity evolves in space­
time according to the Schrodinger equation but, as it does so, it transmits a conserved 
quantity |^ |2 that satisfies the condition of global as well as local conservation.
We need then to examine more closely the extent to which |^ |2 may be considered 
a dynamical property (like energy or momentum) possessed by the physical system, 
in the same manner as the acceleration (as the result of the action of an external 
force F) on a corpuscular mass is considered a proper dynamical property of it. We 
say that a particle in motion has or possesses an acceleration that is considered as a 
dynamical property17. So if in place of an external force, we have the probabilistic 
potential ^  operating on the particle, are we then allowed to attribute its “effect” - 
the probability density \i/j\2 of locating the particle upon a position measurement at 
a certain place - as a legitimate property possessed by the particle as similar to the 
case of acceleration?
Forces in classical physics are defined in terms of the effects (the accelerations) 
they produce on a point mass m  through Newton’s Second Law of motion, namely: 
F =  raa. Notice that here the potential (F) and its effect (a) on a physical object are 
treated in such a way that the potential is described by its effect, which represents a 
dynamical property that the mass m  has acquired due to the influence of (or via its 
interaction with) the potential. Moreover, a one-to-one correspondence exists between 
the potential and its effect so that the same potential always gives a unique value 
of acceleration ceteris paribus; even though the actual magnitude of the acceleration 
depends also of the value of the mass. In this circumstance, the potential is quantified 
in terms of its effect and no distinction is made between the two, at least on the level 
of mathematical treatment. The potential is what is postulated to be a reason for 
the particle to acquire the particular dynamical property in question. The crucial 
idea is that, in the presence of the manifestation of a potential, the possession of the 
dynamical property is characterized by the assignment of a unique numerical value
17The term property in physics refers to the values of some dynamical quantities lying in certain 
specified ranges. Classical physics makes the distinction between internal properties like mass or 
charge and external or dynamical properties such as position, velocity and acceleration whose nu­
merical values specify how the object appears in relation to the framework of space and time. For 
a nice discussion, see Isham, C.J. (1995), p.56ff.
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of this property to the physical system concerned. What is of importance is that the 
effect forms the contact point between the potential and the property acquired by the 
system due to the influence of this potential.
The requirement of possessing one unique numerical value for any dynamical prop­
erty poses potential difficulties when one comes to think about probabilistic systems. 
Given similar (and what, for all intent and purposes, may often be viewed as iden­
tically repeated) dynamical conditions such as the application of the same force in 
casting the same (unbiased) die for a great number of times, only one out of all six 
possible outcomes obtains in any one cast. It would seem, prima facie, in such cir­
cumstance that the same potential is capable of leading to six different values of the 
same dynamical property that corresponds to the orientation in space of the die. The 
one-to-one correspondence between the applied force and the orientation of the die 
seems to be absent in such a case. It is, however, possible to restore this one-to-one 
correspondence by resorting to the consideration of probabilistic potentials as we have 
done in our previous chapter18.
As we saw in the last chapter, working with six probabilistic potentials and six 
outcomes, the one-to-one correspondence between each potential and its associated 
outcome may now be restored, albeit in a retrospective manner. There is one and 
only one outcome for each trial and hence only one result is assigned to it. It is in 
this way that the probabilistic potentials (</>i,...,06) which is dependent on both the 
external applied force and the mass (i.e. an intrinsic property) of the die finds its 
manifestation in the dynamical property of the system, which in this instance is the 
spatial orientation of the die.
This granted, it would seem to follow that by the consideration of probabilistic 
potentials as the tendencies to produce mutually exclusive outcomes in a given situ­
ation, we can attribute genuine properties to the system. Every spatial orientation
18Instead of a material potential, our applied force, we speak about the six probabilistic potentials 
with each corresponding to the tendency of one face of the die showing in a trial. It is understandable 
that one might feel an unease towards this rather untangible and elusive concept of probabilistic 
potentials. One way of bringing one’s thought more at ease with the concept is to regard each one of 
these probabilistic potentials as taking account of the slightly varied initial conditions of the trials 
whose difference is practically immaterial. This way of viewing the probabilistic potentials gives 
more of a physical content to these potentials.
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that represents one face of the die is a genuine dynamical property (similar to that of 
position) of the die in much the same way as the different accelerations of the same 
mass produced by the different magnitudes of the applied force. Here, we have the dif­
ferent probabilistic potentials accounting for the differences in the spatial orientations 
of the die.
In the case of mechanical potentials, the effects get translated into the property 
on which it is exerting influence; these are the properties of the system that gets 
conserved. For instance, when acted upon by an applied force F, a mass m  acceler­
ates, this acceleration manifests as an increase in the conserved quantities (E, p) m 
possesses. It is already clear from this simple example that the potential is in a sense, 
something external to the system. It is tied closely to the variables x, p  that describe 
the state of the system but nonetheless, it is not the state of the system.
In quantum mechanics, this level of clarity seems to have been obscured by proba­
bilistic considerations. I would, however, argue that the basic structure is very similar 
and this hinges upon our interpretation of ip as a probability-generating potential.
Being granted the same level of ontological reality as mechanical potentials, ip, 
as a probability-generating potential is bound up intimately with the “particle” it is 
supposed to influence. Again, analogously to the mechanical sense, it is something 
that is, in a very loose manner of speaking, “external” to the system. Since 1^ 12 
makes the eventual contact with the dynamical properties of the system, it appears 
therefore, by analogy with the case of forces and accelerations, reasonable to regard 
\ip\2 as a property of particles like photons19.
6.4 The W avefunction as a Causal Process
I shall now argue that ip qualifies as a causal process a la H C Q T  on the basis that, 
(i) the quantum process ip constitutes a history and, (ii) it transmits a conserved 
quantity according to the “at-af criterion.
19Here, the probability distribution is revealed by the repeated measurements of an ensemble of 
photons rather than only one of them; and so strictly speaking, the distribution is a property of the 
whole ensemble rather than of a single system.
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rjj evolves continuously in spacetime according to the Schrodinger equation. One 
may consider this evolution as describing a continuous history in the sense that at 
each spacetime point, the modulus square of tp gives the probability of locating the 
particle at that point upon measurement.
Having decided that |-0|2 may be regarded as a property of a physical system 
and also that it is a conserved quantity, we now come to the second question of 
whether the “at-af criterion of causal transmission is satisfied. The essence of the 
“at-af criterion consists in the fact that the subject of transmission, in this case the 
conserved quantity |^ |2, is to be found at every spacetime point between two specified 
destinations (without intersections that involve exchange of a conserved quantity).
Indeed, the continuity equation20 (6.7) has furnished us with the information of 
\ip\2 at every spacetime point. Thus, the spatiotemporal evolution of \ip\2 fulfills the 
“at-af criterion of causal transmission.
However, transmission now takes the form of the possession of a probability dis­
tribution for a particle to be found at a location, defined at every spacetime point 
along each possible path between two specified destinations (the source and the de­
tection screen in the two-slit experiment for example). Formally, the possession of 
this conserved quantity should be achieved in the absence of intersections with other 
processes, which involve exchange of the same quantity. In regard to probability 
distributions, what might one refer to as an intersection and what would indeed con­
stitute an exchange?
Here, one is unable to speak about the trajectories of objects intersecting geo­
metrically, as there is no longer any meaning of a definite trajectory for the object. 
Instead, one now thinks of a certain probability associated with two causal processes 
to intersect. This probability manifests itself in changes in the probability distribu­
tions (e.g the weights of the different basis states) that may naturally be regarded as 
an indication that an exchange has taken place.
This granted, one must, however, be specific about the sort of intersections that
20This being a first-order differential equation serves the same purpose for \ip\2 as the Schrodinger 
equation does for ip.
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induce changes in probability distributions. This is a relevant consideration because 
there exists in quantum physics a very special class of intersections that changes 
the status of a physical system so drastically from being in a state of having no 
definite dynamical property (superposition) to one that does (eigenstate). These are 
intersections which constitute measurements on the system.
Because of its significant dominance in quantum phenomena, there is every reason 
to treat intersections that induce probability changes as falling into two categories: 
those that preserve the basic feature of superposition of probabilistic potentials and 
those that changes these superposing behaviours of the probabilistic potentials (mea­
surements). It is therefore appropriate to stipulate that the latter kind of intersections 
giving rise to changes in probability must be absent in a causal process in quantum 
physics.
6.5 The Problem atic W avefunction
The spatiotemporally continuous path followed by a particle is the paradigm of a 
causal process in classical physics. It is in virtue of the motion of the particle that 
conserved quantities like energy and momentum are carried along from one spacetime 
locale to another. These quantities are the causal influences that produce dynamical 
changes when the particle comes into interaction with another. Central to this picture 
of causation is the idea that there is the instantiation of a unique definite value of 
a conserved quantity at every spacetime point traversed by the particle during its 
motion. The definite instantiations of these conserved quantities are regarded as 
properties of the particle and these properties form part of the description of its 
state.
In the transition to quantum mechanics, the particle “loses its path”: one is no 
longer sanctioned to speak of the particle as traversing each and every point in- 
between two specified destinations in spacetime. The dire consequence that follows 
concerns, of course, the manner one is to think about the transmission of these con­
served quantities in the absence of a carrier travelling continuously in spacetime. This 
is where the notion of transmission, as essentially the causal connection in physical
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processes, reaches a blind alley. Without this important causal ingredient, one would 
feel compelled to expel the concept of causation from the quantum language.
Almost every effort to rescue what remains of causation from the quantum on­
slaught focuses on physical quantities that preserve the feature of spatiotemporal 
continuity. But this by no means a straightforward task. For the start, because of 
the need to satisfy local conservation as demanded by the condition of transmission, 
ip is, by necessity, a complex quantity. But this should not raise such an alarm as it 
often has done. For, strictly speaking, there is no restriction on a potential to be a 
mathematically real quantity, provided the effect it produces can be measured as a 
real quantity21. However, even accepting the fact that ^  is a complex quantity does 
not cause us immediate concern if the distinction between potentials and their effects 
is taken seriously as we have done, there are problems associated with \ip\2 (although 
as a real quantity) as a property of the system.
We have already discussed (Section 6.3) the sense in which \ip\2 can be considered 
as a conserved quantity transmitted by the wavefunction ip as it evolves continuously 
in spacetime. In place of the instantiation of a unique definite value of a dynamical 
quantity, one speaks of the instantiation of a definite probability distribution of dy­
namical values (upon a measurement) at every spacetime point. If there exists not 
a definite value of a previously recognized dynamical value at a particular spacetime 
point, in what right then are these distributions to be considered as a property of the 
system? To answer this question, as it turns out, we need to think more carefully 
about ip itself. Strictly speaking, \ip\2 gives only the probability of locating a particle 
at a position x  upon a measurement performed there. The reference to “probability” 
and “measurement” poses several difficulties. I will first address those in relation to 
probability.
There is one chief problem, much discussed in the voluminous literature on the 
subject, of |^ |2 being interpreted as a probability distribution and its being regarded 
as a property of a system. This is to do with the fact that probability measures are
21 One measures a classical mechanical force by the acceleration it produces on a physical system. 
The acceleration takes on a value given by a real number, but no corresponding restriction applies 
to the force itself.
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defined in terms of a long sequence of repeated trials or equivalently, of an ensemble 
of identical trials. A probability distribution then, at best, represents some kind of 
“aggregate ” property that manifests and reveals itself only in the the presence of a long 
sequence of repeated trials of an experiment or over identical experiments conducted 
on an ensemble of the same kinds of systems simultaneously. It is indeed with the 
very nature of such “aggregate” behaviours that statistical techniques deal. This 
is so whether one is dealing with probabilities in classical or quantum physics. In 
the classical experiment of the tossing of an unbiased coin, a distribution of “heads” 
and “tails” obtains only after a large number of repeated throws of the same coin 
(or throwing a large number of identical coins at the same time). In the two-slit 
experiment, the statistical distribution of the positions of the photons (the interference 
pattern) takes shape only after many photons have been deposited on the detection 
screen. In other words, the distribution is obtained not by the observation of one 
single photon, but a whole ensemble of them, as a result of the repeated firing of 
photons at the slits.
Generally speaking, then, it seems inappropriate to regard \ij)\2 as a property of 
any single individual member of the ensemble. It is apt to trace the roots of this 
difficulty to the classical frequency view of probability (as advocated by Von Mises22 
and codified in an axiomatic form by Kolmogorov23) to which the interpretation of 
|^ |2 adheres. According to these theories, probabilities are deemed meaningful insofar 
as long sequences of either repeated trials or repeatable conditions are concerned. 
And so the frequency interpretation of probability, which hinges upon the notion of 
repeatability, is often thought to render it meaningless to speak about the probability 
of a single trial.
For the frequentist there is no meaning in the pronouncement of a statement like 
“the probability of a single throw of an unbiased coin showing a head” , because it 
is strictly, with respect to the condition of repeatability, incorrect to give probability 
assignment to a single trial. Rather, we are primarily concerned with the situation
22Von Mises, R. (1963).
23Kolmogorov, A.N. (1950).
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where say, m  heads obtain over a long sequence of n trials of the throwing of the same 
coin. The probability of obtaining a head with respect to this sequence of experiments 
is —.n
The stringent requirement of repeatability is then taken to forbid the assignment 
of probabilities to single trials. Prom the perspective of the two-slit experiment, |^ |2 
signifies the probability of finding a particle at a certain location with respect to a 
long sequence of repeated deliveries of photons on the screen through the two slits. It 
does not, strictly, provide the probability of locating the particle in any one particular 
trial.
It has been a long-standing challenge for workers in the foundations of probability 
to try and make sense of singular probability statements. It remains a task no less 
significant for physics to tackle the analogous issue of the probability of a single event. 
This is of particular relevance in relation to the process causal theories of Salmon and 
Dowe that aim to provide a framework for singular causation; namely, to be able to 
speak about causation with respect to the ascription of properties to a single physical 
system such as an electron or a photon.
Of the various treatments that attempt to provide a meaning for singular probabil­
ities (popular mostly amongst the subjectivist types of interpretations of probability), 
I find Popper’s propensity theory attractive since it was put forward with a view of 
probabilities as an objective feature of the world by providing an underlying sub­
stratum for relative frequencies. All the more importantly, it is consistent with my 
interpretation of ip as a probabilistic potential. Let us now very briefly review the 
propensity theory.
Propensity, for Popper, represents a tendency to realize an event and such a ten­
dency is, according to him24, “inherent in every single throw25 ” And the connection 
of propensities and relative frequencies consists in the fact that26, “we estimate the 
measure of this tendency or propensity by appealing to the relative frequency of the
24Popper, K.R. (1990a), p .l l .
25In his discussion of the example of the probability for the event “two turning up” in the cast of 
a fair die.
26ibid.
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actual realization in a large number of throws; in other words by finding out how often 
the event in question actually occurs.”
And again27, “So, instead of speaking of the possibility of an event occurring, we 
might speak more precisely, of an inherent propensity to produce, upon repetition, a 
certain statistical average.”
With the notion of propensity, Popper introduced an objective theory of probabil­
ity based on two-tiers: the potentials for the system to realize certain results and the 
relative frequencies of the occurrences of the results that measure these potentials. In 
contrast, the traditional frequentist takes the “single-tiered” view: a sufficiently long 
sequence of trials giving rise to a distribution of a set of mutually exclusive outcomes 
and probabilities are equated to the limiting relative frequency of occurrences of these 
outcomes. They make no distinction between the series of outcomes and the manners 
in which they have been generated. The lack of consideration of this important con­
nection is the main inhibition of the frequentist view to the provision of a meaning 
to singular probability.
By appealing to propensities, Popper28 puts probability-generating potentials on 
a par with the more familiar types of potentials like physical forces. And even more 
compellingly29, “ The introduction of propensities amounts to generalizing and extend­
ing the idea of forces again.”
After all, one deals with physical situations where a die is thrown or a coin is tossed 
and inevitably, the outcomes are dependent on the particular physical situation under 
examination. A biased coin produces more instances of “heads” , for example, than 
a normal unbiased one. A die landing on a slotted surface would have a chance of 
having one of its edges rather than a face of it pointing upwards. In each of these 
examples, the effects - the “probabilities” - are parasitic upon the physical situation 
as a whole: the system and its environment. This is indeed an important observation 
by Popper30, “I  had stressed that propensities should not be regarded as properties
27ibid.
28ibid., p.12 .
29ibid., p. 14.
30ibid.
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inherent in an object, such as a die or a penny, but that they should be regarded as 
inherent in a situation (of which, of course, the object was a part). I  asserted that the 
situational aspect of the propensity theory was important, and decisively important for 
a realistic interpretation of quantum theory.”
Bearing a marked resonance with our already much discussed probabilistic poten­
tials, propensities give physical reality to each single trial: a potential or tendency 
to produce a certain result. But of course, it is worth emphasizing that for Popper’s 
propensities as well as for our probability-generating potentials, the measures of their 
“strengths” are by means of relative frequencies of the outcomes of an experiment in 
a retrospective manner.
As Popper has observed, propensities (as well as our probability-generating po­
tentials) are situation dependent and therefore should not be regarded as just the 
properties inherent in the objects themselves. We have already argued, in addition, it 
is the effects of the probability-generating potentials (or propensities) that find their 
manifestations in the dynamical properties of the physical objects that come under 
their influence. When an external force is applied to an object, the object acquires 
an acceleration (depending also, of course, on the mass of the object) that is to be 
treated as a legitimate property of the object. There exists a one-to-one correspon­
dence between the potential and the manifestation of its effect. Such a correspondence 
is, as we have maintained, crucial to the assignments of properties to a system since 
the manifestations of the effects of the potentials usually take the form of one single 
definite value of a dynamical variable. While the effects of the probability-generating 
potentials (or propensities) find their manifestations as properties in the object upon 
which they act, the probability-generating potentials (or propensities) themselves do 
not.
Likewise, in the scenario of die-rolling, the introduction of probability-generating 
potentials (or propensities) re-establishes this one-to-one correspondence, facilitating 
the assignment of a property to the system in terms of the manifestation of the effect 
of a particular probabilistic potential; even though the knowledge of this can only be 
inferred in a retrospective fashion.
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The outcome of each trial depends not only on the inherent symmetry of the 
die, for example, its being six-sided, but also on the conditions under which the 
throw is performed, such as in the presence of a strong gust of wind and a slotted 
surface for landing; these conditions invariably find their way into being the dynamical 
properties of the die, which in turn determine its twists and turns in space that lead 
to its eventual orientation.
So, after a long sequence of trials, one would then be able to make a claim that 
the potential <j>i has actually operated on the die, on every occasion that “face 1” 
of the die shows. On each of these occasions, the die acquires this property - its 
orientation with “face 1” showing - through the action of (f)\ alone and the one-to-one 
correspondence between the potential and its effect thus ensures the assignment of 
this property to the die.
Hence, the consideration of propensities or probability-generating potentials ren­
ders the assignment of a property (in the sense of one unique value of a dynamical 
variable) possible in every single trial (in each single throw of the die for example). 
In every trial, one and only one out of the six potentials has operated and this is the 
objective fact the knowledge of which is, however, not available to us a priori. It is 
also in this sense that the measures of these potentials - the probabilities in terms 
of relative frequencies - are considered objective probabilities. There is a physical 
process behind every trial that consists of a probability-generating potential and its 
respective result. The propensity theory therefore provides a basis for and serves well 
the purpose of considering singular probabilities.
This works in part because of the fact that in a classical probabilistic situation, 
once one of the “competing” potentials has become actualized (or crystallized), the 
others would be regarded as not having acted. Put differently, the propensities facing 
a physical system forms a mutually exclusive set.
Given the intimate relationship between the propensities and the dynamical prop­
erties of a physical system, one is rightly to regard the physical “state” of a system 
as encoding not only information about the internal properties such as its mass but 
also that of the effect (like acceleration in the case of mechanical potentials) of the
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potentials acting upon it.
In this sense, one regards the state of a system as a catalogue of its dynamical 
properties, both internal and external. Moreover, it only appears to be appropriate to 
see the state as a property of the system - a summary of all its internal and external 
attributes. But, of course, the assignments of the external attributes are possible 
given the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between the acting potential and 
its effect that manifests indeed as a dynamical property of the system.
In a similar vein, the wavefunction 0  of a physical system encodes information 
about both the internal and external properties of the system. Take for instance, the 
distribution of photons on the detection screen changes as a large multiple of slits 
are introduced. The change in the number of slits alters the possible potential routes 
of each photon, the consequence of which has found its manifestation in a different 
statistical distribution.
The decision of whether one may also, as in the classical case, regard *0 as appro­
priately a property of the system (in the loose sense of being the tendency to produce 
a probability distribution |0 |2) depends largely on the existence of a one-to-one cor­
respondence between the propensity and its effect. It transpires that if the photons 
are measured and tracked down in order to find out from which slit they have each 
emerged, this one-to-one correspondence exists. However, when such observations are 
performed, we recover the “classical case” of a “definite trajectory” for each photon31, 
but at the expense of the vanishing of the interference pattern obtained when no such 
observation is carried out.
The dependence of the one-to-one correspondence on acts of observation of the 
photons has cast serious doubts on whether |0 |2 ought indeed be regarded as objec­
tively a real property of the system. We shall now address the issue of measurement 
in relation to the interpretation of |0 |2.
Granted that our classical intuition tells us for any quantity associated with a 
system to be considered a legitimate property of it, the quantity must be possessed by
31 Each has given rise by a separate probabilistic potential that forms the member of a mutually 
exclusive set.
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it. Possession is to mean that a definite value of that attribute can be assigned at each 
spacetime point (although the actual value may vary from one point to another) along 
the trajectory of the system regardless of whether a measurement is to be performed 
on it or not. The possession of a property in the classical sense forms an objective 
element of reality. In quantum mechanics, the possession of a classical dynamical 
property by a physical system is complicated by the fact that it can only be said to 
possess such a property, in the sense that there is one definite value of that quantity 
at every point of its spacetime path, only when it is measured. The possession of a 
dynamical property no longer has an objective reality that is divorced from the very 
acts of measurement.
The best way to understand how our acts of observing a physical system change 
the “state” of it (speaking in a figurative manner) is to turn again to the two-slit 
experiment, Figure 6-2.
o
Source
Without 
measurements 
at the slits
O
Source
Detectors
With 
measurements 
at the slits
Figure 6.2: The changes in the final observed photon distribution as measure­
ments of the positions of the photons are carried out at the slits.
We have seen how strikingly different the behaviours of photons can be under the 
two scenarios of “with measurement’ and “without measurement’ at the slits and the
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With Measurement 
Distribution of photons shows no inter­
ference pattern.
Indicates that the sum-rule of probabil­
ity is obeyed and the outcomes form a 
mutually exclusive set.
A mutually exclusive set implies that 
there exists a one-one correspondence 
between each operating potential and its 
effect, which in turn means that the po­
tentials also form a mutually exclusive 
set.
Definite trajectories for the photons re­
sult.
Without Measurement 
Distribution of photons shows an inter­
ference pattern.
Indicates that the sum-rule of probability 
is violated and the outcomes no longer 
form a mutually exclusive set but one 
that is exhaustive.
An exhaustive set makes possible the si­
multaneous actions of all the potentials.
No definite trajectory for the photons.
Table 6.1: Differences in the two scenarios of “with measurements” and “without 
measurements” at the slits in the double-slit experiment.
results are summarized and laid out in Table 6-1.
Without any measurement of the positions of photons at the slits, one obtains a 
distribution of photons on the detection screen showing the distinctive characteristic 
of interference and under such circumstance, it is concluded that the probability- 
generating potentials form not a mutually exclusive but a set whose members are in 
operation simultaneously. In this case, there cannot be an assignment of a definite 
trajectory for a photon.
On the contrary, if there is an attempt of observation of the position of the photons 
by devices situated close to each of the two slits, that would result in a distribution 
of photons that obtains, which agrees with the supposition that each photon has 
followed a definite trajectory all along right from the very moment it was emitted at 
the source. In addition, this would mean that the probability-generating potentials 
do not operate together.
The logic central to this argument is as follows: the two modes of behaviours of the 
probabilistic potentials - whether they act independently but simultaneously or act in
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a mutually exclusive fashion - depends on two different situations. These correspond 
respectively to the presence and absence of detection devices set at the slits to observe 
the passage of photons. It may now be argued that a “future” event (with respect to 
the time of emission of a photon by the source) can take an active part in shaping the 
actions of the probabilistic potentials that are to govern the “fate” of the photon. In 
particular, with observations conducted at the slits, the distribution of photons that 
has the characteristic of a set of mutually exclusive potentials describes a reality as if 
the photons had all along followed a definite prescribed trajectory once it is emitted 
from the source.
In contrast, when no attempt whatsoever is made to observe the passage of pho­
tons, the “interfering” distribution of photons, which reveals the characteristics of an 
exhaustive set of probabilistic potentials acting in concert, leads to the description of 
an alternative reality as if  there were no definite trajectory, for the photon right from 
their emission from the source.
6.6 Towards Feynman’s Paths
An important observation emerges. Because of the fact that this seeming dependence 
on the entire physical situation inevitably encompasses events that occur at different 
times (for instance, the observation of the passage of photons as a “later” event in 
relation to the “earlier” emission event at the source) for quantum phenomena, our 
formulation must take into account the overall influence of events at more than one 
time on the behaviours of the probabilistic potentials; rather than one that pays 
attention to the separate influence of an event at each time on those potentials.
In the language of mathematics, this is tantamount to saying that an integral 
formulation of quantum mechanics is more revealing than a differential one. This 
is by no means trivial for it gives us an ontology in which it is the entire physical 
situation consisting of a system and its environment that shapes the behaviours of 
the probabilistic potentials (with the probabilistic potentials ip representing not only 
the system but also its environment). One thinks no longer of ^  els something that 
attaches solely to the photon and that its mere function is to represent the state and
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evolution of the photon, quite independent of everything else.
This view of ip releases one’s thought from the conceptual difficulties associated 
with the conventional view that ip is describing only the system, because the wave- 
function ip is now conceived as something that does not merely describe the system 
alone but rather, is dependent on the system and its environment - the situation as 
a whole, ip does, however, find its manifestations in the dynamical properties of the 
system through its effect \ip\2.
We may now extract the following essence concerning the nature of ip. (I) ip 
represents the set of probability-generating potentials that acts upon a physical system 
like an electron or a photon, (2) ip is essentially periodic and, (3) ip depends on the 
entire situation (both on the system and its environment).
Treating ip as a, propensity has resolved for us the problem associated with the en­
semble interpretation. One may now speak about ip, the superposition of probability- 
generating potentials, as operating on each individual system. It has already been 
pointed out that when the situational aspect is put into focus, ip is most perspicu­
ously represented in an integral rather than a differential formulation. Moreover, also 
because of the dependence on the system’s environment, ip has to be relieved from 
being conceived as a wavepacket that is solely tied to the system itself.
To accommodate this all-encompassing nature of ip, we need a formulation which 
“tunes-down” the emphasis on ilwavepackets as particles” - the direct identification of 
the wavepacket (as mathematically represented by the wavefunction ip) as the particle 
itself.
Tying too tightly the motion of a particle with the continuous advancement in 
spacetime of the wavefunction has also the unfortunate consequence of leading to 
picturing a shift in the behaviours of the potentials (which is my version of what is 
generally called “wavefunction collapse”). Imagine the scenario of low photon density 
in the two-slit experiment (i.e. one photon passes through the apparatus at one time). 
One first observes the distribution of photons on the detection screen that shows in­
terference characteristics. By placing devices at the slits to track the photons, the 
distribution changes to one in which the interference disappears. If the wavefunction
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describes the motion of a photon as some form of a localized manifestation of a “phys­
ical wave” (in the usual sense of waves), one is compelled to describe the “change” 
in the behaviours of the probabilistic potentials as corresponding to the change as 
experienced in the physical situation (the introduction of the devices).
The distribution with interference indicates that the photon is subjected to a 
superposition of probabilistic potentials and hence nothing may be said of it having 
a well-defined trajectory before it reaches the detectors located at the slits. As one of 
these two detectors is triggered (indicating the registration of a photon), one of the 
two superposing potentials would have then become realized while the other would 
have failed to act, to account for an observed distribution that shows no interference! 
And it is therefore, to be concluded that once the position measurement is carried out 
to locate the photon at the slit, a change from the scenario where those propensities 
superpose to another after observation at the slits where one and only one of the 
propensities operates. Schematically, all these may be neatly summarized by the 
“time-line” in Figure 6-3.
One is then led naturally to puzzle over how the act of observation selects or 
lisingle-ouf one particular potential and “dis-associates” its action from that of the 
rest of the superposition. This is the familiar territory of the topic of wavefunction 
collapse. Measurement is thus granted a very special status - this is the very event 
that is held primarily responsible for the change, which takes place between the two 
modes of behaviours of the probabilistic potentials.
The problem is encountered when the wavefunction is viewed as a representation 
of the state of the photon and no more than that. This view of a wavefunction 
immediately points to the usual differential approach, which describes the continu­
ous spatiotemporal motions of particles in the classical context. However, a better 
perspective can be gained from an integral approach that incorporates a sequence 
of events together. One may wonder at this point that given the integral approach 
serves, in most classical cases, as an alternative view of describing the dynamics of 
the system to the differential view and that both views are deemed equivalent, does 
it not make our argument for the integral view mere verbal gibberish?
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S o u rce
Two
Slits
Final
O b serv a tio n
to t s  tc tF
Superposition One potential
"C hange"
J
to tc tF
Superpostion of 
an exhaustive set 
of potentials
One potential 
(behaves "as if" it comes 
from a mutually 
exclusive set
Figure 6.3: The chronology of “wavefunction collapse” in the two-slit experi­
ment.
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I would argue that it does not. In the context of quantum mechanics and in 
light of the view that the wavefunction is situation dependent, the integral approach 
provides far more insights into what is happening. In particular, there is this fallacy: 
the hypothesis that the probabilistic potentials are in a state of superposition before 
it reaches the detector is a testable and hence, in Popper’s words, a falsifiable one. 
Why is that so? One usually supposes that without the detectors at the slits, the 
photons are propelled by potentials that organize them into an interference pattern 
and as soon as detectors are activated at the slits, the interference effect is no longer 
present. It is then deemed reasonable to conclude, as has often been argued, that 
before the photons reach the detectors, they would have been propelled by potentials 
in a superposition. But the crux of the matter remains: only those photons travelling 
through the apparatus before the activation of devices at the slits are found to exhibit 
interference, which evidences the fact that those photons are subjected to the action of 
a set of superposing probabilistic potentials. However, once the devices are activated, 
they influence only those later photons that reaches the detectors from that very 
moment on and these photons behave “as i f  they are emitted into definite trajectories 
leading from the source to one of the slits.
Two Final
S o u rc e  S |its  O b serv a tio n
I----------1—I--------------------- 1
to t s  td tF
Mutually exclusive set
Superposition
Figure 6.4: No “wavefunction collapse”!
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It is therefore to be concluded that the influence of the observations of photons 
at the slits not only affects affairs at that spacetime point but also has far-reaching 
influence on the state of play of an extended spacetime region stretching from where 
the source is situated to the location of the slits. It changes not only the behaviours 
of the propensities at one point but also that in an extended spacetime region. And 
this is the crucial point.
This again suggests that integral approaches, based on the focus of a sequence of 
events as a whole rather than on attention to each event within the sequence at a 
time, seem to be the most appropriate tool for studying quantum phenomena.
To be sure, it is important to note it is not my claim that the appeal to integral 
approaches would help to explain away or even resolve the problems of measurement 
and wavefunction collapse. Needless to say, a proper treatment of these topics is 
far beyond the scope of the present work. Rather, I wish to point out that integral 
approaches do help to focus on the situational aspects of quantum phenomena; it 
highlights the amazing effects the mere observations of position (in terms of local­
ization measurements) have on the behaviours of the probabilistic potentials in an 
extended spacetime region and not just that at a specific spacetime point.
Our strategy is now clear. We need to free ourselves from the burden of a too 
intimate bond between the wavefunction ip and the particle that ip is supposed to 
describe. A more general view of the quantity ip should be adopted to take full 
recognition of the situational aspect in the description of quantum phenomena. In­
deed, it is even advisable to abandon altogether the use of the term “wavefunction” 
that is understood as governing the evolution of a particle in spacetime in a differen­
tial manner. We should, however, retain and work with its most vital essence: the 
probability-generating potentials.
In place of the wavefunction ip, an alternative to a causal process is sought with 
an emphasis on the following features: (1) the periodic nature of the probability- 
generating potentials, (2) the accommodation of a set of exhaustive alternatives in 
addition to a mutually exclusive set and, (3) the situation dependent aspect in quan­
tum phenomena and, (4) the ability to speak about the probability of a single system.
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Fortunately, such an approach does exist and is widely used today as an important 
tool in theoretical physics. It is the Path Integral Formulation of Quantum Mechanics, 
as put forward by Richard Feynman in his 1942 doctoral dissertation. In the next 
chapter, we shall first give an exposition of the formulation and then conclude with 
a discussion of how this approach may bear on the notion of a causal process in the 
quantum-mechanical setting.
6.7 Postscript: Bohmian Quantum M echanics
However, I should conclude this chapter with a brief postscript on how, as some may 
think, that David Bohm’s version of quantum mechanics can fit in with the process 
causality view. I also explain why I have chosen not to enter into an extensive 
discussion of the Bohmian formulation.
Bohm recasts the Schrodinger formulation of quantum mechanics in a form32 that 
permits one to consider the motion of a particle being subjected to two kinds of po­
tentials33: the usual classical potential energy V  and the so-called quantum potential 
U. The quantum potential produces highly non-classical effects and is thus responsi­
ble for the quantum behaviour of the particle in question (interference effects in the 
double-slit arrangement for example).
We are therefore presented with a picture in which a “guiding” quantum potential 
U that acts on the particle and propels its motion through spacetime. In particular, 
Bohm’s formulation provides the virtue that once the initial position xq has been 
specified, the trajectory x(t) is uniquely determined. In regard to the ontological 
picture Bohm offers, Cushing comments34,
A ll o f  the m athem atical details aside, what B ohm  did was to
32Bohm begins with non-relativistic Schrodinger equation, which is taken as given and not derived, 
and he defines the wavefunction ip in terms of two real functions R  and S  such that ip =  Rexp (^ ) .  
Taking \ip\2 as P, he was able to arrive at a continuity equation in the form of equation 6.9, which 
then allows the interpretation of P  (=  \ip\2) as the probability density for the distribution of particles. 
See Cushing, J.T. (1994), Appendix 1.1, p.61.
33The term potential used here in the context of Bohmian quantum mechanics should not be 
confused with the probability-generating potentials that have been introduced earlier.
34Cushing, J.T. (1994), p.43.
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take the Schrodinger equation, which has the fo rm  o f  a wave 
equation and hence naturally invites a wave (or perhaps, a 
w ave-particle) in terpreta tion , and re-expressed it  in  a fo rm  
sim ila r to N ew ton’s second law o f m otion , which naturally in­
v ites a particle in terpreta tion  in term s o f trajectories.
It seems, prima facie, that particles having definite trajectories within the Bohmian 
framework provide just the right paradigm for causal processes in quantum mechanics. 
For, one expects a well-defined particle trajectory would somehow render the notion 
of at-at transmission of causal influences meaningful on the quantum level. Bohmian 
trajectories thus look the right kind of analogue we seek for a causal process (a la 
H CQ T) in the quantum realm.
Despite the nice and simple ontology that Bohmian quantum mechanics offers, 
there are, however, features of the formulation that discredit it from being the most 
appropriate candidate for a quantum causal process. We shall here consider two that 
have caused worries for the Schrodinger wavefunction 'ip to become quantum causal 
processes.
First, I address the issue of probability. The interpretation of |^ |2 intended by 
Bohm as the probability density of particles is not meant to be inherent in the concep­
tual structure, but merely as a result of our ignorance of the precise initial conditions 
of the particles. This is similar to the case of random walks followed by particles in 
Brownian motion. However, when it comes to the consideration of probabilities, one 
still deals with an ensemble of particles. For Bohm, the quantum potential is not 
a superposition of probability-generating potentials, and the probabilistic interpreta­
tion of |^ |2 remains a classical one in that the probability-generating potentials forms 
a mutually exclusive set (as particles are presumed to have well-defined trajectories). 
It fails to capture that quantum mechanics is an inherent probabilistic theory and 
the important essence of the quantum behaviours of probability-generating poten­
tials, namely, their simultaneous actions on the physical system, which I maintain is 
of fundamental significance.
Second, with its differential nature, the formulation is not well placed for the
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consideration of events that occur in extended spacetime regions.
As a consequence of these issues, even though the Bohmian formulation provides 
a coherent transition from the classical to the quantum motion of a particle, it lacks 
the ability to incorporate the simultaneous behaviours of probability-generating po­
tentials at the fundamental level. Moreover, the emphasis of the situational aspect 
of quantum phenomena, which involves the consideration of events at more than one 
time, is much hindered by its differential nature. I therefore conclude that Bohmian 
quantum mechanics remains subordinate to the Feynman Path-Integral approach, 
which as we shall see in the next chapter, allows ones to incorporate the simultane­
ous actions of the probability-generating potentials at a fundamental level; and its 
integral structure accommodates most naturally the consideration of events at more 
than one time.
Chapter 7
Feynm an’s Path Integrals 
(Sum -Over-Histories) Formulation  
of Quantum M echanics and Causal 
Processes
7.1 Introduction
In view of the conceptual problems associated with the interpretation of the wave­
function 'ip, and also because of the fact that the descriptions of quantum phenomena 
require the consideration of events at different times, Chapter 6 concluded that an 
integral approach to the formulation of quantum mechanics (which takes into account 
the situational aspects of probability-generating potentials) might provide a more ap­
propriate setting than the usual Schrodinger differential approach for the extension 
of the notion of a causal process to the quantum realm. Such a scheme - the Feyn­
m a n ’s P a th  Integral F orm ulation  o f  Q uantum  M echanics  - is discussed in 
the present chapter.
To appreciate the full impact of Feynman’s approach, we must first come to gain 
some familiarity, in Section 7.2, with the role of the Principle of Least Action in 
classical mechanics. There, we learn how a classical system picks its one trajectory 
between two locations in spacetime out of the many that are presented to it with the 
help of the calculus of variations.
Feynman’s Path Integral approach takes full advantage of the semantics of 11 all
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possible paths” that are presented to a physical system. These “possible paths” are 
construed as the different alternative configurations for the dynamics of the system, 
and this is where the formulation makes contact with probabilistic considerations. 
The rationale behind this approach is discussed in Section 7.3.
The Path Integral approach is then introduced in Section 7.4, where we shall show 
in details the procedure of “ summing-over-all-paths” to obtain the overall probabilis­
tic potential that operates on the system. I then conclude in Section 7.5 that the 
probability amplitude generated by the “sum-over-all-paths” in Feynman’s approach 
may be regarded as a quantum causal process in the spirit of H CQ T.
Finally, I summarize the main theses of Chapters 5 to 7 in Section 7.6.
7.2 The Principle of Least Action
Before embarking on an exposition of Feynman’s formulation, it is instructive to 
consider first the Principle of Least Action in relation to classical mechanics. This 
enables us to compare and contrast in a fruitful manner its use in classical mechanics 
with the principle as applied to quantum mechanics.
The Principle of Least Action first came to acquire a mathematical definite form in 
the hands of Euler and Lagrange. We shall now introduce the principle by considering 
the simple case of a classical particle of mass m  moving along one-dimension under a 
potential V(x). According to Newton’s Second Law,
cPx dV 
m dfi  =  (7-1}
Given the initial values of the position and velocity of the particle, we are able to 
calculate similar quantities for a later time t + A t  and the process may be repeated 
to “inch” forward to a still later time t +  2A t and so forth. The rationale behind 
this differential approach is that being in a definite position with a definite velocity 
constrains the particle to one particular motion along one trajectory in spacetime.
An equally valid way to formulate the problem is to ask: given that the particle is
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at positions Xi and Xf at times U and t f  respectively, what is there to distinguish the 
actual trajectory xci(t) from all other trajectories or paths that connect these points? 
Under the terrain of determinism - in the crudest form, the thesis that dynamical 
data given at an earlier time completely determine those at a later time - this seems 
a question that is easily tackled. It is because the actual trajectory is constrained by 
the initial data given. This constraint serves to select the actual path from all other 
possible ones that the particle would have followed if given different sets of initial 
data. This is the usual differential approach to the problem. On the other hand, the 
integral approach is global in nature in the sense that it attempts to determine in 
one stroke the entire trajectory Xd(t), in contrast to the local approach that concerns 
itself with the particle’s plan of action in the next infinitesimal stretch of time.
At this point, it seems a sheer matter of preference for one to adopt either the 
differential or integral approach to the problem. But a significant advantage of integral 
approaches over that of differential ones has already emerged even in the domain of 
classical physics. It is a necessity for the differential approach to introduce special 
point coordinates to maintain the correct bookkeeping of the motion of the particle in 
the next infinitesimal spacetime point. Its exact formulation depends heavily on the 
choice of coordinates and can usually get, in a technical sense, rather complicated and 
cumbersome. Whereas in the integral approach, one deals with the “comparisons” of 
the magnitudes of actions (as measures of motion) of the possible paths and differences 
in the magnitudes are invariant with respect to any system of coordinates.
In the integral approach, the motion of a particle is seen to be constrained by 
events at more than one time. Given the events that the particle is at position Xi 
at U and Xf at tf, it must have had certain definite (although we are not interested 
in their individual respective values) velocities to enable it to get from Xi to Xf in 
the time interval t f  — U. In other words, it must have taken up specific positions in- 
between those two end-points and with specific velocities during the interval in order 
to move from one point to another in the prescribed time. The emphasis here is placed 
not on these individual values but rather on the path as an entirety. Take for instance 
the “crossed-over” point M  in Figure 7-1 that belongs to both the actual trajectory
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and another possible candidate (a). This piece of information alone is not useful at 
all in telling the actual path from the rest, for it can either be part of the actual 
motion or that of the virtual motion (a) . Likewise, it is equally non-illuminating and 
un-helpful if even a greater number of individual “crossed-over” points such as X, Y  
and Z  are specified. In the integral approach where one focus on the path as a whole, 
any local information in regard to an individual spacetime point becomes redundant 
as any of these points may appear on the course of more than one path.
" " N
(XI,tl)
Actual motion
"Virtual" motion
------------  "Virtual" motion (b)
Figure 7.1: ’’Possible motions of a particle between two specific spacetime
points.
Disregarding the individual intermediate spacetime points, what other means may 
one fall back on in order to distinguish the actual path of the particle between two 
specific points?
We find a useful hint in this original idea of minimum principles: Nature favours 
the one motion with the minimum expenditure of effort. It transpires that the phrase 
“expenditure of effort” has already appeared in the context of the familiar notions of 
“work” and “energy”. When one speaks of an expenditure of some kind, one refers 
to a specific amount of a certain quantity. When an external force F  is applied to a 
mass m  and the latter is moved through a distance ds from point A  to point B , the
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“effort” of F on m  is then quantified by the notion of 11 work done”, dW 1, by F. This is 
represented mathematically by the expression: W  =  f^F-ds. W  is a scalar quantity 
(it does not depend on direction) that describes the entire motion: the traversal of 
the distance ds by m  under the influence of F. In this sense, W  is a “global” quantity 
that refers to the path as a collective whole. In particular, it is futile to speak about 
the work done at an isolated spacetime point.
The concept of work thus forms the link between the abstract phrase “expenditure 
of effortV and the physical notion of energy in the following manner. Given F =  mr, 
by Newton’s Second Law,
F-dr = r a f f  r-dr = % f f  ± (i-r )d t  (7.2)
Since r r  =  v2, with v being the scalar magnitude of the velocity of the particle. It 
follows, therefore,
r B  1 r v  2 1 1
W =  F-dr = -m  I d(v2) = -m v 2 — -m v \. (7.3)
J a  2  J v  i  2  2
The above equation shows that the work W  done in moving the mass m  from 
location A  to B  is equal to the kinetic energy {\m v2) acquired by the system. So the 
“work done” by the force is “turned” into a kind of mobile (kinetic) energy of the 
object that is being moved. To make the correspondence more precise, it is reasonable 
to conceive of the work W  as the dissipation of some form of energy and the loss of 
this energy is exactly compensated by the gain in kinetic energy by the mass m. 
Denoting this diminution of energy by the quantity —dV, we have,
-d V  = dW = F-s 
dV = -F -s
1 Strictly speaking, the work done is not just equal to “force times distance” as often stated.
Rather, it is the “component of force along the path times the path length”, since force is a vector 
quantity with its effects depending on the direction of its application.
Provided that the quantity F-s is a perfect differential, there exists a function V  
that depends only upon the initial and final positions of the system, which is inde­
pendent of the actual path taken between these positions2. V  is called the “potential 
energy” and is defined for every point in space.
To be precise, it is the difference A V  in the potential energy between two space­
time points that is independent of path and this difference finds its way into an 
increase (which is also in the form of a difference) in the total kinetic energy of the 
particle in its traversal from one point to another. It is indeed the total differences 
of both kinds of energies at each intermediate spacetime point of each path that are 
path independent (the velocities of the particle may differ), and this accounts for the 
fact that some paths require the particle to take a longer time to traverse given the 
same total amount of energy.
The brief digression has led us to this important clue: the concept of energy may 
be employed as our means to distinguish the actual path of a particle’s motion from 
all other possible ones. The quantity we shall work with is, however, not the total 
energy but rather a quantity that corresponds to the difference between the kinetic 
and potential energies at each point along a path.
We shall now explain how the actual path followed by the particle is to be distin­
guished mathematically by the integral method.
One starts by first defining some quantity for each tentative path that is used 
for comparison. This quantity is the function £, called the Lagrangian and given by 
C = T  — V, where T  and V  are the kinetic and potential energies of the particle. 
Since the kinetic and potential energies depend on x and x  respectively, it follows 
that C is a function of both of these quantities.
Having defined the quantity £  for comparison, one must, for each tentative path
2This is only true if in the ideal case where there is no other means of dissipation of potential 
energy (like “heat” to the environment), except for its being converted solely into the kinetic energy 
of the mass.
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x(t) connecting the endpoints (xi,U) and (x /,t/), compute the action <S[x(t)] of the 
path according to the following expression,
«S[rc(t)] =  f  f C(x,x)dt (7.5)
J ti
S  is a function of the entire path and so depends on the function x(t). This 
dependence of S  on another function (£) makes S  a function of a function and the 
special name functional is introduced to denote this fact. It ought to be stressed 
that <S depends not just on the value of x  at some time t. To give the favour of a 
functional, we consider the following.
In Figure 7-2, we consider three different paths A, B  and C, connecting the two 
endpoints (a;*, U) and (a:/, tf),  that the particle could have traveled along. For each of 
the three curves, there is a position x  as well as a velocity x  for the particle at each 
point along the curve. These data generate the three “base” curves Ca , Cb and Cc 
in the three plots (a), (b) and (c) respectively (these curves3 are not replicas of the 
original curves A , B  and C  given that the latter all lie in three-dimensional space and 
time). There is to every point on the curves Ca , Cb and Cc a value corresponding to 
the Lagrangian C. The collection of values forms the curves Ca , Cb and Cc- In other 
words, at every point {x,x), there corresponds a number that gives the Lagrangian 
at that point since the £ ’s themselves are functions of x  and x.
The functionals S a , S b  and Sc  may now be calculated for each of the paths 
(Figures 7-2 and 7-3), bearing in mind that each point on the curves Ca, Cb and Cc 
is itself a function of x , x  and t. The values of S a , S b  and Sc  are then obtained by 
the familiar summation procedure of finding the area under a curve - the Riemann 
integral method. The value of each of these areas corresponds to the functionals S a , 
S b  and Sc  respectively. It is obvious that the value of S  is determined by the overall 
shape of the entire curve C and not just by selected points on C.
With values of the action S  computed for each path, we can now compare these
3The specification of a particle’s motion by its position and velocity (rather than position and 
time) generates a curve in phase-space instead of the three-dimensional real space.
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C /
B
S a S b Sc
Lc
(x\x)
Figure 7.2: Graphical illustration of the notion of a functional.
L a (x ' ,x )
0
ti tf
L b  ( x \ x )
S b
0
ti tt
t
Lc (x',x)
ti tf
Figure 7.3: Graphical illustration of the notion of a functional.
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values by imposing the criterion that the classical path is the one whose action has 
the minimum value. We are to find out for which curve the value of S  is the least.
The calculus of variations exempts us from the seemingly impossible chores of 
having to compute the action for every single path connecting the two spacetime 
points4. This is rendered possible by the crucial observation that for the true path 
- the one with the minimum action - no change in the value of the action would be 
experienced by another path that differs from this path only by a tiny amount, so 
that in the first order, there is no difference in the values of the actions.
One thus starts with the postulation of a true classical path xT(t) (although un­
known) describing the motion of the particle. And to xT(t), a “small” fluctuation or 
variation 77(t) would take us to a very closely neighboring path: x(t) = xT(t) + r)(t). 
The action of this neighboring path can be obtained by the substitution of x(t) into 
the expression for <S,
w :  m
Multiplying out the quadratic term and expanding the V-term as a Taylor series gives,
5  -  / I ? f f . 7 )
Re-arranging and leaving only terms up to the first order in equation (7.7) then yields,
f t2rm ,d x T.0 Tr/ . dxT dn __#/
The first two terms in equation (7.8) correspond to the action S T for the true 
path xT and so the remaining two terms may be regarded as the difference 5S in the 
actions of the true and varied paths respectively,
s s = f y d- w T t - i iv i{ x r ) ]d t  ( r -9)
4In principle, there exists no limit for the number of paths that may connect two points in 
spacetime and that would mean one has to engage oneself in an arduous task of computing and 
comparing a potentially infinite number of actions.
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The ingenuity of the method consists in the very fact that even though the form 
of xT still remains unknown at this stage, but since by definition, its action ST is 
a minimum; any variation in ST would then be in the first order. This means that 
the expression SS above must be zero, regardless of whatever value rj assumes. The 
question is therefore reduced to how one may make the integral in equation (7.9) 
above zero.
The integration of the first term in the above expression may be carried out by 
the procedure of “integration by parts” . Recall that,
Sf% = n f -  Snidt
With /  =  r a ^ ,  equation (7.9) then becomes,
SS = f  2[ro^[r/(t)]£  -  J 3 j ( m ^ ) r ] ( t ) d t  -  J  \ ( t ) V '( x T)dt (7.10)
J ti at J ti at at J t\
Conveniently, the (first) integrated term in equation (7.10) vanishes because all paths
- the actual and the varied ones - share the same two end-points so that rj(ti) =
r](t2) =  0 .
The remaining terms may now be gathered together to arrive at,
SS' =  J  ^ -  V'(xt)]t](t)dt (7.11)
Although small in magnitude, the variation rj(t) is capable of taking any value. It 
may be as small as one would like so that the “varied” path stays very close to the 
actual one. It follows therefore that the only way to make SS' zero is by demanding 
the expression within the square brackets to be equal to zero,
~ m ~ d F  ~  V '^X t  ^ =  0
(7.12)
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=4- -  V {x T) =  (7-13)
And Equation (7.13) is none other than Newton’s Second Law F  =  ma.
We began with the observation that for S  to be a minimum, there ought to be 
no change in the action in the first-order for a nearby path that results when the 
actual path is varied by a minute amount rj(t) (with SS = 0). SS = 0 is satisfied 
when the actual path xT (with the minimum value of S) obeys Newton’s second law. 
Hence, we have demonstrated that the principle of least action implies that the path 
having the minimum action is the classical one satisfying Newton’s law. This simple 
example illustrates for us the integral approach to a classical mechanical problem and 
demonstrates its equivalence to the usual differential approach by way of the familiar 
Newton’s second law.
An important remark is in place. The above derivation of S  has not shown that S  
is a m inim um indeed it may well also have been a maximum. This is what we have 
loosely meant by “least” when referring to the first-order change in the value of S  as 
being zero when the path is changed.
7.3 The Principle of “Least” A ction in Quantum  
Mechanics
Nearly six decades ago in the year 1942, Richard Feynman published a doctoral
thesis with the title “On the Principle of Least Action in Quantum Mechanics”5.
The material contained therein later appeared in a well-known paper in the Physical
Review as 11 Spacetime Approach to Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics”6. In this
work, Feynman draws on a proposal by Paul Dirac7 to develop an integral approach to
quantum mechanics that is shown to be equivalent to both the Schrodinger differential
and the Heisenberg matrix mechanics formulations.
5Feynman, R.P. (1942). (See also Feynman, R.P. and Hibbs, A.R. (1965)).
6Feynman, R.P. (1948). Reprinted in Schwinger, J. (ed.) (1958), p.321-341.
7Dirac, P.A.M. (1933). Reprinted in Schwinger, J. (1958), p.312-320.
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Consider the following comment from Feynman8, as he tries to give an “animated” 
account of the action of a photon - a quantum of light energy - as described by the 
integral approach,
B u t all your in stincts on cause and effect go haywire when 
you say that the particle decides to  take the path that is going 
to give the m in im um 9action. Does it usm ell” the neighboring 
paths to find out whether or not they have m ore action? In  
the case o f light, when we put blocks in the w ay so that the 
photons could not te s t all the paths, we found that they couldn’t 
figure out which way to go, and we had the phenom enon o f  
diffraction.
Is the sam e thing true in mechanics ? Is i t  true that the particle  
doesn’t ju s t Hake the right pa th” but it  looks a t all o ther possi­
ble trajectories ? A nd i f  having things in  the way, we don’t let it 
look, that we w ill get an analog o f diffraction? The m iracle o f 
i t  all is, o f  course, that i t  does ju s t that! T h a t’s what the laws 
o f quantum m echanics say. So our principle o f  least action  
is incom pletely stated. I t isn ’t that a particle takes the path  
o f least action but that i t  sm ells all the paths in  the neighbor­
hood and chooses the one that has the least action  by a m ethod  
analogous to the one by which light chose the sh ortest tim e.
You rem em ber that the way light chose the sh ortest tim e was 
this: I f  it  went on a path that took a different am ount o f  tim e, 
i t  would arrive at a different phase. A nd the to ta l am plitude  
at som e point is the sum  o f contributions o f am plitude fo r  all 
the different ways the light can arrive. A ll the paths that give 
w ildly different phases don’t add up to anything. B u t i f  you  
can find a whole sequence o f paths which have phases alm ost
8Feynman R.P. (1963b), p.19-9.
9Strictly speaking, an extremum.
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all the sam e, then the little contributions w ill add up and you  
get a reasonable to ta l am plitude to arrive. The im portan t path  
becomes the one fo r  which there are m any nearby paths which 
give the sam e phase.
I t  is ju s t exactly the sam e thing fo r  quantum  m echanics. The 
com plete quantum mechanics (for the non-relativistic  case and 
neglecting electron spin) works as follows: The probability that 
a particle staring a t point 1 at the tim e t\ will arrive  a t point 
2 a t tim e ti is the square o f a probability am plitude. The 
to ta l am plitude can be w ritten  as the sum  o f  the am plitudes 
fo r  each possible path - fo r  each way o f arriva l. For every x(t) 
that we could have - fo r  every possible im aginary trajectory - 
we have to calculate an am plitude. Then we add them  all to ­
gether. W hat do we take fo r  the am plitude fo r  each path? Our 
action  integral tells us what the am plitude fo r  a single path  
ought to be. The am plitude is proportional to  som e constant 
tim es exptS/h, where S  is the action fo r  that path. That is, i f  
we represent the phase o f the am plitude by a complex num ­
ber, the phase angle is S /h . The action S  has dim ensions o f  
energy tim es tim e, and the P lan ckfs constant h has the sam e  
dim ensions. I t is the constant that determ ines when quantum  
m echanics is im portant.
The consideration of the 11 different possible paths” that the motion of a particle 
may take makes the integral approach especially suitable to formulate a theory of 
probabilistic nature such as quantum mechanics. One may now speak comfortably 
and legitimately of a single particle being confronted with a number of possibilities 
corresponding to these different paths.
In the usual (Schrodinger) differential approach to quantum mechanics, we study
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the evolution of a wavefunction. But we also know that quantum systems reveal cor­
puscular properties. Following Born, we reconcile the ideas of a “definite” trajectory 
with probability considerations by the use of the concept of the wavefunction. As we 
have discussed, this is achieved by interpreting the wavefunction ip as an entity whose 
modulus square gives the probability distribution when an observation is made. It 
then appears that the “particle” does exist as a woolly ball of possibilities when it 
is not localized by an act of observation. There seems to be a discontinuity in the 
ontology between the wavefunction as representing mere possibilities and the particle. 
Moreover, statistical behaviours only reveal themselves en mass insofar as an ensem­
ble is concerned. This brings further complication as to whether ip may indeed be 
only meaningfully associated with the ensemble rather than the individual members 
of the ensemble, which are deprived of their supposed mathematical representation.
At this point comes Feynman’s enchanting magic. By drawing a close analogy 
with classical wave phenomena, he was able to recognize the essence of quantum 
mechanics: the simultaneous actions of a multitude of co-present possibilities for a 
single physical system. The classical integral approach to mechanics, founded on the 
least action principle, leads to the selection of the actual path in spacetime. But the 
integral formulation of quantum mechanics appeals to the intricate “mingling” of the 
“various possible routes” that are open to the system - the particle - in question.
With Feynman’s integral approach, we have relieved ourselves from the shaky 
pursuit of injecting the probabilistic feature in the the quantum mechanical formu­
lation via the interpretation of the wavefunction and all the conceptual difficulties 
to go with it. Rather, we may now rightfully entertain a picture with a single sys­
tem being subjected to different possibilities. In this sense, the probabilistic feature 
is introduced into the theory from the outset. However, as we shall see, quantum 
mechanics is no ordinary stochastic theory. It is dissimilar from any stochastic theory 
that is disciplined by the axioms of classical Kolmogorovian probability measures. 
The considerations of probabilities have to be drastically revised to accommodate 
the fact that the alternative possible routes are not necessarily mutually exclusive in 
their operations on the physical system. In fact, this new mode of behaviour (of the
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probabilistic potentials) is central to the explanation of the existence of interference 
effects. With these remarks, we now turn proper to an exposition of Feynman’s Sum- 
Over- H is to r ies , or the more commonly-known P ath  Integral Form ulation o f  
Quantum  M echanics.
7 . 4  Feynman’s Path Integral (Sum-Over-Histories) 
Formulation of Quantum M echanics
To sum m arize, when I  was done with th is, as a ph ysic is t I  had 
gained two things. One, I  knew m any different ways o f fo r ­
m ulating classical electrodynam ics, with m any different m ath­
em atical form s. I  got to know how to express the subject ev­
ery  which way. Second, I  had a poin t o f view  - the overall 
spacetim e point o f view - and a disrespect fo r  the H am iltonian  
m ethod o f describing physics.
The character o f quantum mechanics o f the day was to  w rite  
things in the fam ous H am iltonian way - in  the fo rm  o f  a differ­
ential equation, which described how the wavefunction changes 
from  instan t to in stan t, and in term s o f an operator H. I f  
the classical physics could be reduced to a H am ilton ian fo rm , 
everything was all right. N ow , least action  does n o t im ply a 
H am iltonian fo rm  i f  the action is a function  o f anything more 
than positions and velocities at the sam e m om ent. I f  the action  
is o f the fo rm  o f the integral o f a function  (usually called the 
Lagrangian) o f the velocities and positions a t the sam e tim e,
S  =  f£ (x , x)dt, then you s ta r t with the Lagrangian and then cre­
ate a H am iltonian and work out the quantum m echanics, more 
or less uniquely. B u t this thing10 involves the key variables, po­
sitions, a t two different tim es, and therefore it  was not obvious
10By which he refers to an action for the motions of charges.
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what to do to make the quantum-mechanical analogue.
These two excerpts have been taken from Feynman’s Nobel Lecture in 1966, 11 The 
Development of the Space-Time View of Quantum Electrodynamics”11. Feynman’s 
original motivation for developing an integral approach to quantum mechanics stems 
from the desire to generalize the Feynman-Wheeler absorber theory of classical elec­
trodynamics to the quantum regime. The absorber theory is centered upon the ideas 
of “advanced” and “retarded” waves to deal with the feature of back-reaction amongst 
charges and this necessitates the consideration of the phenomena at more than one 
time. Thus, the integral approach that encompasses events at more than one time is 
a natural approach. At that time, the only known method for making the transition 
from classical to the quantum regime was via the Hamiltonian formulation that de­
scribes events at each particular time. This set Feynman to make a desperate search 
for an alternative method of quantization via the integral route.
One indisputable milestone in Feynman’s quest is a paper by Dirac in 193312 in 
which some preliminary explorations concerning a Lagrangian approach to quantum 
mechanics is discussed. The important idea taken over by Feynman from Dirac’s 
paper is that of a quantum mechanical transformation function that connects the 
values of a set of variables at one time t to that at another time T. Such a function has 
been shown by Dirac to be “analogous to” the quantity expt f tTCdt/ h , It was Feynman 
who took the bold step forward and asserted that the vague phrase 11 analogous to”, as 
hesitatingly uttered by Dirac, should indeed be construed as 11 proportional to”. From 
this he convincingly demonstrated the recovery of the Schrodinger equation by the 
identification of the transformation function in quantum mechanics as exactly equal 
to exp'-A’*'*/*. This forms the starting point of our introduction to Feynman’s Path 
Integral method.
We first return to this “classical” question: in order to get from a certain point A  
in spacetime to another point B, which route should a particle take? This question 
is meaningful only insofar as there exists more than one route, in principle, that the
11Feynman, R.P. (1966), p.36.
12Dirac, P.A.M. (1933).
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particle may follow. By “in principle”, I mean in the absence of any considerations of 
whether it is in fact dynamically viable for the particle to do so. In a prima facie sense, 
there exist in principle, infinitely many paths that correspond to any combination of 
spacetime points along which the particle travels. Each of these paths represents a 
distinct possible route from A  to B.
Classically, as we have seen, out of the many possibilities, the particle follows the 
one that comes under the dynamical constraint of the value of its action being an 
extremum. Given infinitely many possibilities, there is one that is unique and actually 
realized.
The ontology of paths via the integral approach as opposed to the usual differ­
ential framework sets the scene for probabilistic considerations already in a classical 
setting13. It would therefore seem most natural to adopt such an ontology as we make 
the transition to quantum mechanics.
The real value of Feynman’s integral approach to quantum mechanics consists in 
the realization of the full potential of the concept 11 all possibilities" \ In quantum me­
chanics, all the “possible paths” act in concurrence to result in one single or resultant 
probabilistic potential that governs the motion of the particle.
The distinction between 11 one out of many possibilities actualizing (as in the 
classical domain) and “ all possibilities actualizing is reminiscent of our previous 
discussion of the difference in the behaviours of classical and quantum probabilistic 
potentials. Classical probabilistic potentials form a mutually exclusive set while their 
quantum counterparts do not form an exclusive one. The latter, as I have argued, is 
essential for the explanation of interference phenomena. It must be borne in mind that 
the objects (the electrons or photons) do not interfere but rather, the probabilistic 
potentials confronting them do!
This is what Feynman’s formulation does. Bypassing all the messy ontology that 
burdens the “mythical” wavefunction, the theory goes straight to periodic possibilities
13In fact, the concept of “paths” has been widely used in physical processes. An example of that is 
Brownian motion in which a particle undergoes a large number of “random” interactions and hence 
may be conceived of as being pursuing a kind of random-walk motion. Such classical processes are 
dealt with probabilistically.
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and their concurrent actions. As such, the theory deals with probabilistic considera­
tions directly. This is introduced into two fundamental postulates14,
P ostu la te  I
I f  an ideal m easurem ent is perform ed to determ ine whether 
a particle has a path lying in a region o f spacetim e, then the 
probability that the result w ill be affirm ative is the absolute 
square o f a sum  o f complex contributions, one from  each path 
in  the region.
P ostu la te  I I
The paths contribute equally in  m agnitude, but the phase o f  
their contribution is the classical action (in units o f h); i.e. 
the tim e integral o f the Lagrangian taken along the path.
Some of the terms that appear in the above postulates call for further clarification. 
First, by an “ideal measurement”, Feynman refers to15, “...a measurement is made 
which is capable only of determining that the path lies somewhere within R  (R is the 
spacetime region concerned)...The measurement is to be what we might call an “ideal 
measurement”. We suppose that no further details could be obtained from the same 
measurement without further disturbance to the system. I  have not been able to find 
a precise definition”.
The main obstacle in framing a precise definition of an “ideal measurement’ stems 
from the fact that the very act of locating the particle by a position measurement 
alters the dynamics of it. An “ideal measurement” is therefore best to be thought 
of as a kind of “quasi-measurement” that serves really as a means for us to know 
that the particle’s motion is contained somewhere in a region of spacetime but with 
no exactitude to pin it down to precise spatial points. This is best illustrated yet
14Feynman, R.P. (1948), p.371 and also in Schwinger, J. (ed.) (1958), p.325.
15ibid., p.370.
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again by the two-slit experiment (see Figure 5-5). The recording of whether a photon 
has fallen somewhere or another on the detection screen constitutes a measurement 
to evidence the fact that after its emission from the source, (the dynamics of) the 
photon has been confined to the region of spacetime between the source and the 
detection screen (via, of course, the two slits). This is the kind of measurement 
taken to be an ideal measurement and can be contrasted with a measurement that is 
performed, for instance, at the slit in order to find out whether it has traversed the 
slit or not. With the latter kind of measurement, one does not obtain a distribution 
of photons showing the distinctive interference pattern on the detection screen. Such 
kind of measurements bring inevitable disturbances to the system as more information 
is extracted from it. So why must one be so elaborate on the notion of an ideal 
measurement in postulate I?
The distinction of both types of measurements was first made by Wolfgang Pauli16. 
Pauli called an ideal measurement a measurement of the first kind17, “...if the result 
of using the measuring apparatus is not known, but only the fact of its use is known 
(the measured quantity is unknown after the measurement, but is determinate), the 
probability that the quantity measured has a certain  value is the sam e  
both before and a fter the m easurem ent.”
One can see from Pauli’s definition the crucial feature for an ideal measurement 
as one which brings no change to the probability that the quantity “measured” has 
a certain value. In the double-slit experiment, the presence of the slits has restricted 
the number of paths - the number of possible routes of the photon - to two, and these 
are the two contributions that find their ways into the calculation of the probability. 
One may think that this manner of restricting the number of possible routes of the 
photons by the two slits could constitute a kind of measurement. Although this is 
a reasonable way of thinking, “measurements” of such kinds would not generally be 
considered as actual measurements of the precise position of each photon. This is 
because, as far as each photon is concerned, it is still presented with two possibilities
16Pauli, W. (1980), p.75.
17ibid.
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as they are emitted from the source and these possibilities interfere! The entire setup, 
from the source to the detection screen via the two-slits together constitute an ideal 
measurement. We know that photons are emitted from the source and they eventually 
reach the detection screen. There is also the obvious information that they somehow 
traverse the two-slits (notice that I have taken care not to say “one” of the slits) 
and this accounts for the appearance of the interference pattern. In the case of no 
observation of photons at the slits , we know before the “measurement” (between 
the photon and the two slits) that there is the probability for the photon to traverse 
the two slits. However, once the photon has “passed” the slits (that is, after the 
“measurement”) and reaches the detection screen, all we know is still that the photon 
had a certain probability to traverse each of the slits. It is in this sense that our 
knowledge has not altered.
Moreover, upon the closure of one of the slits, the photons are given one distinct 
possible route and the interference pattern vanishes. Therefore, the manipulation 
of the apparatus within the spacetime region alters the behaviours of the photons 
and this is possible only if the photons have their existence within that very re­
gion. An ideal measurement therefore preserves the essential concurrent behaviours 
of probability-generating potentials in the quantum domain, which give rise to inter­
ference.
It must, however, be noted that Postulate I makes only a somewhat vague mention 
of “complex contributions” and the exact nature of these are clarified in Postulate II. 
Postulate I states that these complex contributions, one from each path in the region, 
are the main ingredients for the computation of the probability that a particle would 
make a transition from one spacetime point to another (both being those defining the 
region).
There is one more important point that emerges from Postulate I. Feynman gives 
the definition of a path as follows18,
A  path is f ir s t  defined only by the positions Xi through which it  
goes at a sequence o f  equally spaced tim e, t{ = U- 1  +  e.
18Feynman, R.P. (1948), p.371.
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The notion of a path is intended by Feynman to encompass a wider meaning than 
just the spatiotemporal path of a corpuscular entity that is relatively localized in 
space. As he remarks19,
W hen the system  has several degrees o f freedom  the coordinate 
space x has several dim ensions so that the sym bol x w ill rep­
resen t a se t o f coordinates (x l^\x^2\  .. . ,x ^ )  fo r  a system  with k 
degrees o f freedom . A path is a sequence o f configurations fo r  
successive tim es and is described by giving the configuration Xi 
or (x^\x^2\  . . . ,x ^ ) } i.e. the value o f each o f the k coordinates 
fo r  each tim e U.
One should not be seized by surprise that the concept of a path is to be generalized 
this way, especially when we recall that the term path is intended to mean a possibility 
or an alternative. This generalization enables us to deal with fields, a good example of 
a physical system with several degrees of freedom. A field is defined by a collection of 
spatial variables at each time and the collection as a whole changes from one time to 
another. The configuration at each of the successive times may therefore be thought 
of as collectively forming a “path”. We see once again that the more appropriate 
terminology of a “historif may be adopted to accommodate a temporal sequence of 
extended spatial configurations.
Postulate II serves two important functions,
(1) it provides the recipe for calculating the sum of the complex contributions and,
(2) it injects dynamical content into the probabilistic consideration by defining the 
phase of a contribution with the classical action along a path.
Discussions of the second postulate invariably center upon one worrying issue: the 
assumption that all paths contribute equally in magnitude. Given that every path, 
including the classical one xci(t), carry the same weight, how can it be possible to 
regain classical mechanics if the classical path is not in some sense favored?
19ibid.
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Three observations help to dispel this worry. First, it has been stated clearly in 
Postulate I that it is not the sum of the complex contributions but rather, the modulus 
square of this sum that gives the probability measure. Thus, the usual consideration 
of (equal) weights in the context of classical probabilities is not necessarily expected 
to strictly apply. The second observation has to do with the way we approach the 
problem. Be it classical or quantum mechanics, we start with the same problem: 
given that a particle travels from point A  to point B , which route should it take?
In the absence of information otherwise (for example, that there are obstacles 
placed between those two points), we must give all conceivable routes from A  to B  a 
democratic treatment and assign equal weight to each of them. The classical path is 
picked out by the requirement that it is one with its action being an extremum when 
compared to those actions along all the other paths between the two points. This 
requirement is an extra assumption notwithstanding that it is effective in recovering 
the classical path as described also by Newton’s second law. Different weights should 
therefore not be attached to any path in a prima facie fashion.
The third observation concerns the fact that if the complex contributions are 
to be identified with the probability-generating potentials that we have introduced, 
then we may consider the superposition of these contributions in an analogy to the 
superposition of forces in classical dynamics. It is true that when two forces, one that 
has twice the magnitude of the other, act simultaneously on a particle, the motion of 
the particle would naturally be more biased towards the influence of the larger force. 
In the case of the probability-generating potentials, the differences in magnitude of 
their respective influences have found their manifestation in the phases of the paths 
via the action functions <S’s.
Furthermore, the superposition of these complex contributions is a one-to-one 
affair - each potential contributes only once, as similar to the case of the forces so 
that the larger and the smaller forces both contribute once. In the case where they 
are two identical forces, we see them as a “single” resultant force with double the 
magnitude but this “single” force still contributes once. In a way the “weights” have 
been smuggled in through the magnitudes of the forces in the classical scenario; here
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the weights find their ways in through the phases. We ought also to emphasize that 
the phases are periodic in character so that the overall phase difference is responsible 
for the appearance of the interference pattern.
Feynman’s prescription is most simply illustrated by way of an elementary exam­
ple: the free particle. See Figure 7-4.
X(tN)
XN
XO
e e
Figure 7.4: The discrete approximation to a path x(t).
Figure 7-4 shows three examples of a path, labeled by x(t), that could be followed 
by a particle in reaching the spacetime point (x n ^ n )  from (xo, to). Following Feyn­
man, the sequence of times to < t\ < t2 ... < tn  is taken to be of equal spacing e. 
At each of these time points, the particle can take up a position anywhere between 
—oo and +oo. The procedure of “summing over all paths (or histories/ ’ amounts to 
integrating over each x(t{) (that is, all values of x  at each time point) from —oo and 
+oo to take account of all the possibilities. Once all the individual integrations at 
each of the x^’s are carried out, we then let N  go to the continuum limit (N —>oo) to 
signify that the integration is performed over every point t in the interval to to t 
Denoting the quantity whose modulus square is the probability of finding the path 
of a particle to lie in a specific region of spacetime R  by the two postulates
may now be combined to yield <p(R) as follows,
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/oo r oo r oo/ ... / exp[z<S[z(£)]/7i] x Ghidx2 ...dx;v_i (7-14)-oo./ -oo y -oo
Notice that the integration over all paths is carried out for all values of x{U) that 
lie between xq and x n - The two endpoints Xq and xn are left out of this procedure 
as they are both fixed and shared by all paths. The factor A  in front is required to
reach the correct scale for <j){R) when the limit N —>oo is taken.
To simplify the form of equation (7.14), we introduce the “shorthand” T>[x(t)] to 
symbolize the fact that an operation of integrating over all paths is performed and 
the equation may be rewritten as20,
/ X f f exp [iS[x(t)]/ti\V[x(t)\ (7-15)
xo
In order to proceed, we must obtain an expression for the action. As one needs 
only to deal with the presence of kinetic energy of the free particle, its action takes 
the most simple form,
/ t N  r ^ N  1 o  ,C{t)dt = / -m x  dt (7-16)
to J to
For our “discretized” paths, x  is approximated by Xi+1e Xi and equation (7.16) is 
thus modified as,
5 = Er=;i?(5±if^ )2e (7-17)
where e =  CNNtQ)- And so equation (7.14) becomes,
20The factor A  has been absorbed into T>[x(t)\.
To facilitate further computation, let us now switch variables from Xi to y* by the 
transformation,
»  = ( £ ) » *  P.19)
We then evaluate,
(j>{R) =  lim A! f  f  . . . f  exp[— 1 ^ t+1 , ] x dy1dy2...dyN- 1 (7.20)
N —>oo J  _ o o J  _ o o  J - o o  l~ u I
where A! = A{— )L^ .
'  771 /
Let us now begin by performing the y\ integration and focus on the part of the 
integrand just involving yi,
/ - o o exP(-7[(2/2 ~  V i f  +  (Vi -  2/o)2]}dyi 
=  exp{i(y22 -  2yiy2 +  2/i2 +  2/i2 -  2yiy0 +  Vo2)}dyi
=  exp{i[2yi2 -  2(y2 +  2/o)2/i +  (2/2 2 +  2/o2)]}dyi
=  exp[z(y22 +  yo2)] /! 0^  exp[2iyi2 -  2z(y2 +  y0)]yidyi
= exp[z(y22 +  y02)] f  exp{-(-2z)yi2 +  [-2z(y2 +  yoyi)]}dyi (7.21)
J  —oo
Using the following result for Guassian integrals,
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/ O O  9  q 2 ' j r  ,exp_aa: +&x dx = exp4a (—)2  (7.22)
— oo OL
with a  =  —2i and (3 = —2i(y2 4- yo), the integral in equation (7.21) thus becomes,
exp[%22 +  I/O2)] 6xp[( V0^ (7-23)
=  exp[i(y22 +  yo2) ] e x p [ ^ i ^ L ] ( ^ ) ^  (7,24)
=  (*!)* V? + 2^ °  +  »>*] (7.25)
2 2z
,i7 t^  r— ( 2/2 — 2/o)2 n /frnc^
=  ( y )  e x p [ 2i  '  ^ ^
In a similar manner, it may also be shown that the part of the integrand just involving 
2/i and 2/2 is evaluated as,
e x p l d a ^ a ! ! ]  (, . 2T)
and so forth.
And so the pattern emerges that if the process of integration is carried out (N —l) 
times, it will become,
( 7 .2 8 )
In terms of the original coordinates £*,
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At last, we are in a position to evaluate (j){R). Equation (7.18) becomes,
Thus,
We may now complete the integration procedure by letting N —>0 0 , e—»0 with 
Ne—>(tN — to). This is meaningful provided,
A = =  B~n  (7.32)m
Following Feynman, it is conventional to associate a factor with each of the 
N  — 1 integrations and the remaining factor with the overall process. Therefore, the 
precise meaning of the antecedent “sum-over-all-paths” consists in,
f v w t ) ] =  Km (7 .3 3 )J  N—KX),e—>0 B J  - 0 0  J  - 0 0  J - 0 0  B  B  B
where B  =  ( ^ 2 )5 .
'  771 '
The probability of finding the particle somewhere in the region R  is obtained 
by taking the modulus square of <p(R). In order to distinguish it from its modulus 
square, |</>(i?)|2, we call the quantity 4>(R) the “probability amplitude” . It remains to 
be shown that <j)(R) is equivalent to the propagator in the more familiar Schrodinger 
dynamics.
To give a favour before attempting a more vigorous derivation, we may consider 
a region of spacetime bounded by the temporal coordinates t and t' and call it R'.
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Analogously, another similar region of spacetime may be defined by t' and t" and we 
call it R". Defining R! and R" in this manner with respect to temporal coordinates 
enables one to make the assertion that since R! lies entirely previous to R", a proba­
bility can be associated with the path of the particle that had been in region R! and 
will be in region R", given that t1 is the present time. The amplitude we compute for 
region R' only depends on those times all previous to t! and emphatically so, it does 
not depend on the happenings to the system in those times that comes after tf.
We must first, however, remind the reader briefly about the propagator in the 
Schrodinger dynamics. One starts with the Schrodinger equation in the form of,
ih\i?) = H\tp) (7.34)
and the propagator is a unitary matrix which evolves the state vector ^(O)) at t =  0 
to |tp(t)) at t = t,
w ) )  =  m \ m ) -  (7-35)
It can be shown that in the basis of energy eigenvectors (those of the Hamiltonian 
H ), U(t) takes the form,
U(t) = ] r ^ | £ , a ) ( E , a | e x p — (7-36)
a E n
where a  is a degeneracy label.
For a free particle, the time dependent Schrodinger equation is reduced to,
^ (7.37)
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The energy eigenfunctions of the equation are solutions of the plane-wave form,
\tl>) = \E) exp —j~—- (7-38)
Feeding this into equation (7.37) above, one then obtains the time independent 
Schrodinger equation for | E),
H\E) =  j ^ |  E) =  E\E) (7.39)
w ithp =  ± (2 m F )2 .
Hence, there are two eigenstates associated with each eigenvalue E,
| E+) =  \p= (+ 2m E )i)
\E_) = \p = ( -2 m E )1*) (7.40)
One may use instead the compatible observable p that is non-degenerate and in 
the basis of the eigenkets |p) and according to equation (7.35), U(t) becomes,
m = (7-41)
To show its equivalence to </>(i?), U(t) must be expressed in the rr-basis and in 
terms of an orthogonal set of eigenvectors |x),
/
O O  —
_ ^ (x N\p){p\x0) exp (-^—ft)dp- (7.42)
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W ith (x n \p) = —^ - i - e x p ( ^ )  and (x0\p) = —^-r e x p (® ), equation (7.42)
^ 2 7 T 2 ^27Tiij 2
becomes,
=  ( ^ ) J Z exp(-iP(XNh X0) ) ' exp(S )dp' (7-43)
The integral is evaluated by reference to the standard Gaussian integral,
/oo —o 2 . , x , / 7T v I ,b2exp ( -a y  +  by)dy = (-)*  exp(— ) (7.44)a 4 a
with a = gjjj and 6 =  Therefore,
,  m  xi rim(a;^ v — xo)2, _
=  2M ] (7'46)
With t = tn  — to,
=  (27rfei(^  - t0))§ eXP[Tft(rC ~ toT1 ( 7 '4 7 )
which is the quantity 4>(R) obtained by the path integral method earlier.
We would also remark that one may make the transition to classical mechanics 
by appealing to the path-integral idea that the propagator is a sum over all paths of 
possibilities. In the classical regime where h—+0, the exponent in the expression for 
(f)(R) (equation(7.31)) becomes a rapidly oscillating function over each of the variables 
Xi. As the Zi’s vary, the positive and negative contributions very nearly cancel each 
other. The region at which Xi contributes most dominatingly is when the phase of
284
the exponent varies least rapidly with x .^ In other words, the overall contribution 
that obtains is when ^  = 0 for all values of Xi with S  being the action of a path.
The classical path is then the one with its action suffering no change in the first- 
order upon varying the path. What the path-integral has succeeded in telling us 
is that nature does not choose to pick the path with the action at an extremum as 
followed by a classical (macroscopic) system. Rather, because of the vast cancellations 
of the contributions from most paths in the classical regime as the quantum of action 
h approaches zero, only the one that is least affected by the fluctuations contributes to 
the overall dynamics and this is the classical path. On the classical level, the multitude 
of possibilities go through a procedure of self-adjustment (via phase cancellations) to 
leave us with one unique path.
This concludes our brief exposition of the basic ideas behind the Feynman’s Path- 
Integral Formulation of Quantum Mechanics.
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7.5 Feynman Paths and Causal Processes
In the final analysis, whether the “Feynman paths” qualify as causal processes is 
parasitic upon the fact of how well they fulfill, with suitable adjustments, the causal 
notions of histories, possession and transmission in accordance with HCQT.
H C Q T  defines a causal process as the “history of an object that transmits a 
conserved quantity ” with a “history” understood to be a sequence of events - either 
continuous or discrete - in spacetime. An object must have an identity over time (in 
the sense already discussed in Section 4.5), and we admit also entities with infinite 
degrees of freedom like fields in addition to those which are spatiotemporally localized.
Since it is in the nature of quantum phenomena that events at different times are 
to be considered together in a collective manner, so the idea of a history as referring 
to an entire sequence of events is best suited for thinking about quantum physics. 
Feynman’s histories - the possible paths - therefore provide just the paradigm for 
such a kind of history. Moreover, each of these histories corresponds to a possible 
dynamical evolution of the system in spacetime, giving a natural setting for incor­
porating probabilistic considerations at the fundamental level. In particular, the 
sum-over-all-paths procedure (that results in an overall probability amplitude </>(R)) 
reveals the peculiarity in the behaviours of probability-generating potentials - their 
simultaneous actions - which are in sharp contrast to their behaviours in the classical 
domain. As such, a causal process in the Feynman Path-Integral formulation is the 
overall probability amplitude - which arises from the sum-over-all-paths procedure - 
for the object to make a transition from one spacetime region to another.
Next, we must examine the sense in which such Feynman histories can be said 
to possess a conserved quantity and to transmit this quantity. One crucial element 
must not be overlooked. For causal transmission to make sense at all, some physical 
quantity or more precisely, some conserved quantity - the subject of transmission - 
must be present.
It is at once noticed that it is rather futile to speak about the possession of a 
conserved quantity in quantum mechanics, with the notion of possession so bound up
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with the definite values of the dynamical attributes of a physical system. Quantum 
mechanics tells us that it is no longer possible for us to entertain the idea of physical 
attributes having definite values before a measurement21. This being said, however, 
quantum systems do experience exchanges of energy and momentum as they interact. 
This is possible if the system is, in a sense, in possession of such quantities. But the 
notion of possession must now be widened to express the fact that even though no 
definite amount of a conserved quantity can be associated with the system, the system 
is to be thought of as having these quantities in the following sense22.
“Classical” conserved quantities such as energy and momentum find their ways 
into the Path-Integral formalism through the phase of each possible path or alter­
native. This is because the phase of each path is proportional to exp(^)<S[a;(t)] and 
<S[a:(t)], the classical action is dependent on C(x(t),x{t)), which is an explicit energy 
expression for every spacetime point along the path. Also because of the x(t) depen­
dence of C , momentum is considered as obtaining at every spacetime point along the 
path.
We now turn to the notion of transmission. Central to the criterion of causal 
transmission is the “at-af condition, which stipulates that a “quantity” is said to be 
transmitted from a spacetime point A  to another point B, if (and only if) the said 
quantity is possessed at A and at B and at every stage of the process between A and 
B, without any intersections that involve exchange of a conserved quantity.
Under the usual differential approach, given the quantity is to appear at A  and 
then at B, it is therefore quite natural to ask how the quantity gets from point A  to 
point B. Salmon’s reply, which has been rehearsed so many times, is that the quantity 
occupies all the intermediate points in turn between A  and B. It is not necessary, 
says Salmon, to ask how the quantity get from one point to the next. However, it can 
be easily argued, as have been quite ably so by various critics, that the differential
21A measurement would put the system into the eigenstate of the physical attribute in question. 
System in an eigenstate of a dynamical observable has a definite value of that attribute.
22It may be argued that since the overall Feynman probability amplitude is equivalent to the 
wavefunction, might we not consider the modulus square of this quantity as a conserved quantity 
as previously in Chapter 6? However, it must be borne in mind that we do not, strictly speaking, 
have a notion of wavefunction here and so it is only consistent if we refrain from speaking about 
conserved quantities via the continuity equation as derived from the Schrodinger evolution.
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approach emphasizes on the transition from one intermediate point to another.
In Feynman’s approach, a phase is associated with each possible path between 
two points. Within the sum-over-paths procedure, one finally takes the limit e—>0 so 
that one essentially considers the entire set of the spacetime points between the two 
specific points A  and B ; and thus skillfully avoids the question of how to get from 
one (intermediate) point to the next. In this manner, the Path-Integral approach 
considers all the spacetime points at once in-between two specific points. There is 
a single probability amplitude (j){R) (whose modulus square gives the probability) of 
finding the particle to make a transition from its position at point A  to that at point 
B . In effect, a transition probability \<j)(R)\2 between two spacetime point is what 
is rightly referred to when one speaks of transmission in quantum mechanics. The 
probability for a particle to make a transition from one spacetime point to another 
is thus dependent on the energy and momentum being defined at every spacetime 
point in-between the two endpoints. As so, the condition of “possessing a conserved 
quantity at every spacetime point” in the “at-af criterion is satisfied.
Hence, the Path Integral paradigm stays far more akin and faithful to Salmon’s 
original intention for the “at-af criterion, but with also the benefit of circumvent­
ing the need to address the question of “how exactly the intermediate points are 
traversed?”
However, the notion of transmission is defined in the absence of intersections that 
involve exchange of a conserved quantity. To be sure, any exchange of conserved 
quantities like energy or momentum would find its way in the adjustment of the 
phase. As I have argued in Section 6.4, one ought to specify that intersections, which 
destroy the quantum essence of superposition are the ones that should be absent in 
causal processes. These are the non-ideal measurements as opposed to the ideal ones 
discussed in Section 7.4 above.
Recall that the intended function of the stipulation of “the absence of any in­
tersections that involve exchange of a conserved quantity” within the definition of 
transmission is to capture the fact that processes that are genuinely causal are able 
to sustain themselves without the assistance of outside sources. So is there any sense
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this important feature of transmission has been captured?
One thing we can be sure is that if the view of the superposition behaviours of 
probabilistic potentials in the quantum regime is taken seriously, then the description 
of a physical process like a photon is very much intertwined with its environment. 
In the two-slit experiment, the probability amplitude for the location of the photon 
takes account of the presence of the two slits. Such an “intersection” between the 
photon and the slits, however, does not sustain the photon in the sense that the 
environment may be altered (with the two slits removed for example) but we still 
obtain a probability distribution of the photon, albeit one that is different from the 
distribution when the slits are present. And this gives an indication that the photon 
is not sustained by the interactions with the slits.
Conveniently, one finds also, in the Path-Integral paradigm, the reply to the objec­
tions raised by the modalist. The chief criticism from the modal camp on the process 
causation view hinges upon the concern that the view does not explain why the par­
ticle takes a particular course but not others. In the context of classical physics, it 
is reasonable to put forth such an argument. The way that classical mechanics is 
formulated makes it remain agnostic as to this line of attack. Classically, the least 
action principle would not improve the situation: the appeal to the path being one 
with its action at the extremum would only delay the issue, for the modalist can 
effortlessly come up with a similar objection that it has not been explained as to why 
the path with an extremum action ought to be the one that the particle chooses to 
follow.
The Path-Integral paradigm, however, provides a twist in the debate. On this 
view, one considers all possibilities - all potential paths - the superposition of which 
results in a single “effective” probabilistic potential to “guide” the particle along in 
spacetime. This gives a stern reply to the modalist - it provides just a mechanism to 
pick out the “favored” path. This is demonstrated most convincingly in the transition 
from the quantum to the classical regime in the limit where ft—>0. It is emphatically 
not the case that the particle chooses a particular path. Rather, all possibilities are 
utilized with each contributing equally. However, as Ti—>0, the phases associated with
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each path superpose either constructively or destructively, leaving only the one, which 
corresponds to the constructive superposition of phases, to survive and dominate and 
this is the classical trajectory.
7.6 Postlude
It is the aim of the last three chapters of this thesis to generalize the notion of causal 
processes in the theories of Salmon and Dowe to the realm of the microscopic quantum 
world. Chapter 5 explained the basic principles and peculiar features in the physical 
descriptions of quantum phenomena. In particular, the idea of probability-generating 
potentials was put forward to highlight the important differences between classical 
and quantum phenomena. It was argued that the difference essentially consists in 
the behaviours of the quantum probability-generating potentials from their classical 
counterparts. Quantum probability-generating potentials superpose and act in a si­
multaneous manner on a physical system, while classical ones operate in a mutually 
exclusive manner so that if one has been found to have acted on a certain occasion, 
the others would have ceased from their operations accordingly23. The superposition 
of probability-generating potentials is used to explain the appearance of interference 
characteristics exhibited in the probability distribution of photons in the paradig­
matic example of two-slit experiment. Similarly, mutual exclusivity experienced in 
the activities of the probabilistic potentials is responsible, as has been argued, for the 
observation of normal statistical behaviours as expected from classical probability 
theory.
The double-slit experiment also brings to light the intimate relationship between 
the notion of a spacetime path of a particle - which forms the single most important 
element in the notion of a causal process - with probabilistic considerations. For the 
classical probabilist, randomness lies with the emission of photons by the source but 
once emitted into a particular direction, a photon is expected to follow a “prescribed” 
definite track. If its track is so directed to enable it to pass without hindrance through
23In other words, classical probability generating potentials cannot be operating in a simultaneous 
manner.
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“one of the two slits”, then it would certainly register itself on the detection screen at 
the far end. Under this circumstance, the two slits serve the purpose of selecting two 
mutually exclusive subsets of particles (in the sense that having a definite trajectory 
means the particle cannot be at the same time be travelling along another distinct 
trajectory) out of all subsets that correspond to the possible emission of photons in 
a 47r solid-angle.
For the quantum probabilist, things take on a very different outlook altogether. 
The interference pattern displayed in the distribution of recorded photons is not 
one that is expected from classical reasoning. Classically, the possessions of definite 
trajectories imply that the trajectories of the emitted photons, with especially the 
two subsets selected by the slits, form a mutually exclusive set; as a result of which a 
distribution that obeys the sum-rule of probability (one that shows no interference) 
obtains.
However, the actual distribution with the characteristics of interference is not one 
that arises should the sum-rule be conformed to. From this we conclude that the 
“trajectories” do not form a mutually exclusive set. In other words, the photon is in 
some sense “associated with” both trajectories. I have taken extra care not to use the 
expression “travelling in” (both trajectories), for it would prove most disconcerting as 
to the meaning of an spatiotemporally localized corpuscular entity to be “spreaded- 
out” between two trajectories - two distinctively localized lines of spacetime points - 
that only extended entities in spacetime are capable of.
The appearance of the interference characteristics further supports a view of an 
extended entity. Thus the “wavefunction” whose mathematical form is inspired by 
the extended physical wave was invented. The very fact that the interference pattern 
emerges even with the individual photons reaching the screen one at a time implies 
that such a “waveform” cannot be identified with that of a classical wave, and we 
have seen that it had to acquire its meaning through a probabilistic interpretation 
(its modulus square gives the probability distribution of photons).
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The whole procedure seems artificial: having to associate a wave with the particle24 
and then to impose an (probabilistic) interpretation on it. In addition, this differential 
approach that deals with the wavefunction evolving forward at each time presents 
tremendous difficulties when an event at a different spacetime point appears to play 
a crucial part in determining the behaviour of the wavefunction at a specific spacetime 
point. A concrete example, which I discussed in the second half of Chapter 6, is when 
detectors are placed at the slits to track which of the two slits a photon has come 
through, and the presence of these detectors alters dramatically the behaviour of the 
wavefunction at a spatial point some distance away.
In view of these difficulties, it is appropriate to adopt a formulation of quantum 
mechanics that takes seriously the nature of the interdependence amongst events at 
different times. We have seen that such an approach exists and was introduced by 
Feynman as the Path-Integral approach to quantum mechanics. In this approach, 
the notion of a “path” enters at the most fundamental level. This is not a path in 
spacetime in the ordinary construal of the word, but is closely related to the latter 
as it corresponds to the possibility of a particle taking on specific values for certain 
dynamical variables at specific spacetime points. No special favoritism is shown at the 
outset as to which one of all the possible paths is to dominate. Rather, each of these 
possibilities contributes on an equal basis to the final eventuality. However, in order to 
take into account the full consequences of quantum phenomena, one must extract and 
take over from the wave description the periodic nature of these potentials. Periodicity 
is then introduced as the phase of each “path”. As these paths or potentials operate, 
their relative phases may either reinforce or cancel each other to various degrees, 
in much the same way that real physical waves interfere. The final “dominating” 
potential is the product of the aggregation of the phases of each contributing potential 
or possibility. It is also through the notion of “paths” as alternatives that probabilistic 
considerations enter at the most fundamental level.
But the question of interest is whether there is a difference between the Feynman
24This alone appears to be a natural move as a “tightly-packed” wavepacket formed by the su­
perposition of a large number of Fourier modes would give the localized property of a corpuscular 
entity.
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approach and that of the wavefunction. I would say “yes from standpoint of process 
causation” . The argument goes as follows. In wave mechanics, one speaks of the 
wavepacket as composed of a large number of Fourier modes. Because of the prin­
ciple of superposition, a linear combination of any number of these Fourier modes 
would satisfy the Schrodinger equation. The larger the number of modes superposed, 
the more localized is the wavepacket. This localization of the wavepacket is then 
identified with the precision in locating the particle. However, despite its relatively 
localized position, a wavepacket is a “spread-out” entity and its “fuzziness” depends 
largely upon the number of Fourier modes that are in superposition. Because of the 
uncertainty, one may not speak about the trajectory of a particle in a straightforward 
sense. As a result, this poses problems on a fundamental level for engaging in causal 
talk in the quantum domain .
Feynman’s Path-Integral approach, on the other hand, has a distinct advantage 
over the Schrodinger wavefunction approach. In this picture, the classical character 
of the localization of a particle is very much retained. And this particle would then 
be subjected to the action of probabilistic potentials as analogous to the case of forces 
acting on particles that we find ourselves so familiar with in classical physics. This 
enables us to adopt a kind of propensity view like the one expounded by Popper and 
to speak of probability on a singular level. The concerted effort of the probabilistic 
potentials acts on every single particle. Classical determinism consists in the fact 
that our acting potential, the mechanical force, produces the “same” single effect 
on a particle. In contrast, the aggregate action of the quantum potentials produces 
not one but a multitude of effects on an ensemble of identically prepared particles. 
In spite of the probabilistic complications, a photon emitted from a source is sent 
through the two-slits apparatus (and gets registered on the screen) by these quantum 
probabilistic potentials. Arguably, a formulation with these potentials placed at its 
core forms a natural foundation for causation on the quantum level.
There are causal processes a la H C Q T in quantum mechanics. These are the 
probability-generating potentials - as probability amplitudes obtained by the “sum- 
over-all-paths” procedures in the Feynman Path Integral approach. They provide an
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underlying mechanism for the production of quantum phenomena; they propel the 
system through a multitude of possibilities. Because of the all encompassing aspect of 
the system and its environment, these causal processes in quantum mechanics amount 
to more than just the spatiotemporal trajectory of the system itself.
The entanglement of probabilistic potentials imposes upon us the view of these 
histories as “holistic” entities, rather than paying attention to the individual members 
of the sequence. In this way, Salmon’s intention for causal processes as “ropes of 
causation” is fulfilled more profoundly on the quantum level.
However, there remain unfinished businesses. It is natural for one to proceed 
to elucidate the notion of interaction in the quantum context via the Path-Integral 
approach to the subject of quantum field theory.
There exist recent approaches25 in theoretical physics that are founded on the 
notion of “histories” and it would be of great interest to analyze how the ideas behind 
these approaches bear on process causation.
Finally, the very structure of spacetime with respect to its continuous nature has 
deep implications for the notion of causal process and causation and it would indeed 
be a holy grail of both philosophy and physics to understand the nature of spacetime 
and its relation to causation.
25I have in mind, in particular, the so-called “Consistent Histories” or “Decoherent Histories” 
approaches of Omnes, R. (1994), Griffiths, R.B. (1984) and Gell-Mann, M. and Hartle, J.B. (1990). 
For a shorter and user-friendly introduction, see Gell-Mann, M. (1994). A detailed survey can be 
found in Omnes, R. (1992).
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